RENDERED: JUNE 13, 2024 TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2022-SC-0508-DG
BRADLEY RACING STABLES, LLC; APPELLANTS AND WILLIAM BUFF BRADLEY
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2021-CA-0766 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 19-CI-001372
JOI DENISE ROBY; BLUE CROSS APPELLEES BLUE SHIELD OF TEXAS; CHURCHILL DOWNS, INC.; AND KYLE MCGINTY
AND
2022-SC-0516-DG
CHURCHILL DOWNS, INC. APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2021-CA-0766 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 19-CI-001372
JOI DENISE ROBY; BLUE CROSS APPELLEES BLUE SHIELD OF TEXAS; BRADLEY RACING STABLES, LLC; WILLIAM BUFF BRADLEY; AND KYLE MCGINTY
2022-SC-0523-DG
JOI DENISE ROBY AND APPELLANTS BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF TEXAS ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2021-CA-0766 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 19-CI-001372
CHURCHILL DOWNS, INC.; APPELLEES BRADLEY RACING STABLES, LLC; WILLIAM BUFF BRADLEY; AND KYLE MCGINTY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE VANMETER
REVERSING
The Farm Animals Activity Act (“FAAA”), KRS 1 247.401–.4029, “provides
limited liability for those engaged in farm animal activities.” Keeneland Ass’n,
Inc. v. Prather, 627 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Ky. 2021). However, limited liability
“shall not apply to farm animal activity sponsors, farm animal activity
professionals, persons, or participants when engaged in horse racing activities.”
KRS 247.4025(1) (emphasis added). This case presents another opportunity for
us to clarify the parameters of engaging in horse racing activities. Specifically,
we address whether a horse stabled in the backside of Churchill Downs during
a race meet, in this instance the Kentucky Derby, but not actively engaged in
any activities related to the races, was engaged in horse racing activities for the
purposes of the FAAA exemption. We hold that an animal not actively engaged
in activities directly related to the running of a horse race is not exempted
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes
2 under KRS 247.4025(1), regardless of the fact that the horse was stabled in a
location actively involved in horse racing.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During the 2018 Kentucky Derby, Kyle McGinty invited Joi Denise Roby
and her husband to the backside stable area of Churchill Downs. This area
was not open to the public and individuals needed credentials to gain access to
the area. As a Kentucky Horse Racing Commission (“KHRC”) license holder,
McGinty was credentialed to access the area and was allowed to admit two
personal guests. Roby and her husband did not purchase tickets to enter the
Churchill Downs racetrack but were permitted as McGinty’s personal guests.
At the gate entrance where Roby and her husband met with McGinty, a
warning sign was posted. The warning sign, as required by KRS 247.4027(3)
stated:
WARNING. Under Kentucky law, a farm animal activity sponsor, farm animal professional, or other person does not have the duty to eliminate all risks of injury of participation in farm animal activities. There are inherent risks of injury that you voluntarily accept if you participate in farm animal activities.
As McGinty’s personal guests, Roby and her husband walked through
the backside passing several horses stabled in the area. Roby was familiar
with and comfortable around horses. She owned a quarter horse, had ridden
horses for most of her life, and was aware of the inherent risks of being around
them, including the unpredictable nature to bite. Those inherent risks did not
stop her from interacting with the horses in their stalls. She was petting
horses, giving them peppermints, and taking photographs with them. One of
3 the horses Roby approached was a stable pony named Henry. 2 Henry was
owned by Bradley and was used to escort racehorses to and from the track,
although not on the day in question. As Roby approached Henry in his stall,
he lunged and bit her.
