Jolly v. J. M. Hampton & Sons Lbr. Co.

353 S.W.2d 338, 234 Ark. 574, 1962 Ark. LEXIS 728
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedFebruary 5, 1962
Docket5-2553
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 353 S.W.2d 338 (Jolly v. J. M. Hampton & Sons Lbr. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jolly v. J. M. Hampton & Sons Lbr. Co., 353 S.W.2d 338, 234 Ark. 574, 1962 Ark. LEXIS 728 (Ark. 1962).

Opinion

Carleton Harris, Chief Justice.

Tbis is a Workmen’s Compensation case. Jim Jolly was employed by J. M. Hampton and Sons Lumber Company, as a sawmill worker, near Mt. Ida, Arkansas. On the morning of October 13, 1959, Jolly, while performing the duties of Ms employment, came in contact with a defective conduit carrying electricity, and received an electric shock, and burns about the face, arm and leg. He was rendered unconscious for several hours, and was taken to St. Joseph’s Hospital in Hot Springs, where he was hospitalized under the care of the Burton-Eisele Clinic. Jolly was discharged a few days later, hut between November 11,1959, and the middle of April, 1960, appellant was, at intervals, in St. Joseph’s Hospital for more than 40 days for treatment, and for skin grafting on his face, mainly the lip and nose. Jolly was paid compensation for a period of twenty-seven weeks and five days, and on April 25th, received his final check in the amount of $36.49, which he refused to cash. On the same date, he resumed work at Hampton’s Mill. His duties were different from those engaged in before the accident, but his pay was the same. Claim for additional compensation was filed, wherein Jolly sought compensation for disfigurement, and permanent partial disability for loss of hearing and impairment of eye-sight. After a hearing before the full Commission, Jolly’s claim was denied and dismissed by that tribunal, and on appeal to the Montgomery Circuit Court, the Commission was affirmed. From such judgment of the court, comes this appeal. Appellant relies upon four points for reversal, the first three dealing with the failure of the Commission and Court to make an award for disfigurement, and the fourth, dealing with Jolly’s failure to receive an award for permanent partial disability. The first three points are all related, and we will discuss them together.

J oily, 55 years of age, testified that he was burned on the leg, arm, face, nose, head and lip — “All of my lip come out. ’ ’ He testified that part of one ear was removed in order to repair his nose, and, when meeting people, he was embarrassed because of his scars. The report of Dr. James A. Jenkins was offered by appellant, and pertinent portions are as follows:

“There is a skin graft scar, wedge shaped, approximately 2x1 1/2 x 1 1/2 cm., in the upper lip, and a nearly circular scar from skin grafting on the left nasal ala. There is a 12 x 15 cm. scar on the lateral aspect on the middle one-third of the left leg. He also has a very mild hyperopia. Neurological examination reveals an anesthesia of the upper lift and left nasal ala. There is also a donor site scar from the skin graft on the helix of the left ear.

It is my opinion that these scars are of disfiguring nature on his face and are permanent. The anesthesia associated with these scars is also permanent.”

Two letters from Dr. James H. French of the BurtonEisele Clinic, relative to Jolly’s condition, were offered in evidence as follows:

“Mr. Jolly was operated April 9, 1960, at which time he had division of the pedicle graft from the cheek to the nose, and further plastic repair to the upper lip. He was discharged from the hospital April 14, 1960, and was last seen in this office April 18, 1960. He was discharged to return to work April 25, 1960.

This patient will be left with noticeable scars about the upper lip and nose, but his prognosis otherwise is good. * * *

Mr. Jolly’s disability will be of a cosmetic nature, that is, scarring of the lips, nose, left cheek and ear. There should be no other physical handicap resulting from his injury.”

Appellant vigorously contends that the disfigurement alone warranted an award. Cases are cited from four states in support of his argument, vis, New York, Illinois, South Carolina, and New Jersey, but these cases are really of no aid to appellant, for statutes of those states are different from the Arkansas Statute. Section 81-1313, Ark. Stats., Anno., subsection (g) provides:

“The Commission shall award compensation for serious and permanent facial or head disfigurement in a sum not to exceed two thousand ($2,000.00) dollars, based solely upon the effect such disfigurement shall have on the future earning capacity of the injured employee in similar employment.1 No award for disfigurement shall be entered until twelve (12) months after the injury. ’ ’

The statutes of the states referred to do not contain the italicized provision. Of course, under this provision, the authority of the Commission to make an award for disfigurement is somewhat limited. Actually, this Court has already held that the only compensable disfigurement is one that affects earning capacity in a similar employment. Long-Bell Lumber Company v. Mitchell, 206 Ark. 854, 177 S. W. 2d 920. It is true that that decision was rendered under our first Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act 319 of 1937), but the provisions of the section of that act relating to disfigurement are substantially the same as the present statute.2 If anything, it appears that the present statute requires even more of a showing that the disfigurement must affect the future earning capacity of the injured employee.

There is no substantial evidence in this record that Jolly’s future employment has been impaired because of the disfigurement. Perhaps one could be so horribly disfigured that his appearance in itself would furnish sufficient evidence that employers would not be prone to employ him, and, of course, people engaged in some vocations or professions would be more adversely affected by disfigurement than those employed in other occupations. For instance, a receptionist, model, beautician, salesman, teacher, i.e., people who constantly deal with, and are before the public, would be much more apt to be refused employment because of their appearance than persons who were seeking employment in capacities where they would only come in contact with fellow employees. In the case before us, Mr. Jolly testified that he believed he was a better looking man before the accident, and this is undoubtedly true, but again, the award is only made when his future earning capacity in similar employment is affected. The Commission found:

"It is true that there are some appearances of disfigurement of claimant’s face, though skillful plastic surgery has tended to reduce it to a considerable extent. However, there is no evidence in the case to meet the requirement of the statute that such disfigurement has had effect upon the claimant’s future earning capacity in similar employment.”

Appellant contends that the Commission acted arbitrarily in refusing to accept the proffered evidence of Delbert Byers, a witness on behalf of appellant, who was asked the question: "Do you know whether or not that facial condition that he’s got, would interfere with getting employment in your part of the country over there?” A. “Well, it would to a certain extent.” Objection was made by appellees and the objection was sustained.

We agree that this was not competent evidence. Byers, a son-in-law of Jolly, possessed no particular qualifications for determining the likelihood of Jolly’s being refused employment. The record does not reflect that he was an employer, or a personnel director, or that he had any experience in employing job applicants.

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Bluebook (online)
353 S.W.2d 338, 234 Ark. 574, 1962 Ark. LEXIS 728, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jolly-v-j-m-hampton-sons-lbr-co-ark-1962.