NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0943-24
JOLESSA A. WADE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JUDEANN M. STRAUSS,
Defendant,
and
WILLIAM STRAUSS and ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents. __________________________
Submitted January 13, 2026 – Decided February 12, 2026
Before Judges Rose and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-5353-21.
Law Offices of Karim Arzadi, attorneys for appellant (Michele Labrada, of counsel and on the briefs). Dwyer Connell & Lisbona LLP, attorneys for respondent William Strauss (Donald S. DeDio and Lauren B. Connell Madia, on the brief).
Goetz Schenker Blee & Wiederhorn, LLP, attorneys for respondent Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company (Daniel W. Szep, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Jolessa A. Wade appeals from the October 25, 2024 summary
judgment dismissal of her first amended complaint against defendants William
Strauss and Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company. In her complaint, plaintiff
sought economic and noneconomic damages allegedly sustained in a motor
vehicle accident while she was employed as an Uber rideshare driver. Because
plaintiff failed to maintain personal automobile liability insurance on her car,
the motion court determined she was barred from maintaining her claims
pursuant to the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (No-Fault Act),
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35.
Plaintiff does not dispute her personal automobile liability insurance
lapsed for nonpayment of the premium before the accident occurred. Citing
N.J.S.A. 39:5H-2 of the Transportation Network Company Safety and
Regulatory Act (TNCSRA), N.J.S.A. 39:5H-1 to -27, plaintiff instead maintains,
at the time of the accident, her "personal vehicle" did not fall within the
A-0943-24 2 definition of an "automobile" under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2 of the No-Fault Act.
Plaintiff therefore contends she was not required to maintain personal injury
protection (PIP) benefits and, as such, the litigation bar set forth in N.J.S.A.
39:6A-4.5(a) of the No-Fault Act does not prohibit her causes of action against
defendants.
Having considered plaintiff's contentions in view of the limited record
before the motion court, we conclude genuine issues of material fact precluded
summary judgment. We therefore reverse the October 25, 2024 order and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
We summarize the facts from the motion record in a light most favorable
to plaintiff as the non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142
N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see also R. 4:46-2(c). The accident occurred in the
afternoon of Wednesday, July 10, 2019, while plaintiff was operating her Mazda
CX7 on Clinton Street in Newark. At the time of the incident, plaintiff was
providing a prearranged ride to a passenger who hired her through the Uber ride-
sharing application.
A-0943-24 3 William1 remained at the scene and reported the accident to police.
According to the responding officer's report, William claimed he was exiting a
parking lot on Clinton Street, while driving a Lexis RX350 registered to Judeann
M. Strauss, when the Lexis was struck by another car whose operator fled the
scene.
Plaintiff left the accident location, but drove to the local police precinct
to report the accident. According to the police report she filed, plaintiff claimed
her car was struck by another car as the driver exited the parking lot.
In her first amended complaint, plaintiff asserted a single cause of action
against William and Judeann seeking damages for serious permanent physical
injuries sustained as the proximate cause of their negligence. 2 In her second
count, plaintiff alleged "[d]efendants, Uber Technologies, Inc. and/or Rasier,
LLC, maintained an automobile insurance policy with . . . [d]efendant,
1 Because the individual defendants share the same surname, we use their first names. We intend no disrespect. 2 The initial complaint sought similar relief, but did not name William. After the first amended complaint was filed, the motion court granted Judeann's unopposed summary judgment motion and dismissed plaintiff's claims against Judeann with prejudice for lack of agency. Judeann is not a party to this appeal. A-0943-24 4 Allstate."3 Plaintiff claimed Allstate "wrongfully failed and refused to provide
uninsured/underinsured benefits to [p]laintiff and to intervene in [p]laintiff's
underlying action."
During discovery plaintiff asserted, as an Uber driver at the time of the
accident, she was insured under Uber policy's issued by Allstate. As reflected
in the declaration sheet, the Allstate policy provided: $1.5 million in liability
coverage; $10,000 in auto medical payments; $1.5 million in uninsured motorist
coverage; and $1.5 million in underinsured motorist coverage.4 The declaration
sheet does not reflect Allstate provided PIP coverage.