Roby sued Bradley and Churchill Downs in Jefferson Circuit Court for
breaching its duty to maintain and keep the premises safe for the use of its
patrons, failing to exercise reasonable care for the safety of Roby, and failing to
eliminate or warn of dangerous conditions on the premises. 3 Bradley and
Churchill Downs moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the FAAA
exemption contained in KRS 247.4025(1) did not apply to Churchill Downs
because the stabling of a horse was a farm animal activity, not a horse racing
activity. As for Bradley, the court held the FAAA horse racing exemption did
not apply because Roby was engaged in a farm animal activity when she was
bit by the horse. The court also ruled that Roby was a licensee because she
conferred no benefit to Churchill Downs and no evidence in the record
supported a breach of duty. As to the application of LMCO 4 § 91.028(A), the
2 “Stable ponies” are non-racing horses that tend to be older and friendlier than
thoroughbred racehorses. These stable ponies act as a calming presence for the racehorses to better control them as they go to and from the track. 3 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas filed an intervening complaint against
Churchill Downs and Bradley. The Jefferson Circuit Court through an agreed order permitted Blue Cross Blue Shield to intervene as subrogee of Roby. 4 Louisville Metro Code of Ordinances.
4 court held it did not impose strict liability for injuries caused by horses. Roby
appealed.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Jefferson Circuit Court holding on
LMCO § 91.028(A) but reversed the trial court orders granting summary
judgment for Bradley and Churchill Downs. The Court of Appeals found that
the horse racing exemption applied because: 1) live racing was occurring; 2)
Roby was injured after being bitten by a horse located on the premises; and 3)
the horse was used to escort racehorses to and from the track. The court then
found that Roby was an invitee under the analysis in Bramlett v. Ryan, 635
S.W.3d 831 (Ky. 2021).
Bradley, Churchill Downs, and Roby all sought discretionary review from
this Court, which we granted. Bradley and Churchill Downs sought
discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ ruling as to the applicability of the
FAAA horse racing exemption and Roby’s status as an invitee. Roby sought
discretionary review on the Court of Appeals’ application of LMCO § 91.028(A).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when the record shows “no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” CR 5 56.03. As a matter of law, we review issues relative to
statutory construction de novo. We owe no deference to the construction of
5 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
5 statutes by the trial court or Court of Appeals. Cumberland Valley Contractors,
Inc. v. Bell Cnty. Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Ky. 2007).
The primary objective in construing statutory language is determining
the intent of the legislature in enacting the legislation. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of
Educ. v. Fell, 391 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Ky. 2012). To do so, we look first to the
language of the statute, giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
at 719; Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011);
Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't, 260 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Ky.
2008). Statutes are to be construed as they are written, and “the intent of the
legislature must be deduced from the language it used, when it is plain and
unambiguous[.]” W. Ky. Coal Co. v. Nall & Bailey, 228 Ky. 76, 80, 14 S.W.2d
400, 401-02 (1929). This Court has previously held “the language of the FAAA
[to be] clear and the provisions . . . easily applied to the parties and activities in
this case.” Prather, 627 S.W.3d at 883. We once again find that to be true
here.
III. ANALYSIS
This case turns on the interpretation of the FAAA horse racing exemption
contained in KRS 247.4025(1). We must decide whether any party was
“engaged in horse racing activities” at the time of Roby’s injuries. Whether or
not the horse racing exemption applies here will determine liability for
Churchill Downs and Bradley.
6 A. The FAAA horse racing exemption does not apply to Roby.
“The FAAA was enacted to define the duties of persons responsible for
farm animals to others who participate [or engage] in farm animal activities.”
Prather, 627 S.W.3d at 883 (citing KRS 247.4013). 6 A person “engages in a
farm animal activity” by:
[L]eading, showing, exhibiting, riding, training, providing, or assisting in providing medical treatment of, grooming, driving, or being a passenger upon a farm animal, whether mounted or unmounted; visiting, touring, or utilizing a farm animal facility as part of an organized event or activity; or assisting a participant or show management in farm animal activities. The term does not include being a spectator at a farm animal activity, except in cases where the spectator voluntarily places himself or herself in immediate proximity to the activity.
KRS 247.4015(1).
