Jonathan Routier v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Russell Circuit Court: CV-22-900158).

• Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: May 23, 2025
• Docket: CL-2024-0368
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: May 23, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025 _________________________

CL-2024-0368 _________________________

Jonathan Routier

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Russell Circuit Court (CV-22-900158)

PER CURIAM.

Jonathan Routier appeals from a judgment of the Russell Circuit

Court ("the trial court") ordering the forfeiture of $47,013. For the

reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the trial court did not have

jurisdiction over the money; therefore, its judgment is void, and we

dismiss the appeal with instructions. CL-2024-0368

Background

On September 19, 2022, the State of Alabama ("the state")

commenced in the trial court a forfeiture action against Routier seeking

the money that law-enforcement officials seized during an investigation

into whether H&R Autos ("H&R") was being used as a "front" to move

stolen vehicles. Routier co-owned H&R, a business located in Phenix City

that sold used vehicles. The state commenced the action pursuant to the

Alabama Comprehensive Criminal Proceeds Forfeiture Act, § 15-5-60 et

seq., Ala. Code 1975, which allows the forfeiture of any proceeds derived

from the commission of a felony offense. § 15-5-61(a), Ala. Code 1975. A

person who knowingly owns, operates, or conducts a motor vehicle theft

facility is guilty of a class C felony. § 32-8-88(b), Ala. Code 1975.

At the outset of the trial, Routier contended that the forfeiture

action was due to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

because, he said, law-enforcement officials seized the money in Georgia.

Therefore, he said, Georgia and not Alabama had jurisdiction over any

forfeiture proceedings regarding the money. After hearing the parties'

arguments, the trial court denied Routier's motion.

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During the trial, the trial court heard testimony from two law-

enforcement officials involved in the investigation. The evidence relevant

to this appeal indicated that the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency

("ALEA") was part of the investigation concerning whether H&R was

connected to the sale of stolen vehicles in east Alabama and west Georgia.

ALEA Special Agent Senior Donald Carter testified that his lieutenant,

Darrell Seymour, had directed him to conduct surveillance at H&R to

determine whether there were certain vehicles on the lot that ALEA had

identified as possibly using fraudulent vehicle-identification numbers

("VINs"). Carter testified that he drove by H&R's lot but that he did not

see any of the vehicles that ALEA had suspected of having fraudulent

VINs. He then drove by Routier's residence in Columbus, Georgia, and

saw two of the vehicles with questionable VINs; he could see the dealer

plate on one of the vehicles. Carter testified that he reported his results

to his lieutenant, who asked him to travel to Buena Vista, Georgia, to see

whether two other allegedly stolen vehicles were there. Carter said that

when he located those vehicles in Buena Vista, he reported back to his

lieutenant, and "[ALEA was] able to do more intel work into other

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events." One of those vehicles did not have a car tag, Carter said, but the

other vehicle had a dealer tag that was issued to H&R.

Based on his surveillance and other research, Carter said, ALEA

contacted law-enforcement officials in Columbus, and they planned a

joint operation involving the suspected car-theft ring. Search warrants

were issued for five locations in east Alabama and west Georgia,

including H&R and Routier's house. Law-enforcement officials from

various agencies executed the warrants at the same time on August 10,

2022, Carter said. He testified that he went to H&R but did not find

anything illegal or out of the ordinary. He said he then went to Routier's

house in Columbus, where, pursuant to one of the warrants, Columbus

law-enforcement officers recovered three of the four vehicles that were

the subjects of their investigation and seized the money at issue in this

matter.

Carter said that he did not take possession of the money at that

time. He said that Georgia officials took the money but that he was later

contacted by the lead investigator in Georgia, who told him that the

Georgia district attorney involved in the matter had determined that the

money did not "fall squarely within [Georgia's] statute, and that

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[Alabama had] better jurisdiction." At that point, Carter said, he gave

paperwork to the Russell County District Attorney's office for the

forfeiture of the money to be carried out. Carter testified that he did not

have any further involvement in the investigation. The record does not

contain any evidence indicating that the State of Georgia initiated

forfeiture proceedings or had any other involvement with the money once

it was turned over to Alabama law-enforcement officials.

