NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 18-3525 ___________
JONATHAN PIERRE,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A209-866-637) Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Q. Golparvar ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) August 16, 2019
Before: MCKEE, COWEN and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 5, 2019) ___________
O P I N I O N* ___________
PER CURIAM
Jonathan Pierre, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We will deny
the petition.
I.
Pierre, a citizen of Haiti, entered the United States in November 2016 without
valid entry documents, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), INA §
212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Pierre provided a statement to a border patrol agent on the day he
arrived and was subsequently given a credible fear interview in December 2016. Pierre
filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
At the hearing before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Pierre testified that, while
living in Haiti, his family had a long-term dispute with a neighbor. On April 5, 2013,
Pierre came home to a fight on his front lawn between several children (involving
Pierre’s niece and a family member of the neighbor). Pierre split up the fight. Later that
day, Pierre’s neighbor, Rezou, went to Pierre’s house and threatened him. Pierre
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 responded by calling the police; the next day, he also went to the police station to file a
report. The police ordered Rezou to appear in court the following day and Rezou
complied. At court, Rezou made further threats against Pierre, and was subsequently
detained and released two days later. On April 9, 2013, Pierre was then attacked and
assaulted by a group of four men, two of whom were related to Rezou. Pierre testified
that he believes that Rezou orchestrated the attack. Immediately following the attack,
Pierre was transported to the hospital to treat his injuries. Pierre testified that after his
assault, he was informed that the men who had assaulted him then returned to his house
and threw rocks at it. Because of the assault, Pierre decided he need to leave Haiti to
avoid further harm from Rezou. He left Haiti on April 11, 2013 and traveled to Brazil,
where he lived for the next three years. Pierre also testified that on April 29, 2018, his
mother’s house (in Haiti) was attacked. Pierre believes Rezou was responsible for the
attack on his mother’s house as well. In addition to the harm he suffered due to his
neighbor in Haiti, Pierre briefly testified that he fears persecution on account of his
membership in a social group, called A.A.S.C. (AGEMO ARTS SECOURS
CULTUREL), which appears to be political in nature and whose leader was assassinated.
The IJ determined that Pierre’s testimony was not credible. The IJ based on this
conclusion on the inconsistencies between Pierre’s testimony before the IJ and the
information contained in his interviews with the border patrol officer and asylum officer.
In addition, the IJ concluded that, even if Pierre were found credible, he failed to show
that he was eligible for asylum. Furthermore, the IJ concluded that, because Pierre failed
to meet the applicable burden of proof for his asylum claim, he necessarily failed to meet
3 the higher burden for his withholding claim. Finally, the IJ determined that his claim
under CAT failed because he failed to show past torture, that he would more likely than
not be tortured if returned to Haiti, or government acquiescence.
Pierre appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA
dismissed the appeal, finding no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination
or in the IJ’s determination that Pierre failed to satisfy his burden to establish past
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a statutorily protected
ground. The BIA also found no clear error in the IJ’s determination that Pierre failed to
establish eligibility for withholding of removal and failed to meet his burden to establish
his eligibility for protection under CAT. This petition for review followed.
II.
This Court has authority to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a). “[W]hen the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the
bases for the IJ’s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both the IJ and
the BIA.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). We review the agency’s
factual findings, including an adverse credibility determination, for substantial evidence.
See Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005). Under this deferential standard
of review, we must uphold those findings “unless the evidence not only supports a
contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483–84 (3d Cir.
2001).
III.
4 In his petition for review, Pierre primarily challenges the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination. Pierre argues that the IJ inappropriately relied on inconsistencies between
his border interview, credible fear interview, asylum application, and testimony at the
hearing. 1 According to Pierre, his border interview was as unreliable as a typical airport
interview, which we have found is not a valid ground upon which to base an adverse
credibility determination. See Balasubramanrim v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir.
1998). While Pierre correctly argues that we have counseled against placing too much
weight on a petitioner’s interview with immigration authorities at the point of entry, see
Chen, 376 F.3d at 223–24, here the IJ pointed to other reasons for finding Pierre’s
testimony incredible, namely, the inconsistencies in his credible fear interview.
Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that either interview in this case was
unreliable. The IJ noted that the interview with the border patrol agent involved “a very
detailed account of questions and answers posed,” wherein Pierre “was very clear and
emphatic that he left Haiti so that he could find better work.” A.R. at 60. Therefore, we
conclude that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial
evidence.
IV.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 18-3525 ___________
JONATHAN PIERRE,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A209-866-637) Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Q. Golparvar ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) August 16, 2019
Before: MCKEE, COWEN and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 5, 2019) ___________
O P I N I O N* ___________
PER CURIAM
Jonathan Pierre, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We will deny
the petition.
I.
Pierre, a citizen of Haiti, entered the United States in November 2016 without
valid entry documents, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), INA §
212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Pierre provided a statement to a border patrol agent on the day he
arrived and was subsequently given a credible fear interview in December 2016. Pierre
filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
At the hearing before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Pierre testified that, while
living in Haiti, his family had a long-term dispute with a neighbor. On April 5, 2013,
Pierre came home to a fight on his front lawn between several children (involving
Pierre’s niece and a family member of the neighbor). Pierre split up the fight. Later that
day, Pierre’s neighbor, Rezou, went to Pierre’s house and threatened him. Pierre
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 responded by calling the police; the next day, he also went to the police station to file a
report. The police ordered Rezou to appear in court the following day and Rezou
complied. At court, Rezou made further threats against Pierre, and was subsequently
detained and released two days later. On April 9, 2013, Pierre was then attacked and
assaulted by a group of four men, two of whom were related to Rezou. Pierre testified
that he believes that Rezou orchestrated the attack. Immediately following the attack,
Pierre was transported to the hospital to treat his injuries. Pierre testified that after his
assault, he was informed that the men who had assaulted him then returned to his house
and threw rocks at it. Because of the assault, Pierre decided he need to leave Haiti to
avoid further harm from Rezou. He left Haiti on April 11, 2013 and traveled to Brazil,
where he lived for the next three years. Pierre also testified that on April 29, 2018, his
mother’s house (in Haiti) was attacked. Pierre believes Rezou was responsible for the
attack on his mother’s house as well. In addition to the harm he suffered due to his
neighbor in Haiti, Pierre briefly testified that he fears persecution on account of his
membership in a social group, called A.A.S.C. (AGEMO ARTS SECOURS
CULTUREL), which appears to be political in nature and whose leader was assassinated.
