Opinion issued February 13, 2024
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-22-00745-CR ——————————— JONATHAN DAVON GEIGER, Appellant V. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 337th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1697155
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Jonathan Davon Geiger was convicted of robbery1 and sentenced
to five years’ imprisonment. In his sole issue on appeal, Geiger contends that
1 TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02(a)(1). insufficient evidence supports his conviction. Because the evidence is sufficient, we
affirm.
Background
In November 2020, complainant Lucy Mejia was driving to work. While
stopped at an intersection, a stranger entered her vehicle through the passenger side
of her car. The man was wearing a hoodie and he grabbed Mejia above the waist by
her shirt and skin. Mejia struggled with him to escape from her car. She ran to a
nearby McDonald’s while the man drove off.
Jonas and Petunia Lewis were at the nearby McDonald’s. Jonas was placing
an order at the counter when an unknown Black man in a gray hoodie and jeans ran
inside. The man was hunched over and ran quickly through the McDonald’s,
immediately exiting through another door. Petunia was in the parking lot, waiting
inside the couple’s truck. Jonas went outside after he noticed the man was looking
into his truck, but he soon ran away. The couple saw the man run across the street,
get into Mejia’s car, and drive away after she jumped out of it. Mejia ran toward the
couple and Petunia called 911.
Law enforcement found Geiger with Mejia’s car less than 20 minutes after the
911 dispatch. Harris County Sherriff’s Office Deputy D. Vasquez was initially
dispatched to the robbery scene where he spoke to Mejia. HCSO Deputy J. Rhodes
was assisting as a back-up unit and found Geiger standing next to Mejia’s car, which
2 was wrecked in a ditch, less than two miles from the intersection where it was stolen.
When Deputy Rhodes asked Geiger if he had lost control of the car, Geiger
responded that he might have hit something. Geiger fled on foot when Deputy
Rhodes asked him to put his hands behind his back. Geiger jumped a fence and ran
across the main lanes of the nearby highway, but he was apprehended by HCSO
Deputy E. Zubia, who saw Geiger trying to hide in the brush.
Geiger was indicted for robbery, pleaded not guilty, and went to trial. The jury
heard testimony from Jonas and Petunia Lewis, Deputy Vasquez, Mejia, Deputy
Rhodes, and Deputy Zubia. The jury found Geiger guilty, and the trial court
sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Geiger contends that the evidence was legally insufficient because the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the identity of the robber and (2) bodily
injury to Mejia.
A. Standard of Review
In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational factfinder
could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010). The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and
3 the weight to be given to their testimony, so we defer to the factfinder’s
determinations on those matters. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We do “not intrude on
the jury’s role to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to
draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Johnson v. State, 560
S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Musacchio v. United States, 577
U.S. 237, 243 (2016)) (internal quotations omitted).
B. Analysis
To establish that Geiger committed robbery as charged in his indictment. the
State was required to prove that “in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent
to obtain or maintain control of the property, [Geiger] . . . intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly [caused] bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02(a)(1).
“‘In the course of committing theft’ means conduct that occurs in an attempt to
commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of theft.” Id. § 29.01.
I. Identity
On the identity issue, Geiger contends that because there was no direct
evidence that Geiger was the robber there is insufficient evidence to support the
conviction. But the lack of direct evidence does not decide guilt. Guevara v. State,
152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Identity may be proven by circumstantial
evidence or by inferences. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App.
4 2016); Jones v. State, 458 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015,
pet. ref’d). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and
“circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Here, Jonas was able to describe the man he saw at the McDonald’s as
African-American and wearing a gray hoodie, but he did not see his face. Petunia
was only able to describe the man as Black and wearing a dark hoodie. Mejia
described him as wearing a “jacket with [a] hoodie.” About 20 minutes after the
robbery, Deputy Rhodes found Geiger, a Black man wearing a gray hoodie, standing
next to Mejia’s crashed car. This was about two miles, or a five or six-minute drive,
from where the robbery occurred. When asked about what happened, Geiger told
Deputy Rhodes, “he might have hit something.” When Deputy Rhodes instructed
Geiger to put his arms behind his back, Geiger ran.
