Jonathon Gustafson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals·Decided June 17, 2015·No. 05A02-1410-CR-752·Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jun 17 2015, 9:06 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Brandon E. Murphy Gregory F. Zoeller Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Cynthia L. Ploughe Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jonathon Gustafson, June 17, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No. 05A02-1410-CR-752 v. Appeal from the Blackford Circuit Court Cause No. 05C01-1403-FB-89 State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable Dean A Young, Judge

Barnes, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1410-CR-752 | June 17, 2015 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary

[1] Jonathon Gustafson appeals his twenty-year executed sentence for convictions

for three counts of burglary as Class B felonies. We affirm.

Issue

[2] The issue is whether Gustafson’s twenty-year sentence is inappropriate in light

of his character and offenses.

Facts

[3] Between November 2013 and March 2014, Gustafson broke into three different

residences and stole property. For these offenses collectively, Gustafson was

charged with four counts of burglary as Class B felonies, one count of aiding

burglary as a Class B felony, and two counts of theft as Class D felonies.

Pursuant to a plea agreement entered with the State, Gustafson pled guilty to

three counts of burglary as Class B felonies. The State agreed to dismiss the

remaining counts as well as a case pending in another county. The agreement

also stipulated that the sentences for the three guilty pleas would run

concurrently, although the trial court retained discretion as to the duration of

the sentences.

[4] At the sentencing hearing, Gustafson explained that he had a drug addiction

and expressed interest in participating in a State-facilitated treatment program.

He agreed to pay restitution to the victims and urged the trial court to consider

a term of probation in his sentence, which would allow him to work to pay the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1410-CR-752 | June 17, 2015 Page 2 of 6 restitution. The State recommended that the trial court impose the maximum

applicable sentence of twenty years.

[5] The trial court found Gustafson’s criminal history and his lack of initiative to

address his substance-abuse problem as aggravating factors. The trial court

cited hardship to Gustafson’s minor child, his cooperation in the case, and his

expression of remorse as mitigating factors. The trial court qualified, however,

that given Gustafson’s criminal history, this articulation of remorse was

accorded little weight.

[6] The trial court sentenced Gustafson to the maximum sentence of twenty years

for each of the three counts, to run concurrently. Gustafson now appeals.

Analysis

[7] Gustafson argues that the trial court’s imposition of the twenty-year executed

sentence is inappropriate. We assess whether Gustafson’s sentence is

inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of his character and

the nature of the offense. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind.

2007). Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be “extremely” deferential to

a trial court’s sentencing decision, we still must give due consideration to that

decision. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We

also understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its

sentencing decisions. Id. “Additionally, a defendant bears the burden of

persuading the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.” Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1410-CR-752 | June 17, 2015 Page 3 of 6 [8] The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the

outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged

with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived

‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind.

2008). We “should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than

the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the

sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is inappropriate

ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime,

the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a

given case. Id. at 1224. When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence

under Rule 7(B), we may consider all aspects of the penal consequences

imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including whether a

portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023,

1025 (Ind. 2010).

[9] Our review of Gustafson’s character reveals that he is twenty-seven years old

and has one son, whom he has custody of and financially supports. Gustafson

is addicted to opiates and other prescription medication and believes his

criminality is motivated by his drug dependency. While Gustafson’s

recognition of his addiction and professed desire to seek treatment is

commendable, the fact that Gustafson “has a substance abuse problem is not

necessarily a factor that weighs in favor of a lesser sentence.” Marley v. State, 17

N.E.3d 335, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. The trial court properly

reasoned that any mitigating treatment accorded to Gustafson’s recognition of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1410-CR-752 | June 17, 2015 Page 4 of 6 his drug problem is tempered by the fact that, although he is aware of his

problem, he previously has not taken steps to address or treat it. See Hape v.

State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Gustafson’s

criminal history includes a juvenile adjudication and three felony convictions

for residential entry, receiving stolen property, and burglary. This criminal

history, involving offenses similar to those underlying Gustafson’s appeal,

indicates a defiance to rehabilitation and “disregard for law and authority.”

Clark v. State, 26 N.E.3d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Although Gustafson

expressed remorse for the burglaries, the trial court found that Gustafson’s

criminal history belied this sentiment, rendering it a “hollow gesture.” Tr. p.

49. Because it witnessed Gustafson’s apology and demeanor first hand,

“substantial deference must be given to the trial court’s evaluation of remorse.”

Sharkey v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1074, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[10] As to the nature of the offenses, Gustafson committed three burglaries of

different residences within less than a six-month period. Cf. Buchanan v. State,

Jonathon Gustafson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

Jonathon Gustafson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Jonathon Gustafson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Davidson v. State
926 N.E.2d 1023 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2010)
Cardwell v. State
895 N.E.2d 1219 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2008)
Anglemyer v. State
868 N.E.2d 482 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Buchanan v. State
767 N.E.2d 967 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2002)
Hape v. State
903 N.E.2d 977 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2009)
Rutherford v. State
866 N.E.2d 867 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2007)
Sharkey v. State
967 N.E.2d 1074 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2012)
Wendy Thompson v. State of Indiana
5 N.E.3d 383 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2014)
Brian M. Marley v. State of Indiana
17 N.E.3d 335 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2014)
Justin J. Clark v. State of Indiana
26 N.E.3d 615 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2014)