At deposition, plaintiff testified she drove the Mazda only while working
for Uber and not for personal use. It is undisputed plaintiff's automobile liability
insurance lapsed prior to the accident for nonpayment of the premium. Plaintiff
further acknowledged while en route to the police precinct to file an accident
report, she did not utilize the Uber application. After filing the report, plaintiff
3 Plaintiff's reference to Uber and Rasier as defendants appears to reflect her underlying complaint as Uber and Rasier were not listed in the caption of the initial or first amended complaint. The underlying complaint was not provided on appeal. Neither Uber nor Rasier is a party to this appeal. 4 The Allstate policy was not included in the record provided on appeal. A-0943-24 5 "took the bus" home, leaving her car "[o]n the street" for "maybe like a week
until [she] was able to get money to get insurance" for her car.
Prior to the close of discovery, William moved for summary judgment and
Allstate thereafter joined his motion. Following arguments on the motion, the
court reserved decision. On October 25, 2024, the court issued a written
decision and accompanying order granting summary judgment in favor of
William and Allstate, thereby dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
In its decision, the court addressed the parties' arguments pursuant to its
interpretation of the governing law. The court determined, at the time of the
accident, plaintiff was driving an "automobile" as defined in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2
of the No-Fault Act, and not – as plaintiff contended – a "personal vehicle" as
defined in the TNCSRA.
Noting plaintiff did not dispute she failed to maintain insurance on her
Mazda, the court found she therefore failed to comply with TNCSRA's
requirements under N.J.S.A. 39:5H-16 and -19, that a transportation network
company (TNC) driver possess proof of valid automobile liability insurance.
Because plaintiff allowed her automobile liability insurance to lapse, the court
determined plaintiff was not authorized to utilize Uber's digital network as a
TNC driver or provide prearranged rides at the time of the accident under
A-0943-24 6 N.J.S.A. 39:5H-20(f). The court reasoned "[p]laintiff c[ould not] violate the
terms of the TNC[SRA] and seek refuge in that act to excuse a violation of New
Jersey's compulsory automobile insurance laws." The court found plaintiff's
argument "at odds with the overall statutory scheme of New Jersey's automobile
liability insurance laws."
Finding no genuine issues of fact precluded judgment as a matter of law
on plaintiff's failure to maintain insurance under the No-Fault Act, the court was
persuaded plaintiff was "culpably uninsured" under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). The
court therefore concluded plaintiff was barred from recovering economic and
noneconomic losses sustained as a result of the July 10, 2019 accident pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). This appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo a trial court's decision on a summary judgment motion.
See Conforti v. County of Ocean, 255 N.J. 142, 162 (2023). Employing the
same standard as the trial court, we review the record to determine whether there
are material factual disputes and, if not, whether the undisputed facts viewed a
light most favorable to plaintiff, as the non-moving party, nonetheless entitle
defendant to judgment as a matter of law. See Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73,
78 (2022); Brill, 142 N.J. at 540; see also R. 4:46-2(c). We owe no deference
A-0943-24 7 to the trial court's legal analysis. The Palisades at Fort Lee Condo. Ass'n, Inc.
v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427, 442 (2017).
We likewise review de novo matters of statutory interpretation. Grillo v.
State, 469 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (2021); see also Malzberg v. Josey, 473 N.J.
Super. 537, 545-46 (App. Div. 2022) (reviewing the trial court's interpretation
of the TNCSRA "with a fresh set of eyes"). Because "[t]his is a case of statutory
interpretation," we must "'discern and give effect' to the Legislature's intent."
State v. Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 488 (2015) (quoting State v. O'Driscoll, 215 N.J.
461, 474 (2013)). Ordinarily, "the best indicator of that intent is the statutory
language" itself, DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005), and "courts
should 'ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance,
and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the
legislation as a whole,'" Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 101
(2009) (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).
"It is firmly established that '[t]he first step in determining the
Legislature's intent is to look at the plain language of the statute.'" Cohen v.