Based on Geiger’s statement to Deputy Rhodes, the factfinder could
reasonably infer that he was driving Mejia’s car when it crashed. See Gross v. State,
380 S.W.3d 181, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (factfinder may draw reasonable
inferences from evidence). Geiger also matched the descriptions provided by the
Lewises and Mejia. See Jenkins, 439 S.W.3d at 599. Finally, the jury could also have
considered Geiger’s flight from law enforcement as evidence of his guilt. See
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (factfinder may draw
5 an inference of guilt from the circumstance of flight). Taken together, a reasonable
factfinder could have found that Geiger was the robber. See Murray v. State, 457
S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (resolving conflicts in testimony, weighing
the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences is the factfinder’s role); Johnson,
560 S.W.3d at 226 (appellate courts do not intrude on factfinder’s role in drawing
reasonable inferences and weighing evidence).
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Opinion issued February 13, 2024
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-22-00745-CR ——————————— JONATHAN DAVON GEIGER, Appellant V. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 337th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1697155
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Jonathan Davon Geiger was convicted of robbery1 and sentenced
to five years’ imprisonment. In his sole issue on appeal, Geiger contends that
1 TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02(a)(1). insufficient evidence supports his conviction. Because the evidence is sufficient, we
affirm.
Background
In November 2020, complainant Lucy Mejia was driving to work. While
stopped at an intersection, a stranger entered her vehicle through the passenger side
of her car. The man was wearing a hoodie and he grabbed Mejia above the waist by
her shirt and skin. Mejia struggled with him to escape from her car. She ran to a
nearby McDonald’s while the man drove off.
Jonas and Petunia Lewis were at the nearby McDonald’s. Jonas was placing
an order at the counter when an unknown Black man in a gray hoodie and jeans ran
inside. The man was hunched over and ran quickly through the McDonald’s,
immediately exiting through another door. Petunia was in the parking lot, waiting
inside the couple’s truck. Jonas went outside after he noticed the man was looking
into his truck, but he soon ran away. The couple saw the man run across the street,
get into Mejia’s car, and drive away after she jumped out of it. Mejia ran toward the
couple and Petunia called 911.
Law enforcement found Geiger with Mejia’s car less than 20 minutes after the
911 dispatch. Harris County Sherriff’s Office Deputy D. Vasquez was initially
dispatched to the robbery scene where he spoke to Mejia. HCSO Deputy J. Rhodes
was assisting as a back-up unit and found Geiger standing next to Mejia’s car, which
2 was wrecked in a ditch, less than two miles from the intersection where it was stolen.
When Deputy Rhodes asked Geiger if he had lost control of the car, Geiger
responded that he might have hit something. Geiger fled on foot when Deputy
Rhodes asked him to put his hands behind his back. Geiger jumped a fence and ran
across the main lanes of the nearby highway, but he was apprehended by HCSO
Deputy E. Zubia, who saw Geiger trying to hide in the brush.
Geiger was indicted for robbery, pleaded not guilty, and went to trial. The jury
heard testimony from Jonas and Petunia Lewis, Deputy Vasquez, Mejia, Deputy
Rhodes, and Deputy Zubia. The jury found Geiger guilty, and the trial court
sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Geiger contends that the evidence was legally insufficient because the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the identity of the robber and (2) bodily
injury to Mejia.
A. Standard of Review
In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational factfinder
could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010). The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and
3 the weight to be given to their testimony, so we defer to the factfinder’s
determinations on those matters. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We do “not intrude on
the jury’s role to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to
draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Johnson v. State, 560
S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Musacchio v. United States, 577
U.S. 237, 243 (2016)) (internal quotations omitted).
