Jonathan G. Ex Rel. Micheal G. v. Lower Merion School District

955 F. Supp. 413, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2688, 1997 WL 109599
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 10, 1997
Docket2:96-cv-02121
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 955 F. Supp. 413 (Jonathan G. Ex Rel. Micheal G. v. Lower Merion School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jonathan G. Ex Rel. Micheal G. v. Lower Merion School District, 955 F. Supp. 413, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2688, 1997 WL 109599 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOYNER, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Michael and Sondra G. have brought this action on their own behalf and that of their son Jonathan G., appealing the decision of the Pennsylvania Special Education Appeals Panel (“Appeals Panel” or “Panel”), under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), as codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (West 1990 & Supp. 1996). 1 Nevertheless, we have affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

BACKGROUND

Jonathan G. is a student with learning disabilities as defined by IDEA, and is currently attending school in the Lower Merion School District (“Lower Merion”). In the 1993-1994 school year, while in fifth grade, Jonathan attended a self-contained learning support class. 2 In the subsequent year, he attended a resource room learning support program. Both placements were approved by his parents although they also purchased private educational services for him.

In April 1995, Lower Merion developed a Comprehensive Evaluation Report (“CER”) and Notice of Recommended Assignment (“NORA”), as well as an Individualized Educational Program (“IEP”) for Jonathan. 3 Based on these reports, Lower Merion proposed an educational placement for Jonathan in an inclusive setting with regular education students in seventh grade. Nevertheless, Mr. and Mrs. G. rejected the inclusion-based IEP that was proposed on April 20,1995 and obtained independent evaluations during July and August 1995.

Since the disagreement between Lower Merion and Jonathan’s parents was not resolved at a pre-hearing conference on September 7, 1995, due process hearings were held before a Special Education Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer, in a decision dated December 31,1995, directed the implementation of the School District’s proposed IEP and denied the parents’ request for reimbursement of their expenses for the additional educational services. Subsequently, the parents appealed the decision of the Hearing Officer and the Appeals Panel affirmed the Hearing Officer’s decision in all respects. Plaintiffs then brought this action to challenge the Appeals Panel’s decision, raising two primary issues for our consideration, namely, the adequacy of Jonathan’s placement, and their entitlement to reimbursement for the additional educational services they obtained. 4 Nevertheless, after careful evaluation of the record presented to us, we affirm the decision of the Appeals Panel.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

In reviewing a claim under the IDEA, this court is required to “receive the records of the administrative proceedings, hear additional evidence at the request of a party” and base its decision on the “preponderance of the evidence.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). 5 The *415 court is also required to give “due weight to the administrative proceedings,” Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), although the court must consider the findings of the- administrative tribunal carefully, and may accept or reject such findings. Susan N. v. Wilson School Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 758 (3d Cir.1995). Finally, the court must be careful not to substitute its judgment about proper education methods for that of the state educational authorities. Rowley, at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051.

II. Jonathan’s Placement

Congress’ intent in enacting IDEA was to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that children with disabilities are educated with those who are not disabled. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). Indeed, IDEA provides that children with disabilities should only be removed from a regular education environment when the disability is such that education in that environment is not feasible, even with the use of supplementary aids and services. Id. This requirement is commonly referred to as IDEA’S “mainstreaming requirement.”

In interpreting IDEA’S mainstreaming requirement, the Third Circuit has fashioned a two-pronged test to evaluate the propriety of a disabled child’s inclusion in a regular classroom. According to this test, the court must determine (1) if the child can be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom with supplemental aids and services and (2) whether the child’s school has included the child in inclusive school programs to the maximum extent appropriate. Oberti v. Board of Education of Clementon, 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir.1993).

In many cases, the parents of a disabled child argue in favor of mainstreaming -with the school district recommending a more restrictive placement.- In this case, however, Lower Merion has proposed an inclusive placement but Jonathan’s parents have indicated that they prefer that Jonathan receive self-contained instruction. The parents have therefore challenged the propriety of Jonathan’s placement in an inclusive classroom setting.

Mr. and Mrs. G. have claimed that both the Hearing Officer and the Appeals Panel failed to appropriately evaluate plaintiffs’ expert evidence. In particular, plaintiffs claim that the Hearing Officer did not evaluate the testimony and evidence of plaintiffs’ experts at all, and that the Appeals Panel accepted only the evidence presented by Lower Mer-ion, incorrectly assuming that it was obligated to affirm the Hearing Officer’s decision. Plaintiffs further claim that had their evidence been properly evaluated, it would clearly have shown that Jonathan requires a self-contained placement. Plaintiffs also state that all of their evidence was based on objective test results while Lower Merion’s evidence was largely based on anecdotal information, and is therefore, presumably, not as convincing as plaintiffs’ evidence. Finally, plaintiffs claim that Lower Merion failed to diagnose the cause of Jonathan’s impairment and that this failure shows that their proposed educational program cannot possibly be properly tailored to suit Jonathan’s needs.

In response, Lower Merion claims that there is no evidence that either the Hearing Officer or the Appeals Panel failed to adequately consider plaintiffs’ evidence. Furthermore, Lower Merion argues, the Hearing Officer and the Appeals Panel do not need to give detañed explanations of the reason(s) for their decision.

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Related

Lindsley Ex Rel. Kolodziejczack v. Girard School District
213 F. Supp. 2d 523 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
955 F. Supp. 413, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2688, 1997 WL 109599, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jonathan-g-ex-rel-micheal-g-v-lower-merion-school-district-paed-1997.