RENDERED: APRIL 11, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0642-MR
JON HARR APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JEFFREY L. PRESTON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00211
TRINA HARR (NOW ROBERTS) APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: Jon Harr appeals an order of the Greenup Family Court
denying his motion to modify an order awarding maintenance to his former spouse,
Trina Harr Roberts.1 Harr contends that the court erred by failing to conclude
either that Roberts was no longer entitled to maintenance or that the amount of
maintenance awarded to her should be reduced. After our review, we affirm.
1 By order entered on February 28, 2024, Trina Harr was restored to her maiden name of Roberts, by which we will refer to her throughout this Opinion. Harr and Roberts married in May 2008; Harr filed the dissolution
action in May 2023. There are no minor children.
Following trial, the family court entered a decree of dissolution in
November 2023. The court divided the marital portion of a retirement account
between the parties and awarded a vehicle to each of them. It ordered the sale of
the parties’ real property with equity to be divided equally between them.
Additionally, the court made an award of maintenance to Roberts in the amount of
$1,000.00 per month. The court’s order provided that the issue of maintenance
“may be revisited once the real estate can be sold and [the court] can determine any
sums [Roberts] receives after payment of the debts.” Harr filed a motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the maintenance award, which was denied.
On March 8, 2024, Harr filed another motion to modify the court’s
maintenance award. By this time, the real property had been sold. Harr argued
that Roberts was incurring no living expenses as she was residing at her brother’s
home while the payment of maintenance was causing him financial hardship in
light of his mounting expenses. Harr stated that Roberts had received $34,000.00
upon the sale of the parties’ real property and noted that she had been awarded a
portion of the retirement account as well. He indicated that she might now be
employed. Harr also sought to recover his attorney’s fees.
-2- In her response, Roberts noted that she had indeed been forced by the
circumstances to rely upon the kindness of family. She argued that she needed
time to acquire sufficient education or job skills before she could be expected to
meet her reasonable needs independently. She requested the court to order that
maintenance be paid to her for several years.
During a hearing conducted in April 2024, the court heard testimony
indicating that Harr had earned $94,303 in 2023 (which was more than he had
earned the year before); that he benefitted from the use of a company car; and that
he earned extra money by performing in a band. Moreover, Harr had recently
remarried and admitted that he expected his new spouse to help pay household
expenses of more than $5,500.00 per month.
In her testimony, Roberts explained that she had not worked outside
the home during the parties’ fifteen-year marriage and that she lacked a high-
school diploma. However, she had recently secured a position with a company
providing hospice care. She earned $16.53 per hour for a 36-hour work week.
Roberts outlined the costs of her monthly expenses totalling $3,800.00 and
itemized her substantial outstanding medical bills. Roberts explained that while
she continued to reside with a family member in South Carolina in order to reduce
her living expenses, she had recently purchased a “tiny home” with the proceeds
from the sale of the parties’ real property. She expected to incur additional
-3- expenses to make the home habitable. Finally, Roberts argued that she should not
be forced to deplete her portion of the parties’ retirement savings in an effort to
meet her current financial needs, asking the court to deny the motion to modify its
maintenance award.
The court entered an order denying Harr’s motion to modify the
maintenance award. It concluded that Roberts remained unable to meet her
reasonable needs independently and that Harr continued to be more than able to
continue paying maintenance of $1,000.00 per month while meeting his own
reasonable expenses. The court ordered Harr to pay maintenance to Roberts for a
period of 48 months. It denied Harr’s subsequent motion to alter, amend, or
vacate, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Harr argues that the family court abused its discretion by
failing to reduce or terminate the maintenance award. He contends that the award
is unconscionable -- in part -- because the evidence showed that the parties’
marriage had been relatively short. He also asserts that no testimony was offered
to establish the parties’ standard of living during the marriage. He argues that
Roberts’s earnings, coupled with her share of the proceeds derived from the sale of
their real property and the value of her portion of the retirement account, are
sufficient to provide for her reasonable needs to cover her monthly expenses.
-4- Finally, Harr argues that the maintenance award will cause him to suffer financial
ruination.
In reviewing a court’s decision to deny a subsequent motion for
modification of the award, we are governed in our review by the standard of abuse
of discretion. Tudor v. Tudor, 399 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Ky. App. 2013). A court
abuses its discretion only where it is established that its decision is “arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Artrip v. Noe, 311
S.W.3d 229, 232 (Ky. 2010).
