Jonathan Oscar Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJuly 25, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-05966
StatusUnknown

This text of Jonathan Oscar Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security (Jonathan Oscar Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jonathan Oscar Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security, (C.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JONATHAN O. D., Case No. CV 22-05966-RAO

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Jonathan O. D.1 (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Commissioner’s denial 19 of his application for supplemental security income (“SSI”). For the reasons stated 20 below, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED. 21 II. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 22 On February 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability 23 beginning May 1, 1994. (AR 60). On May 1, 2020, his application was denied. 24 (AR 83). Plaintiff’s application was denied again upon reconsideration on July 14, 25

26 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil 27 Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United 28 States. 1 2020. (AR 95). On August 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing. 2 (AR 101). On September 23, 2021, a telephonic hearing was held on the 3 Commissioner’s denial of Plaintiff’s application at which an impartial vocational 4 expert testified. (AR 38-59). On October 27, 2021, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim 5 for benefits because he was not disabled within the meaning of 6 42 U.S.C. § 1614(a)(3)(A). (AR 18-30). On November 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed an 7 administrative appeal. (AR 226-28). On June 28, 2022, Plaintiff’s appeal was 8 denied. (AR 1-6). On August 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed this action. (Dkt. No. 1). 9 The ALJ analyzed whether Plaintiff was disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the 10 Social Security Act. The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any 11 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 12 mental impairment” or combination of impairments lasting twelve or more months. 13 Id. 14 Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (2023), the ALJ followed the familiar five- 15 step sequential analysis for determining whether an individual is disabled within the 16 meaning of the Social Security Act. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had 17 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 28, 2020. (AR 23). At 18 step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had two severe impairments: 19 schizophrenia and personality disorder. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that 20 Plaintiff’s combined impairments did not equal the severity of impairments listed in 21 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926. (AR 25). Before proceeding to step 22 four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff possessed the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 23 to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with a few non-exertional 24 limitations: understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions that have been 25 well-explained; able to adapt to minimal changes in work setting; no public contact; 26 and low-stress environment. (AR 26). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has 27 no past relevant work. (AR 29). At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering 28 Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there 1 are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could 2 perform. (Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under a 3 disability from February 28, 2020, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 30). 4 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s 6 decision to deny benefits. A court must affirm an ALJ’s findings of fact if they, when 7 applied against proper legal standards, are supported by substantial evidence. Mayes 8 v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence . . . is 9 ‘more than a mere scintilla[,]’ . . . [which] means—and means only—‘such relevant 10 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” 11 Biestek v. Berryhill, —U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2019) 12 (citations omitted); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). 13 Substantial evidence is shown “by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of 14 the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and 15 making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation 16 omitted). 17 “[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a 18 specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record 19 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the 20 Secretary’s conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) 21 (citations and internal quotations omitted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to more 22 than one rational interpretation,’ the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. 23 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 24 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)); see Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 25 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the 26 ALJ’s conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”). 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly credit Dr. Paul Rogers’ 3 opinion and that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial 4 evidence. (Joint Stipulation (“JS”), Dkt. No. 21). 5 The Court agrees. 6 A. Dr. Rogers’ Opinion 7 The ALJ’s decision noted that Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Rogers, 8 provided a statement dated June 22, 2020, regarding Plaintiff’s mental capacity 9 assessment. (AR 27; AR 387-89). Dr. Rogers’ statement indicated that Plaintiff has 10 a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder. (AR 387). 11 The statement noted that Plaintiff had mild limitations in following one- or two-step 12 oral instructions to carry out tasks and maintaining personal hygiene and attire 13 appropriate for a work setting. (AR 387-88). Plaintiff had moderate limitations in 14 initiating and performing tasks he knows how to do and adapting to changes. (Id.). 15 Dr.

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Related

Ryan v. Commissioner of Social Security
528 F.3d 1194 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Robbins v. Social Security Administration
466 F.3d 880 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Kanika Revels v. Nancy Berryhill
874 F.3d 648 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)
Reddick v. Chater
157 F.3d 715 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
Jonathan Oscar Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jonathan-oscar-davis-v-commissioner-of-social-security-cacd-2023.