Southbridge Park, Inc., 369 N.J. Super. 156, 161 (App. Div. 2004) (alteration in
original) (quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001)). "[W]hen the
language of a statute is clear on its face, 'the sole function of the courts is to
A-0943-24 8 enforce it according to its terms.'" Ibid. (quoting Hubbard, 168 N.J. at 329); see
also Munafo, 222 N.J. at 488 (holding "a court may not rewrite a statute or add
language that the Legislature omitted"); O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488
(2002) (holding "a court may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the
Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that
expressed by way of the plain language"). We must "construe and apply the
statute as enacted." In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548
(1980).
In the present matter, plaintiff does not dispute she lacked personal
automobile liability insurance at the time of the accident. Rather, at issue is
whether plaintiff was driving an "automobile" as defined in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a)
of the No-Fault Act thereby requiring her to maintain PIP benefits at the time of
the accident and, because she failed to do so, whether she was barred from
pursuing her claim for economic and noneconomic damages under N.J.S.A.
39:6A-4.5(a).
"To reduce the cost of automobile insurance, protect victims of
automobile accidents and reduce public expenditures when accidents are caused
by judgment-proof tortfeasors," our state has enacted a comprehensive statutory
scheme centering on compulsory insurance laws. Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J.
A-0943-24 9 193, 201 (2011). "All owners of motor vehicles registered or principally
garaged in New Jersey are required to maintain minimum amounts of standard,
basic, or special liability insurance coverage for bodily injury, death, and
property damage caused by their vehicles." Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am.,
178 N.J. 460, 466 (2004) (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1). Accordingly, "automobile
accident victims are not left without the means to recover financially for their
injuries from a judgment-proof tortfeasor." Ibid.
Building on that requirement, in 1972, New Jersey enacted the No-Fault
Act, which further directs all insurance policies "include PIP benefits, which
guarantee 'without regard to fault,' medical expense coverage for the named
insured and members of his or her household." Perrelli, 206 N.J. at 201 (quoting
Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 466); see also N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. The No-Fault Act further
provides:
Any person who, at the time of an automobile accident resulting in injuries to that person, is required but fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage mandated by [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, -3.1 or -3.3] shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of an accident while operating an uninsured automobile.
[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).]
A-0943-24 10 This limitation on the right to sue, and other limitations contained in the
No-Fault Act, were intended to further its two primary goals, that is, to: (1)
"provide prompt payment of medical expenses arising from an automobile
accident, regardless of fault"; and (2) "contain the rising cost of automobile
insurance premiums." Goyco v. Progressive Ins. Co., 257 N.J. 313, 320 (2024)
(quoting Cooper Hosp. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 249 N.J.
174, 179 (2021)). These restrictions on the right to sue are considered "trade-
off[s] for lower premiums and prompt payment of medical expenses." Caviglia,
178 N.J. at 467. Thus, "an injured, uninsured driver [cannot] draw on the pool
of accident-victim insurance funds to which he [or she] did not contribute." Id.
at 471. In this way, the legislation provides a "very powerful incentive to
comply with the compulsory insurance laws: obtain automobile liability
insurance coverage or lose the right to maintain a suit for both economic and
noneconomic injuries." Ibid.
Under the No-Fault Act, an "automobile" is defined as:
[A] private passenger automobile of a private passenger or station wagon type that is owned or hired and is neither used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers nor rented to others with a driver; and a motor vehicle with a pickup body, a delivery sedan, a van, or a panel truck or a camper type vehicle used for recreational purposes owned by an individual or by husband and wife who are residents of the same
A-0943-24 11 household, not customarily used in the occupation, profession or business of the insured other than farming or ranching. . . .
[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a).]
Enacted in 2017, the TNCSRA established statewide standards for TNCs,
such as Uber, by outlining various requirements for these companies and their
drivers and riders. See N.J.S.A. 39:5H-3 to -26. In doing so, the Legislature
"clearly recognized the commercial and societal value of new technologies that
use mobile digital networks to connect customers with service providers."
