Johnston v. Parkin

Ohio Court of Appeals

Johnston v. Parkin

168 N.E. 755, 33 Ohio App. 174, 6 Ohio Law. Abs. 685, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 366

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedOctober 17, 1928

Docket1577

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 168 N.E. 755 (Johnston v. Parkin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Johnston v. Parkin, 168 N.E. 755, 33 Ohio App. 174, 6 Ohio Law. Abs. 685, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 366 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928).

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Opinion

PARDEE, J.

We have had cited to us, by the attorneys in this case, the decisions in the cases of Hunt v. Held, 90 OS. 280; Arnoff v. Williams, et al., 94 OS. 145; Arnoff, et al., v. Chase, et al., 101 OS. 331, and Hitz v. Flower, et al., 104 OS. 47. The plaintiff’s attorney relies upon Arnoff, et al., v. Chase, et al., supra, and the defendant’s attorneys rely upon the other cases herein cited.

From an examination of these cases and the facts in the instant case, we are unanimously of the opinion that the case of Arnoff, et al., v. Chase, et al., supra, controls us in arriving at a proper decision in this ease.

The court said, in referring to deed restrictions, that the words “house” and “residence,” as used in common speech, are the equivalent of the home known as a residence occupied by one family.

We are satisfied that the original alloter, when he used the expression “only one residence shall be erected on any lot,” intended that any residence building erected thereon should be used as a one-family residence, as the phrase is commonly used and understood by people who buy and sell real estate; and when the defendant attempts to erect a building on her lot for the purpose of having four single residences in one building, she violates the plain and ordinary meaning which should be and is given to the word “residence,” and her attempt is as much a violation of the restrictions as though the defendant were attempting to erect four single residences upon said lot — which right, of course, the defendant would not claim.

We are therefore of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief asked, and a permanent injunction is issued, preventing the said defendant from erecting the building that she admits she intends to erect.

(Washburn, PJ., and Funk, J., concur.)

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PARDEE, J.

We have had cited to us, by the attorneys in this case, the decisions in the cases of Hunt v. Held, 90 OS. 280; Arnoff v. Williams, et al., 94 OS. 145; Arnoff, et al., v. Chase, et al., 101 OS. 331, and Hitz v. Flower, et al., 104 OS. 47. The plaintiff’s attorney relies upon Arnoff, et al., v. Chase, et al., supra, and the defendant’s attorneys rely upon the other cases herein cited.

From an examination of these cases and the facts in the instant case, we are unanimously of the opinion that the case of Arnoff, et al., v. Chase, et al., supra, controls us in arriving at a proper decision in this ease.

The court said, in referring to deed restrictions, that the words “house” and “residence,” as used in common speech, are the equivalent of the home known as a residence occupied by one family.

We are satisfied that the original alloter, when he used the expression “only one residence shall be erected on any lot,” intended that any residence building erected thereon should be used as a one-family residence, as the phrase is commonly used and understood by people who buy and sell real estate; and when the defendant attempts to erect a building on her lot for the purpose of having four single residences in one building, she violates the plain and ordinary meaning which should be and is given to the word “residence,” and her attempt is as much a violation of the restrictions as though the defendant were attempting to erect four single residences upon said lot — which right, of course, the defendant would not claim.

We are therefore of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief asked, and a permanent injunction is issued, preventing the said defendant from erecting the building that she admits she intends to erect.

(Washburn, PJ., and Funk, J., concur.)

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168 N.E. 755, 33 Ohio App. 174, 6 Ohio Law. Abs. 685, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 366, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnston-v-parkin-ohioctapp-1928.

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