ALEA Special Agent Senior James Conner testified that he

specialized in identifying vehicles with fraudulent VINs or with "cloned"

VINs. His testimony involved how stolen vehicles are identified. He said

that the Columbus, Georgia, police department seized about $47,000 as

part of the investigation into H&R. He acknowledged that, potentially,

some or all of that money could have come from legitimate sales of used

vehicles.

On April 16, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment condemning

the $47,013 in currency that law-enforcement officials had seized from

Routier's house, and it divided that amount among the law-enforcement

agencies from both Alabama and Georgia that were involved in the

investigation. It also directed that a certain portion of the money be used

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to pay court costs and the costs of maintaining the forfeiture action. The

judgment did not contain any findings of fact. Routier did not file a

motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. On May 20, 2024, he filed

a notice of appeal.

Analysis

Routier contends that the trial court's judgment ordering the

forfeiture of the money seized from his house in Columbus is void

because, he says, no "qualifying offense" occurred in Alabama and

Alabama did not have the authority to seize property in another state. In

support of his contention, Routier refers to the general proposition that,

for an Alabama court to acquire jurisdiction, the res must be " 'validly

seized and brought within the control of the court.' " Garrett v. State, 739

So. 2d 49, 52 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting City of

Gadsden v. Jordan, 760 So. 2d 873 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), reversed on

other grounds, 760 So. 2d 877 (Ala. 1999)). He argues that because the

"seizing agency" in this matter was a Georgia law-enforcement agency,

jurisdiction over the seizure was in Muscogee County, Georgia.1

1We take judicial notice that Columbus, where Routier lived, is in

Muscogee County, Georgia.

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We find the latter contention dispositive; therefore, we pretermit

consideration of Routier's argument that no "qualifying office" occurred

in Alabama and discuss only his argument that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction over the money, which was property seized in another state.

Section 20-2-93(9), Ala. Code 1975 (which is applicable to the forfeiture

action pursuant to § 15-5-63, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Alabama

Comprehensive Criminal Proceeds Forfeiture Act), defines a "seizing

agency" as "[a] state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency or

department that seizes property in accordance with this section." The

state acknowledges that § 20-2-93 does not specifically address the

circumstances of this case but argues that there is nothing in Alabama's

statutes regarding forfeiture that forbids the transfer of seized money

between law-enforcement agencies. The state contends that jurisdiction

over the forfeiture action for the money found in Routier's house that was

subsequently transferred to Alabama law-enforcement officials fell

within the trial court's statutory jurisdiction.

In its appellate brief, the state observes that this is a "unique"

situation that Alabama courts have not addressed. In his appellate brief,

Routier says that he also found no Alabama law on point, and our own

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research revealed no such authority. In support of his contention that an

Alabama court did not have jurisdiction to consider the forfeiture action

for the money seized in Georgia, Routier relies on a case from the Georgia

Court of Appeals, Morrow v. State of Georgia, 186 Ga. App. 615, 367

S.E.2d 854 (1988). In that case, on two occasions, Morrow had driven a

1982 Honda automobile ("the Honda"), which was registered in his name,

from his house in Tennessee to Fannin County, Georgia, where he sold

cocaine to an undercover agent of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation

("the GBI"). 186 Ga. App. at 615, 367 S.E.2d at 855. When Morrow

traveled to Georgia to sell cocaine to the undercover agent a third time,

he was arrested. On that occasion, he drove a borrowed vehicle. Id.

About a week after Morrow's arrest, Tennessee law-enforcement

officials executed a search warrant based on information that the GBI

had provided and seized the Honda from Morrow's residence. An

investigator from Fannin County, Georgia, "acting at the direction of the

Fannin County District Attorney but without benefit of judicial process,"

traveled to Tennessee, took possession of the Honda, and delivered it into

the custody of the Fannin County sheriff. 186 Ga. App. at 615, 367 S.E.2d

at 855-56. The State of Georgia then filed a petition for condemnation

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and forfeiture of the Honda, alleging that it had been used to facilitate

the transportation of cocaine, in violation of Georgia law. 186 Ga. App. at

615, 367 S.E.2d at 856. The Georgia trial court entered a summary

judgment condemning Morrow's interest in the Honda. 186 Ga. App. at

615, 367 S.E.2d at 855.

