Jonathan Taylor v. Teresa Jill Adams

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio)
• Decided: February 25, 2026
• Docket: 04-25-00721-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-25-00721-CV

Jonathan TAYLOR, Appellant

v.

Teresa Jill ADAMS, Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024-CV-07358 Honorable Cesar Garcia, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 25, 2026

VACATED AND DISMISSED

On October 31, 2025, appellant Jonathan Taylor filed a notice of appeal, and shortly

thereafter, the clerk’s record was filed. The clerk’s record shows this appeal arises out of a forcible

detainer action and the county court at law signed a judgment of possession in favor of appellee

Teresa Jill Adams on October 30, 2025. The record further shows appellant did not pay a

supersedeas bond to stay execution of the judgment, and the county court at law subsequently

issued a writ of possession to enforce the judgment. The writ of possession was executed on 04-25-00721-CV

December 18, 2025, and the officer’s return on the executed writ of possession states possession

of the premises was delivered to appellee.

We have a duty to examine our own jurisdiction. Guillen v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 494 S.W.3d

861, 865 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). We lack jurisdiction to decide moot

appeals. Briones v. Brazos Bend Villa Apts., 438 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession

of the property. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of the City of San Antonio,

198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006); see also TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 24.001–.002. An appeal of a

judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action becomes moot if the judgment is not timely

superseded, the appellant is no longer in possession, and the appellant does not have a potentially

meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 786–87.

Because the record shows appellant did not pay a supersedeas bond to stay execution of

the October 30, 2025 judgment and the writ of possession was subsequently executed, this appeal

may be moot. See id. We therefore ordered appellant to file a written response February 12, 2026

explaining: (1) whether he had a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession

of the property; and (2) why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot. We admonished appellant

that a failure to timely respond and show how this court has jurisdiction would result in a dismissal

of this appeal.

Appellant did not file a response. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and

dismiss the case as moot. See id.

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