Malzberg, 473 N.J. Super. at 554. Pursuant to the TNCSRA, a TNC provides
access to its "digital network," typically in the form of a cellphone application,
to connect a rider with a driver. N.J.S.A. 39:5H-2. In exchange for
compensation, a TNC driver uses a "personal vehicle" to provide a "prearranged
ride," that is, a ride arranged through the TNC's digital network that begins when
a driver accepts the request and ends when the rider exits the vehicle. Ibid.
Under the TNCSRA, a "personal vehicle" is defined as:
[A] motor vehicle that is used by a [TNC] driver to provide prearranged rides and is owned, leased, or otherwise authorized for use by the [TNC] driver. . . . A personal vehicle shall not be considered an automobile as defined in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2] while a [TNC] driver is providing a prearranged ride.
[N.J.S.A. 39:5H-2.]
A-0943-24 12 Plaintiff maintains the undisputed record demonstrates, when the accident
occurred, she was a TNC driver providing a "prearranged ride" to an individual
via the Uber application. Citing our pre-TNCSRA decision in Bello v. Hurley
Limousines, 249 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 1991), Allstate counters the
temporary use of plaintiff's vehicle in providing prearranged rides does not
overcome its general classification as a private passenger automobile under the
No-Fault Act.
Similar to the present matter, the issue in Bello was whether a car involved
in a pedestrian death met the definition of an "automobile" in N.J.S.A. 39:6A -
2(a). 249 N.J. Super. at 36. We concluded a four-door sedan registered as a
limousine, but temporarily used by the driver for his own personal business, was
a limousine and not an "automobile" under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a). Id. at 36-37.
We held a "motor vehicle's classification as a public or livery conveyance for
passengers" under the No-Fault Act "does not change by its temporary or
transitory use for some other purpose. Rather, the motor vehicle's general status
controls its classification." Id. at 37.
We held "[h]ad the Legislature intended that the motor vehicle's use at the
precise time of the accident controlled its classification, it is reasonable to
conclude that the Legislature would have included language to that effect in the
A-0943-24 13 [No-Fault] Act." Ibid. We reasoned "classifying vehicles by their use at the
precise time of the accident would create chaos and undermine the purposes of
the Act." Ibid.
Bello does not command the same result here. Under the TNCSRA, a
vehicle's temporary use expressly affects its general classification. See N.J.S.A.
39:5H-2. As we explained in Bello, the Legislature knows how to include
language in a statute when it intends a "motor vehicle's use at the precise time
of the accident control[s] its classification." 249 N.J. Super. at 37. Although
the Legislature did not include the "vehicle's use" language in the No-Fault Act,
the Legislature expressly stated a "personal vehicle shall not be considered an
automobile as defined [in the No-Fault Act] while a [TNC] driver is providing
a prearranged ride." N.J.S.A. 39:5H-2.
A plain reading of the definitions embodied in the No-Fault Act and
TNCSRA, reveals their terms are clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., DiProspero,
183 N.J. at 492. There is no dispute that at the time of the accident, plaintiff
was a TNC driver, who operated her motor vehicle while "providing a
prearranged ride" to a passenger. Construing N.J.S.A. 39:5H-2 as enacted,
under these circumstances, we conclude plaintiff's Mazda fell squarely within
the TNCSRA's definition of a "personal vehicle."
A-0943-24 14 We also part company with the motion court's conclusion that, because
plaintiff violated certain provisions of the TNCSRA, her vehicle could not be
considered a "personal vehicle" as defined in N.J.S.A. 39:5H-2. Stated another
way, the court held because the TNCSRA required plaintiff to maintain
automobile liability insurance on her personal vehicle, her failure to do so barred
her from seeking the TNCSRA's protection. To support its decision, the court
cited N.J.S.A. 39:5H-16, -19, and -20; on appeal William also cites N.J.S.A.
39:5H-11. None of these provisions is dispositive.
Both N.J.S.A. 39:5H-16 and -19 pertain to a TNC driver's application
process. N.J.S.A. 39:5H-16 requires TNC applicants to include, among other
information, "a copy of [their] . . . automobile liability insurance" in their
application. N.J.S.A. 39:5H-19, requires a TNC to "conduct a social security
number trace" of applicants and provides the applicant the option of submitting
three of eleven specified documents. One of the documents listed as an option
is "the applicant's automobile liability insurance policy." N.J.S.A. 39:5H-
19(a)(3).