Our legislature wanted to preserve and promote the long Kentucky
tradition of activities involving farm animals and the safety of its participants.
KRS 247.401. To accomplish that goal the legislature established that,
“persons do not have a duty to eliminate risks inherent in farm animal
activities which are beyond their immediate control if those risks are or should
be reasonably obvious, expected or necessary to participants engaged in farm
animal activities.” KRS 247.4013. Although farm animal activity sponsors,
farm animal professionals, or other persons do not have a duty to eliminate
those inherent risks, they still owe a duty to reasonably warn of the inherent
risks of the farm animal activities. KRS 247.402(1). With few exceptions, if
6 The FAAA includes horses as a type of farm animal. KRS 247.4015(2).
7 participants are reasonably warned of the inherent risks of farm animal
activities, then they shall not “make any claim against, maintain an action
against, or recover from a farm animal activity sponsor, a farm animal
professional, or any other person for injury, loss, damage, or death of the
participant resulting from any of the inherent risks of farm animal activities.” 7
Id. Those “inherent risks of farm animal activities” include, but are not limited
to, the unpredictability of a horse’s reaction “to sounds, sudden movement,
and unfamiliar . . . persons.” KRS 247.4015(9)(b).
In addressing farm animal activities, our legislature also described
certain other related activities that were not to be granted limited liability by
exempting those activities from FAAA application. One such exemption is for
those engaged in horse racing activities. The FAAA states it “shall not apply to
farm animal activity sponsors, farm animal activity professionals, persons, or
participants when engaged in horse racing activities.” KRS 247.4025(1)
(emphasis added). The FAAA defined “‘horse racing activities’ [to be] the
conduct of horse racing activities within the confines of any horse racing
facility licensed and regulated by KRS 230.070 to 230.990, but shall not
include harness racing at county fairs.” KRS 247.4015(8). By defining “horse
racing activities” as, essentially, “horse racing activities”, the legislature left us
with little direction beyond the common meaning of the phrase. Thus, unlike
7 KRS 247.402(2)-(3) provides exceptions for participants to file claims against
farm animal activity sponsors, farm animal professionals, or any other persons, none of which apply in this case.
8 “engages in a farm animal activity,” the FAAA did not define what it means to
engage in a horse racing activity beyond providing a geographical limitation.
We reason that a horse racing activity is in some way different than a
farm animal activity. That difference between “engaging in a horse racing
activity” and “engaging in a farm animal activity” is enough to be exempted
from FAAA application. The line between when one is engaged in farm animal
activities and horse racing activities presents a fact-intensive question focused
on the actions of the animal itself, taken in context, as opposed to a blanket
determination taken from the general character of the event. Fortunately, the
case before us presents a clear-cut instance where an animal was engaged only
in farm animal activities despite the occurrence of racing at the same venue.
This conclusion flows naturally from our prior decisions regarding the
horse racing exemption. This Court has previously held the horse racing
exemption did not apply when someone fell to the ground after a horse broke
loose at Keeneland. Prather, 627 S.W.3d at 881. Prather visited Keeneland
during a September Yearling Sale event. Id. at 880. Sales events involve an
enclosed sales pavilion where auctions occur, and the premises includes a
backside area where the horses are stalled. Id. at 881. Keeneland’s sales also
typically do not occur concurrently with racing meets at the track. Id. at 886.
The events that led to Prather’s injury occurred when a horse broke loose as a
handler was loading the horse into a van. Id. The horse bolted towards
Prather’s direction, and he fell trying to avoid the horse. Id.
9 We determined the horse racing exemption did not apply because
Prather’s injuries stemmed from an inherent risk of engaging in a farm animal
activity, not a horse racing activity. Prather, 627 S.W.3d at 887-88. “A horse
becoming ‘spooked’ or getting loose from its handler is something farm animal
activity sponsors and participants should recognize as an obvious risk.” Id. at
888. “Prather, a participant familiar with horses generally . . . testified that the
area where the horse was crossing was very crowded with people. Any number
of things could have startled the horse and caused it to break loose from the
handler.” Id. at 889.