B. Analysis
To establish that Geiger committed robbery as charged in his indictment. the
State was required to prove that “in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent
to obtain or maintain control of the property, [Geiger] . . . intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly [caused] bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02(a)(1).
“‘In the course of committing theft’ means conduct that occurs in an attempt to
commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of theft.” Id. § 29.01.
I. Identity
On the identity issue, Geiger contends that because there was no direct
evidence that Geiger was the robber there is insufficient evidence to support the
conviction. But the lack of direct evidence does not decide guilt. Guevara v. State,
152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Identity may be proven by circumstantial
evidence or by inferences. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App.
4 2016); Jones v. State, 458 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015,
pet. ref’d). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and
“circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Here, Jonas was able to describe the man he saw at the McDonald’s as
African-American and wearing a gray hoodie, but he did not see his face. Petunia
was only able to describe the man as Black and wearing a dark hoodie. Mejia
described him as wearing a “jacket with [a] hoodie.” About 20 minutes after the
robbery, Deputy Rhodes found Geiger, a Black man wearing a gray hoodie, standing
next to Mejia’s crashed car. This was about two miles, or a five or six-minute drive,
from where the robbery occurred. When asked about what happened, Geiger told
Deputy Rhodes, “he might have hit something.” When Deputy Rhodes instructed
Geiger to put his arms behind his back, Geiger ran.
Based on Geiger’s statement to Deputy Rhodes, the factfinder could
reasonably infer that he was driving Mejia’s car when it crashed. See Gross v. State,
380 S.W.3d 181, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (factfinder may draw reasonable
inferences from evidence). Geiger also matched the descriptions provided by the
Lewises and Mejia. See Jenkins, 439 S.W.3d at 599. Finally, the jury could also have
considered Geiger’s flight from law enforcement as evidence of his guilt. See
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (factfinder may draw
5 an inference of guilt from the circumstance of flight). Taken together, a reasonable
factfinder could have found that Geiger was the robber. See Murray v. State, 457
S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (resolving conflicts in testimony, weighing
the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences is the factfinder’s role); Johnson,
560 S.W.3d at 226 (appellate courts do not intrude on factfinder’s role in drawing
reasonable inferences and weighing evidence).
II. Bodily Injury
Geiger contends that because Mejia denied feeling pain when the robber
grabbed her but later testified that she did feel pain at that moment, a rational
factfinder could not have found that the State proved bodily injury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Bodily injury means “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(8). “This definition encompasses
even relatively minor physical contact if it constitutes more than offensive
touching.” Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Here, Mejia testified multiple times that she felt pain when appellant grabbed
her. She explained that he grabbed her above her waist by her shirt and her skin when
he got into the car, describing his grasp as “[v]ery strong,” and that she felt pain and
struggled with him to escape. See Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012) (“Any physical pain, however minor, will suffice to establish bodily
injury.”). The factfinder may also infer that a complainant “actually felt or suffered
6 physical pain because people of common intelligence understand pain and some of
the natural causes of it.” Id. That Mejia did not report any pain to law enforcement
at the time of the robbery does not mean there was insufficient evidence. See Metcalf
v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (jury is sole judge of witness
credibility and can believe all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony). We assume
the factfinder weighed both her testimony at trial and her answers to law enforcement
at the time of the robbery and resolved the conflicts in favor of their verdict. See id.;
see also Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“a reviewing
court does not sit as the thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that
of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence”).
Geiger also argues that on cross-examination, Deputy Vasquez revealed that
despite Mejia not saying she felt pain at the time of the incident, he relayed that she
did in his police report. So, according to Geiger, a rational factfinder could not have
found that the State proved bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, we
assume the factfinder weighed this evidence, along with the other evidence
presented, and resolved any conflicts in favor of the verdict. Merritt v. State, 368
S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (jury is sole judge of witness credibility
and weight of any evidence).
7 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational
factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Geiger committed
the robbery. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
We overrule Geiger’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sarah Beth Landau Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas-Molloy.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).