A plain reading of these provisions demonstrates they set forth
documentation and other requirements for TNCs and their drivers as part of the
application process. But these provisions neither impose ongoing obligations
A-0943-24 15 on TNC drivers to maintain personal automobile liability insurance, nor bar or
limit insurance coverage for their failure to do so. Simply stated, these
provisions govern the application and approval process. Further, the record
contains no indication, nor do defendants contend, plaintiff failed to comply
with these requirements when she submitted her application to Uber.
Similarly, N.J.S.A. 39:5H-11 requires a TNC to provide written notice to
its drivers regarding the company's insurance coverage before they begin
accepting ride requests, N.J.S.A. 39:5H-11(a), and to inform them that their
personal automobile insurance may not apply while using the platform, N.J.S.A.
39:5H-11(b). These provisions do not mandate a TNC driver maintain personal
automobile insurance.
We turn to the motion court's finding that, by allowing her insurance to
lapse, plaintiff also violated the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:5H-20(f) (Section
20(f)), which directs:
An applicant or driver shall be prohibited from utilizing the [TNC]'s digital network as a [TNC] driver or from providing a prearranged ride as a [TNC] driver if . . . [t]he applicant or driver does not possess proof of valid automobile liability insurance for the personal vehicle[.]
Asserting she was insured under Allstate's policy issued to Uber, plaintiff
argues that policy was a valid automobile liability insurance policy covering her
A-0943-24 16 "personal vehicle" at the time of the incident. Defendants urge us to affirm the
court's conclusion that, because plaintiff allowed her personal automobile
liability insurance to lapse, she did not possess proof of valid automobile
liability insurance as Section 20(f) requires. They contend plaintiff not only was
prohibited from accessing Uber's digital network and from providing a
prearranged ride, but also this violation precluded her from invoking the
TNCSRA's protections.
The TNCSRA does not outline the statutory consequences of violating
Section 20(f), or whether a violation renders plaintiff ineligible to invoke its
protections. Notably, the parties do not dispute, on the date of the accident,
plaintiff accessed Uber's digital network and was connected to a TNC rider –
and, at that time, was providing a prearranged ride to her passenger.
However, there is no evidence in the motion record to support the court's'
conclusion that a TNC driver's violation of Section 20(f) removes the driver's
car from the definition of a "personal vehicle" under the TNCSRA. That
determination hinges on two elements, whether: (1) plaintiff was insured by
Allstate through Uber; and (2) Allstate's policy was "valid automobile liability
insurance" under Section 20(f). Because the motion court did not resolve these
A-0943-24 17 factors, we remand the issue for consideration. We add the following remarks
for guidance on remand.
In remanding this matter, we recognize the TNCSRA does not expressly
define the term "valid automobile liability insurance." Elsewhere in the act
however, a TNC driver's automobile insurance requirements are specified.
N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(a) to (j). Specifically,
a [TNC] driver, [TNC], or any combination of the two shall maintain primary automobile insurance that recognizes that the driver is a [TNC] driver, or otherwise uses a personal vehicle to provide prearranged rides, and covers the driver: (1) while the driver is logged on to the [TNC]'s digital network but is not providing a prearranged ride; or (2) while the driver is providing a prearranged ride.
[N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(a).]
The insurance requirements differ depending upon whether the TNC drive r is
providing a ride.
When a TNC driver is logged into the digital network and "is available to
receive a prearranged ride request, but is not providing a prearranged ride,"
N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(b) directs:
[T]he [TNC] driver, [TNC], or any combination of the two shall maintain the following insurance coverage:
(1) primary automobile liability insurance in the amount of at least $50,000 for death or bodily
A-0943-24 18 injury per person, $100,000 for death or bodily injury per incident, and $25,000 for property damage;
(2) primary [PIP] benefits that provide coverage amounts selected pursuant to section 4 of [the No-Fault Act]; and
(3) uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to the extent required pursuant to section 2 of [N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1].