Roby’s case is like Prather in many aspects. Both Roby and Prather had
experience in the horse industry and were aware of the inherent risks
associated with horses. Id. at 889. Roby owned her own horse, rode horses for
many years, and was aware of the unpredictability of horses to bite. Prather
had two previous employment experiences involving horses and worked for
another company where a horse got loose. Id. Another similarity between the
two cases is that both Keeneland and Churchill Downs had clearly visible signs
warning of the inherent risks of farm animal activities, in accordance with KRS
247.4027(3). Id. at 888.
Roby’s case has distinguishable facts. In Prather, “[n]o live racing was
occurring” on the day Prather was injured. Id. at 886. Live horse racing was
occurring on the day Roby was injured. Roby was also not located in an area
open to the public. She was in a restricted access area of Churchill Downs
under McGinty’s escort. Further, the horse that bit Roby was responsible for
10 escorting racehorses to and from the track — although the horse was not
engaged in that activity that day. While distinguishable, the differences are not
enough for this Court to find that the horse racing exemption applies to Roby.
The primary complication presented by Roby’s case is that the incident
occurred on Churchill Downs’ busiest day of the year, although no dispute
exists that the offending horse was merely boarding on the backside of the
track. Accordingly, these activities were conducted within the confines of a
horse racing facility and the situs element of the horse racing exemption is
satisfied. Roby’s argument relies on the distinguishing facts from Prather to
meet the conduct element of “engaged in horse racing activities.” She argues
the horse racing exemption should apply because horse racing was occurring
on the day she was injured, she was injured on the premises, and the horse
was used to escort racehorses to and from the track. Roby contends that if
these facts do not qualify as horse racing activities, then the exemption will
most likely only be applied to jockeys during the actual race itself. We
disagree.
As relates to Henry the horse, neither Bradley nor Churchill Downs were
engaged in horse racing activities at the time Roby was injured. Bradley owned
the horse that bit Roby and used the horse to escort racehorses to and from
track. But at the time Henry bit Roby, the horse was not being used to escort a
racehorse to the track. The horse was in its stall when Roby approached it.
Bradley was engaged in a farm animal activity as defined in KRS 247.4015. He
was “[b]oarding farm animals” and “utilizing a farm animal facility as part of an
11 organized event or activity.” See KRS 247.4015(1) (defining engages in a farm
animal activity); see also KRS 247.4015(3)(c) (defining farm animal activities).
Bradley’s activity fits that of a farm animal activity, but not a horse racing
activity.
Whether Churchill Downs was engaged in horse racing activities is a
closer call. Roby was injured on Derby Day and Churchill Downs was engaged
in live horse racing on that day. However, Churchill Downs also boards
hundreds of horses at its location year-round. Not every horse stalled at a
horse racing facility is engaged in horse racing activities whenever live horse
racing is occurring. At the time of Roby’s injuries, Churchill Downs was also
engaged in the farm animal activity of boarding a farm animal. Churchill
Downs was not using the horse to escort racehorses to the racetrack. Applying
the horse racing exemption to every horse located at a horse racing facility even
if that horse has nothing to do with the horse racing defeats the legislature’s
goal of preserving the long Kentucky tradition of activities involving horses. 8
Roby was also not engaged in horse racing activities as a participant.
She was interacting with the horses in their stalls in a restricted access area.
Roby obtained admission to the backside with the plan to watch the races from
that area. By walking past and interacting with the horses she “voluntarily
8 This conclusion also avoids the absurd result that simply by virtue of racing
occurring at a track, any and all farm animals located on the premises are somehow involved in horse racing activities. We can imagine no reasonable argument that the chickens and goats known to roam the backside of Churchill Downs would be “engaged in horse racing activities” simply by being present during a meet.
12 place[d] . . . herself in immediate proximity of the [farm animal] activity.” KRS
247.4015(1).