The IJ determined that Pierre’s testimony was not credible. The IJ based on this
conclusion on the inconsistencies between Pierre’s testimony before the IJ and the
information contained in his interviews with the border patrol officer and asylum officer.
In addition, the IJ concluded that, even if Pierre were found credible, he failed to show
that he was eligible for asylum. Furthermore, the IJ concluded that, because Pierre failed
to meet the applicable burden of proof for his asylum claim, he necessarily failed to meet
3 the higher burden for his withholding claim. Finally, the IJ determined that his claim
under CAT failed because he failed to show past torture, that he would more likely than
not be tortured if returned to Haiti, or government acquiescence.
Pierre appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA
dismissed the appeal, finding no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination
or in the IJ’s determination that Pierre failed to satisfy his burden to establish past
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a statutorily protected
ground. The BIA also found no clear error in the IJ’s determination that Pierre failed to
establish eligibility for withholding of removal and failed to meet his burden to establish
his eligibility for protection under CAT. This petition for review followed.
II.
This Court has authority to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a). “[W]hen the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the
bases for the IJ’s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both the IJ and
the BIA.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). We review the agency’s
factual findings, including an adverse credibility determination, for substantial evidence.
See Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005). Under this deferential standard
of review, we must uphold those findings “unless the evidence not only supports a
contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483–84 (3d Cir.
2001).
III.
4 In his petition for review, Pierre primarily challenges the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination. Pierre argues that the IJ inappropriately relied on inconsistencies between
his border interview, credible fear interview, asylum application, and testimony at the
hearing. 1 According to Pierre, his border interview was as unreliable as a typical airport
interview, which we have found is not a valid ground upon which to base an adverse
credibility determination. See Balasubramanrim v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir.
1998). While Pierre correctly argues that we have counseled against placing too much
weight on a petitioner’s interview with immigration authorities at the point of entry, see
Chen, 376 F.3d at 223–24, here the IJ pointed to other reasons for finding Pierre’s
testimony incredible, namely, the inconsistencies in his credible fear interview.
Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that either interview in this case was
unreliable. The IJ noted that the interview with the border patrol agent involved “a very
detailed account of questions and answers posed,” wherein Pierre “was very clear and
emphatic that he left Haiti so that he could find better work.” A.R. at 60. Therefore, we
conclude that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial
evidence.
IV.
1 Regarding the statement he provided to the border patrol agent, the IJ noted that Pierre stated that he left his home in Haiti in order to find work, that he had not been harmed or mistreated, that he was not involved in any political group, and that the came to the United States to find better work than what he had in Brazil. Regarding the interview with the asylum officer, the IJ noted that Pierre did not speak of his political involvement and that he did not indicate that the individuals who assaulted him also threw rocks at his house the following day.
5 The IJ’s alternative determination, that, even if Pierre were credible, he failed to
meet his burden to establish that he is eligible for asylum, is also supported by substantial
evidence. An applicant for asylum has the burden of establishing that he is unable or
unwilling to return to his home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); INA § 101(a)(42)(A); Abdille,
242 F.3d at 482. “[A] key task for any asylum applicant is to show a sufficient ‘nexus’
between persecution and one of the listed protected grounds.” Ndayshimiye v. Att’y
Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009).
The IJ determined that Pierre failed to show past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution. The evidence in the record does not compel a contrary
conclusion since we have previously determined that “isolated incidents that do not result
in serious injury do not rise to the level of persecution.” Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607,
615 (3d Cir. 2005). Additionally, the record supports the IJ’s conclusion that the harm
Pierre suffered was not on account of a statutorily protected ground. Instead, the record
reveals that the harm Pierre suffered arose from a dispute with a neighbor who believed
that Pierre punched his son. In short, there is no link between the harm he fears and his
ethnicity, nationality, religion, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group. 2
2 To the extent that Pierre claims that he was persecuted, or likely will be persecuted, on account of his membership in a political group (the A.A.S.C.) and his political beliefs, the IJ’s decision to dismiss this explanation is supported by substantial evidence. The only information Pierre provided in support of this argument was that the leader of his alleged 6 Furthermore, the IJ’s conclusion that Pierre failed to show that the government
was unable or unwilling to protect him is supported by substantial evidence. As noted by
the IJ, the record supports the conclusion that the police responded to Pierre’s report,
issued a subpoena for Rezou to appear in court, and detained him for two days due to his
threats against Pierre. Pierre testified that, after his attack, he did not contact the police to
report the attack because he “didn’t get any result” by contacting the police previously.
However, as noted, the record contradicts that explanation.
Because we conclude that Pierre has failed to establish his eligibility for asylum,
we necessarily conclude that he has not satisfied the more stringent requirements for
withholding of removal. See Paripovic v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2005).
Finally, the record supports the IJ’s conclusion that Pierre has failed to demonstrate that
he is likely to be tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, government officials if
removed to Haiti. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18(a).
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition
political group was assassinated. However, as noted by the IJ, even if the leader was assassinated, that fact that does show that Pierre is in any danger due to his affiliation with the group. 7