Relevant here, when "a [TNC] driver is providing a prearranged ride,"
N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(c) provides:
[T]he [TNC] driver, [TNC], or any combination of the two shall maintain the following insurance coverage:
(1) primary automobile liability insurance in the amount of at least $1,500,000 for death, bodily injury, and property damage;
(2) primary automobile insurance for medical payments benefits in an amount of at least $10,000 per person per incident, which shall only apply to and provide coverage for the benefit of the [TNC] driver; and
(3) uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in an amount of at least $1,500,000.
Accordingly, the TNCSRA requires higher insurance coverage when a
driver is providing a prearranged ride versus when a driver is logged into the
digital network but not engaged in a prearranged ride. Of particular relevance
A-0943-24 19 to the issues raised on this appeal, subsection (b) mandates PIP coverage in
accordance with the No-Fault Act whereas subsection (c) contains no such
requirement. Compare N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(b), with N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(c).
Further, the TNCSRA requires primary automobile insurance for medical
payments, but this coverage is limited and inures to the benefit of the TNC
driver. N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(c).
Because it is undisputed plaintiff was providing a prearranged ride at the
time of the accident, subsection (c) governs the determination as to whether
Allstate's policy satisfied the applicable insurance requirements. According to
the declaration sheet provided on appeal, the Allstate policy provides the
necessary coverage amounts outlined in N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(c). Therefore, if
plaintiff was insured by Allstate at the time of the accident, she would meet the
TNCSRA's coverage requirements.
The "determination of whether an individual is an insured under an
insurance policy is a matter of law to be decided by the court" requiring the court
"interpret the policy 'according to its plain language and ordinary meaning'" and
construe the policy "'to comport with the insured's reasonable expectations of
coverage.'" Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Palisades Safety & Ins. Ass'n, 364 N.J. Super.
A-0943-24 20 599, 604 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 166
N.J. 260, 272-74 (2001)).
Here, the trial court emphasized plaintiff's personal automobile liability
insurance lapsed, but overlooked the possibility she may have been insured by
Allstate through Uber's policy at the time of the accident, as she argues. Because
the Allstate policy detailing the scope and limitations of coverage was not
included in the motion record, however, we cannot interpret the policy according
to its plain language and ordinary meaning.
Although defendants argue plaintiff was operating an uninsured motor
vehicle, neither addresses whether plaintiff was covered under Uber's policy
with Allstate. Instead, in his responding brief, William cites Uber's website as
of "May 6, 2025,"5 which states:
All drivers must maintain their own insurance policy in accordance with state and local laws. For uberX and uberXL in NJ that means valid insurance with coverage that meets or exceeds New Jersey's minimum financial responsibility requirements, with the driver's name on the insurance policy.
5 William included a three-page printout of Uber's website in his appellate appendix, but the printout appears to have cut off information, there are references to hyperlinks and videos that this court cannot access, and several sections direct the reader to other parts of Uber's website for additional information. A-0943-24 21 In addition, Uber maintains automobile liability insurance on behalf of all U.S. drivers.
There are at least two problems with this information. Initially, the
information was not presented to the motion court for consideration and, thus, it
is inappropriate for consideration on appeal. See Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199,
226-27 (2014). Secondly, trial and appellate courts cannot "fill in missing
information on their own." N.J. Dep't. of Child. & Fams. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 28
(2013).
In any event, it is unclear from the record whether Uber's requirements
were implemented at the time of the accident in 2019. Because this information
was not included in the motion record, we cannot determine Uber's requirements
at the time of the accident and the consequences, if any, Uber imposed if those
requirements were breached.
On remand, the parties shall provide to the court for its consideration the
full Allstate policy issued to Uber and Uber's requirements, if any, in effect at
the time of the accident. We leave to the court's sound discretion whether to
permit further briefing and argument. In remanding this matter, we do not
suggest a preferred result, but only that the court fully interpret the Allstate
policy "according to its plain language and ordinary meaning." See Hurley, 166
N.J. at 272-73.
A-0943-24 22 Reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction is not retained.
A-0943-24 23