Not applying the horse racing exemption to Roby’s case does not mean
the exemption will only be limited to jockeys during the race and/or stable
hands near a racehorse. 9 The key to applying the horse racing exemption is to
determine whether the activity engaged in at the time of the injury meets the
definition of engaging in a farm animal activity. If the activity engaged in at the
time of the injury possesses some direct relationship to horse racing, then it
could meet the definition of a horse racing activity. For example, and as shown
by the recent running of the 150th Kentucky Derby, the paddock and track
area can host massive crowds of people standing near horses engaged in a
horse racing activity. Without deciding, we believe one would be hard-pressed
to argue the horse racing exemption did not apply were any of those people to
be injured by a thoroughbred or stable pony in that context. Thus, the horse
racing exemption is not rendered meaningless but is instead focused in on the
activities that uniquely occur at horse racing events.
In sum, horse racing activities were occurring at Churchill Downs during
the Kentucky Derby, but not when Roby was bitten by the horse. Bradley,
Churchill Downs, and Roby were engaged in a farm animal activity at the time
9 We make no pronouncement concerning possible application of the FAAA to
jockeys or stable hands. In Munday v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 600 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. App. 1980), the Court of Appeals held that under the facts presented a jockey was an independent contractor, not an employee, and not, therefore, entitled to workers’ compensation.
13 she suffered her injuries. The horse was secured in its stall and was not
escorting any racehorses to and from the track at the time he bit Roby.
Therefore, the FAAA horse racing exemption, KRS 247.4025(1), does not apply
to Roby’s injuries.
B. LMCO § 91.028(A) does not apply to Roby’s injuries.
Roby argues that Bradley and Churchill Downs should be liable for her
personal injuries caused by the horse because LMCO § 91.028(A) imposes
liability for any personal injury caused by an animal. We agree with the lower
courts and find Roby’s argument to be unconvincing.
LMCO § 91.028(A) states “[a]ny person, owning, controlling or having
care or custody of any animal shall be liable for any personal injury caused by
such animal, and for any damages caused by such animal to public or private
property.” While on its face, the ordinance would appear to apply to Roby’s
case, in light of our holding above, LMCO § 91.028(A) is inapplicable. In this
instance, the breadth of Louisville’s ordinance brings it into conflict with the
FAAA which specifically limits liability for persons that would otherwise be held
liable under LMCO § 91.028(A). Where a municipal ordinance conflicts with
state law, the ordinance is rendered invalid. Boyle v. Campbell, 450 S.W.2d
265, 268 (Ky. 1970). Accordingly, the FAAA prevails over the ordinance and
Bradley and Churchill Downs do not owe Roby a duty under LMCO § 91.028(A)
and are not liable.
14 C. Roby’s argument as to the duty owed by Churchill Downs is moot. In her argument before this Court, Roby contends that Churchill Downs
owed her a duty of care such that they could be held liable for the injuries she
sustained while on its property. Because we have already held that the FAAA
precludes liability for Roby’s injury, Roby’s arguments regarding the duty owed
to her by Churchill Downs are rendered moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate
the Jefferson Circuit Court orders granting summary judgment to Bradley and
Churchill Downs.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS/APPELLEES, WILLIAM BRADLEY AND BRADLEY RACING STABLES, LLC:
James P. Nolan II Neil P. Baine Matthew F.X. Craven Perry A. Adanick Rolfes Henry Co., LPA
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE, JOI DENISE ROBY:
Jennifer R. Hall Hall Legal Group, PLLC
Nicholas Darrell Mudd Mudd Legal Group, PLLC
15 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE, CHURCHILL DOWNS INC.:
Patricia C. Le Meur Katherine T. Watts John F. Parker, Jr. Phillips Parker Orberson & Arnett, PLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF TEXAS:
Linda Helen Clare Anthony George Galasso, Jr.
APPELLEE: Kyle McGinty, Pro se