The family court’s initial award of maintenance adequately met the
statutory criteria underlying the purpose of such an award. A maintenance award
may be modified “upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and
continuing as to make the terms unconscionable.” KRS2 403.250(1). Maintenance
becomes unconscionable if it is “manifestly unfair or inequitable.” Combs v.
Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Ky. 1990). Since the relevant legislative policy is
aimed at fostering relative stability, a movant must demonstrate compelling
evidence in order to justify modification of a maintenance award. Bickel v. Bickel,
95 S.W.3d 925, 927-28 (Ky. App. 2002).
Harr contends that he is entitled to a reduction in his maintenance
obligation because Roberts: is now earning an income; was awarded a portion of
2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-5- the retirement proceeds; and received a cash payout representing her share of
equity in the marital property. Harr also explains that he has incurred (or expects
to incur) expenses that will prevent him from being able to meet the obligation.
Our family courts do not apply a mathematical formula to
maintenance awards. Age v. Age, 340 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Ky. App. 2011). Moreover,
the parties’ circumstances can be expected to fluctuate over time. However, a
modification of maintenance is not always justified. Holland v. Herzfeld, 610
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RENDERED: APRIL 11, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0642-MR
JON HARR APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JEFFREY L. PRESTON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00211
TRINA HARR (NOW ROBERTS) APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: Jon Harr appeals an order of the Greenup Family Court
denying his motion to modify an order awarding maintenance to his former spouse,
Trina Harr Roberts.1 Harr contends that the court erred by failing to conclude
either that Roberts was no longer entitled to maintenance or that the amount of
maintenance awarded to her should be reduced. After our review, we affirm.
1 By order entered on February 28, 2024, Trina Harr was restored to her maiden name of Roberts, by which we will refer to her throughout this Opinion. Harr and Roberts married in May 2008; Harr filed the dissolution
action in May 2023. There are no minor children.
Following trial, the family court entered a decree of dissolution in
November 2023. The court divided the marital portion of a retirement account
between the parties and awarded a vehicle to each of them. It ordered the sale of
the parties’ real property with equity to be divided equally between them.
Additionally, the court made an award of maintenance to Roberts in the amount of
$1,000.00 per month. The court’s order provided that the issue of maintenance
“may be revisited once the real estate can be sold and [the court] can determine any
sums [Roberts] receives after payment of the debts.” Harr filed a motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the maintenance award, which was denied.
On March 8, 2024, Harr filed another motion to modify the court’s
maintenance award. By this time, the real property had been sold. Harr argued
that Roberts was incurring no living expenses as she was residing at her brother’s
home while the payment of maintenance was causing him financial hardship in
light of his mounting expenses. Harr stated that Roberts had received $34,000.00
upon the sale of the parties’ real property and noted that she had been awarded a
portion of the retirement account as well. He indicated that she might now be
employed. Harr also sought to recover his attorney’s fees.
-2- In her response, Roberts noted that she had indeed been forced by the
circumstances to rely upon the kindness of family. She argued that she needed
time to acquire sufficient education or job skills before she could be expected to
meet her reasonable needs independently. She requested the court to order that
maintenance be paid to her for several years.
During a hearing conducted in April 2024, the court heard testimony
indicating that Harr had earned $94,303 in 2023 (which was more than he had
earned the year before); that he benefitted from the use of a company car; and that
he earned extra money by performing in a band. Moreover, Harr had recently
remarried and admitted that he expected his new spouse to help pay household
expenses of more than $5,500.00 per month.
In her testimony, Roberts explained that she had not worked outside
the home during the parties’ fifteen-year marriage and that she lacked a high-
school diploma. However, she had recently secured a position with a company
providing hospice care. She earned $16.53 per hour for a 36-hour work week.
Roberts outlined the costs of her monthly expenses totalling $3,800.00 and
itemized her substantial outstanding medical bills. Roberts explained that while
she continued to reside with a family member in South Carolina in order to reduce
her living expenses, she had recently purchased a “tiny home” with the proceeds
from the sale of the parties’ real property. She expected to incur additional
-3- expenses to make the home habitable. Finally, Roberts argued that she should not
be forced to deplete her portion of the parties’ retirement savings in an effort to
meet her current financial needs, asking the court to deny the motion to modify its
maintenance award.