In reversing the forfeiture judgment, the Georgia appellate court

observed that the Fannin County investigator who took the Honda from

Tennessee did not do so pursuant to judicial process, but, instead, "he

simply took the vehicle from the custody of the Tennessee authorities"

who had seized the vehicle pursuant to a search warrant. 186 Ga. App.

at 616, 367 S.E.2d at 856. "Clearly, no process was ever issued by any

court purporting to authorize either the Fannin County District Attorney

or the Fannin County Sheriff to assume possession" of the Honda. Id.

In his brief, Routier argues that, just as Tennessee authorities held

the Honda for the Georgia law-enforcement agent who took it back to

Georgia without the benefit of judicial process, in this case, he says,

Georgia authorities held the seized money for Carter, "who then took the

property to Alabama without the benefit of judicial process, and

persuaded the District Attorney in Alabama to file a forfeiture action."

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Routier says the only difference between Morrow and the present case is

that Morrow involved a car rather than money.

Five judges of the Georgia appellate court agreed with the rationale

set forth in Morrow; three did not. 186 Ga. App. at 616, 367 S.E.2d at

856. The state urges this court to adopt the rationale of the dissenting

opinion in Morrow, in which it was argued that the Tennessee authorities

had lawful possession of the vehicle at issue and were empowered to

deliver it into the custody of the Georgia authorities. See 186 Ga. App. at

617, 367 S.E.2d at 856-57. Noting that there was no authority forbidding

the transaction between the Tennessee and Georgia authorities, the

dissenting opinion concluded that Morrow had failed to demonstrate the

illegality of the Georgia court's action in ordering the forfeiture of the

vehicle. Id.

In a forfeiture action, a trial court exercises in rem jurisdiction,

which refers to the "court's power to adjudicate the rights to a given piece

of property, including the power to seize and hold it." Black's Law

Dictionary 982 (10th ed. 2014).

"A court obtains in rem jurisdiction when it validly seizes property so that it is brought within the control of the court. Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 85, 113 S.Ct. 554, 121 L.Ed.2d 474 (1992). Judicial control of

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the res may be either actual or constructive. Id. at 87. '[T]hat court which first acquires [in rem] jurisdiction draws to itself the exclusive authority to control and dispose of the res.' Ex parte Consolidated Graphite Corp., 221 Ala. 394, 397-98, 129 So. 262, 265 (1930)."

Little v. Gaston, 232 So. 3d 231, 234 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).

Here, the money was seized pursuant to a search warrant issued by

a Georgia court, which then obtained in rem jurisdiction over the money.

Although the Muscogee County district attorney turned the money over

to Alabama law-enforcement officials, the Georgia court's control over the

money had attached, and it retained constructive control over the money.

See Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 85

(1992).

We cannot distinguish the operative circumstances in Morrow from

those in this case and are persuaded by its rationale that a court with

jurisdiction over the seizure itself, and, hence, the seized property, must

approve the transfer of the seized property to another state for that state

to assume in rem jurisdiction. Here, Georgia law-enforcement officials

seized the money from Routier's house in Georgia pursuant to a search

warrant issued by a Georgia court. The money was later transferred from

Georgia law-enforcement officials to Alabama law-enforcement officials,

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but there is no evidence indicating that a Georgia court had issued any

process authorizing that transfer or allowing Alabama law-enforcement

officials to assume possession of the money. We agree with Routier that

the trial court lacked in rem jurisdiction over the money.

Because the trial court lacked in rem jurisdiction, its judgment

ordering the forfeiture of the money is void. Noll v. Noll, 47 So. 3d 275,

279 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) ("A judgment entered without jurisdiction is

void."). "A void judgment will not support an appeal, and 'an appellate

court must dismiss an attempted appeal from such a void judgment.' "

Colburn v. Colburn, 14 So. 3d 176, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (quoting

Vann v. Cook, 989 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)). Therefore, we

dismiss Routier's appeal albeit with instructions that the trial court

vacate its judgment and dismiss the forfeiture action.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards and Hanson, JJ., concur.