Jonathon Sinclair v. Department of the Interior

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedOctober 21, 2022
DocketSF-0752-16-0565-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jonathon Sinclair v. Department of the Interior (Jonathon Sinclair v. Department of the Interior) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jonathon Sinclair v. Department of the Interior, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JONATHON M. SINCLAIR, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-16-0565-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, DATE: October 21, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jonathon M. Sinclair, Henderson, Nevada, pro se.

Shari Mauney, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member Member Limon recused himself and did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decisio n, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 On September 7, 2014, the agency used a Veterans Recruitment Appointment (VRA) authority under the Jobs for Veterans Act, Pub. L. No. 107-288, 116 Stat. 2033 (2002), to appoint the appellant to the excepted-service position of Mail Clerk, GS-0305-05. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 21. On August 9, 2015, the appellant began a new VRA with the agency in the excepted-service position of Warehouse Helper, BB-6907-00. Id. at 17-19. The appointment documentation informed him that he was required to satisfactorily complete a new 2-year trial period. Id. On June 2, 2016, the agency terminated his appointment, citing misconduct on May 24-25, 2016. Id. at 14-16. ¶3 On June 17, 2016, the appellant filed the instant appeal with the Board. IAF, Tab 1. After issuing an order on jurisdiction informing the appellant of his burdens and reviewing the parties’ responses, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding the requested hearing. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. 3

¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has not filed a response.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶5 Whether the Board has appellate jurisdiction by statute in a removal or other adverse action depends on whether the appellant is a Federal “employee” as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1). Smirne v. Department of the Army, 115 M.S.P.R. 51, ¶ 5 (2010). The appellant asserted below, and the agency did not dispute, that he was a preference-eligible veteran detailed to the Warehouse Helper position from May 14, 2015, until his official appointment to that position on August 9, 2015. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, 8. As a preference eligible in the excepted service, the appellant would need to have completed 1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar positions with the agency in order to have appeal rights before the Board. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B); ID at 5. ¶6 We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s service on a detail does not entitle him to the rights of the position to which he was detailed and therefore cannot be credited toward his completion of 1 year of service in the same or similar positions. ID at 5; see Wafford v. U.S. Postal Service, 34 M.S.P.R. 691, 693 (1987). We further find that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that his Mail Clerk position was the “same or similar” to his Warehouse Helper position in that they did not involve related or comparable work that required the same or similar skills. See Martinez v. Department of Homeland Security, 118 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 9 (2012) (citing Mathis v. U.S. Postal Service, 865 F.2d 232, 234 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). The appellant failed to make even a bare assertion that the Mail Clerk and Warehouse Helper positions were the same or similar. IAF, Tabs 1, 6; PFR File, Tab 1. Nor does the record contain any information regarding the duties of the positions. Accordingly, the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he was an “employee” with Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. 4

¶7 On review, the appellant alleges for the first time that his termination was based on partisan political reasons and/or preappointment reasons. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. As with career or career-conditional employees, individuals who are terminated during the first year of their VRA may appeal to the Board if they contend that they were terminated based on partisan political reasons, their marital status, or for reasons based on conditions arising before their appointment without being afforded the procedural due process rights set forth at 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. LeMaster v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 2 n.1 (2016); 5 C.F.R. §§ 307.105, 315.806. Although the administrative judge informed the appellant of the Board’s jurisdiction over such matters, IAF, Tab 3 at 4-5, the appellant failed to make any assertion below that his termination was based on such reasons, IAF, Tabs 1, 6. Because the appellant raised this argument for the first time on review, and he has not shown that he based his argument on new and material evidence not previously available despite his due diligence, the Board will not consider it. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). ¶8 For the reasons set forth above, we deny the appellant’s petition for review and affirm the initial decision dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1).

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Jonathon Sinclair v. Department of the Interior, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jonathon-sinclair-v-department-of-the-interior-mspb-2022.