The court entered an order denying Harr’s motion to modify the
maintenance award. It concluded that Roberts remained unable to meet her
reasonable needs independently and that Harr continued to be more than able to
continue paying maintenance of $1,000.00 per month while meeting his own
reasonable expenses. The court ordered Harr to pay maintenance to Roberts for a
period of 48 months. It denied Harr’s subsequent motion to alter, amend, or
vacate, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Harr argues that the family court abused its discretion by
failing to reduce or terminate the maintenance award. He contends that the award
is unconscionable -- in part -- because the evidence showed that the parties’
marriage had been relatively short. He also asserts that no testimony was offered
to establish the parties’ standard of living during the marriage. He argues that
Roberts’s earnings, coupled with her share of the proceeds derived from the sale of
their real property and the value of her portion of the retirement account, are
sufficient to provide for her reasonable needs to cover her monthly expenses.
-4- Finally, Harr argues that the maintenance award will cause him to suffer financial
ruination.
In reviewing a court’s decision to deny a subsequent motion for
modification of the award, we are governed in our review by the standard of abuse
of discretion. Tudor v. Tudor, 399 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Ky. App. 2013). A court
abuses its discretion only where it is established that its decision is “arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Artrip v. Noe, 311
S.W.3d 229, 232 (Ky. 2010).
The family court’s initial award of maintenance adequately met the
statutory criteria underlying the purpose of such an award. A maintenance award
may be modified “upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and
continuing as to make the terms unconscionable.” KRS2 403.250(1). Maintenance
becomes unconscionable if it is “manifestly unfair or inequitable.” Combs v.
Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Ky. 1990). Since the relevant legislative policy is
aimed at fostering relative stability, a movant must demonstrate compelling
evidence in order to justify modification of a maintenance award. Bickel v. Bickel,
95 S.W.3d 925, 927-28 (Ky. App. 2002).
Harr contends that he is entitled to a reduction in his maintenance
obligation because Roberts: is now earning an income; was awarded a portion of
2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-5- the retirement proceeds; and received a cash payout representing her share of
equity in the marital property. Harr also explains that he has incurred (or expects
to incur) expenses that will prevent him from being able to meet the obligation.
Our family courts do not apply a mathematical formula to
maintenance awards. Age v. Age, 340 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Ky. App. 2011). Moreover,
the parties’ circumstances can be expected to fluctuate over time. However, a
modification of maintenance is not always justified. Holland v. Herzfeld, 610
S.W.3d 360, 364 (Ky. App. 2020).
Roberts’s receipt of an amount of equity from the anticipated sale of
real property, added to her modest income, does not result in a change in the
parties’ circumstances sufficient enough to compel a reduction in the maintenance
award. She is not required to deplete her share of the retirement account in order
to meet her current financial needs. See Naramore v. Naramore, 611 S.W.3d 281,
288 (Ky. App. 2020). See also Daunhauer v. Daunhauer, 295 S.W.3d 154, 159
(Ky. App. 2009) (noting in dicta that retirement accounts are generally intended to
meet future needs in retirement rather than current needs) and Smith v. Smith, 503
S.W.3d 178, 185-86 (Ky. App. 2016) (noting an argument concerning tax
consequences of withdrawing funds from retirement accounts while upholding
maintenance award in favor of former spouse who had been awarded a portion of
retirement accounts).
-6- Harr’s income far exceeds that of Roberts. The family court
concluded that Harr could meet his “extraordinary” expenses while contributing to
Roberts’s maintenance for a period during which she could not be expected to meet
her reasonable needs independently. Comparing the parties’ circumstances at the
time of the original order with their condition as of the time of the modification
hearing, the family court concluded that Harr’s standard of living had substantially
improved while Roberts continued to struggle to meet reasonable monthly
expenses. Harr’s obligations to pay his taxes and his mother’s funeral expenses --
as well as his decision to purchase a new truck and riding lawn mower -- do not
change the calculation or the reasoning of the family court. Consequently, its
decision to continue the original maintenance award was not manifestly unfair or
inequitable.
The family court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence of
record, and it did not abuse its considerable discretion. Therefore, we affirm its
order denying the motion for modification.
ALL CONCUR.
-7- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Tracy D. Frye Sharon E. Rowsey Russell, Kentucky Ashland, Kentucky
Marie E. Troxler Russell, Kentucky
Whitney N. Davis Russell, Kentucky
-8-