Johnston v. Hyde

32 N.J. Eq. 446
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedMay 15, 1880
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 32 N.J. Eq. 446 (Johnston v. Hyde) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnston v. Hyde, 32 N.J. Eq. 446 (N.J. Ct. App. 1880).

Opinion

The Chancellor.

The complainant and defendant are respectively the owners of adjoining tracts of land in Plainfield. On that [447]*447of the former, 'which contains .more than 100 acres in its enclosure, his dwelling-house (his country residence) stands, and on that of the latter is an ancient mill. The complainant’s property was conveyed to him in .or about the year 1864, and since that year he has been in the actual possession and occupation of it. When he bought it, there was an artificial water-course (a raceway) running through it, and the mill on the defendant’s premises wa3 then in use as such. In or about 1872, the complainant substituted for the raceway a wooden box or trunk, of the dimensions of one foot and three inches in height, two feet and eight inches in width, and of the length of one thousand and sixty •feet, or thereabouts, with a fall of about five inches, nearly in the-bed of the raceway, and filled in with earth around it, and covered the place with sod. Over part of it he built a macadamized road from his house to his stables. In 1874, the defendant entered upon the complainant’s land and attempted to raise the gate which the complainant had placed at the mouth of the trunk near the dam. He was forbidden to do so by the complainant, who denied his right to come on his land, but the defendant.persisted in his purpose of raising the gate. Immediately after that transaction, the original bill was filed for an injunction restraining him from entering upon the complainant’s premises for the purpose of interfering with the trunk or interfering with the complainant’s premises for any such purpose, or in any [448]*448way disturbing the complainant in the enjoyment of his premises. On the filing of the bill an injunction was granted, which was subsequently modified (Johnston v. Hyde, 10 C. E. Gr. 454) so as to permit the defendant to enter upon the complainant’s premises for the purpose of raising, and, if necessary, of removing that gate and any other obstruction to the flow of the water which, subsequently to the filing of the bill, had been, or at any time thereafter might be, placed or constructed therein. The defendant having answered the bill, filed a cross-bill for a decree establishing his right to the easement of an open raceway through the complainant’s premises leading from the pond thereon to the defendant’s mill, and to the maintenance of the pond and the dam thereto, so that the water in the pond may be of the same height at which it was.on the 8th day of May, 1824, and the raceway of the same depth and width it was at that date, and that the trunk may be. declared to be á nuisance to him, and may be abated, and the raceway restored to the condition in which it was at that date, and that Mr. Johnston may be perpetually enjoined from continuing, by means of the trunk, the gate therein, or otherwise, any obstruction to the full and free enjoyment by Mr. Hyde of the raceway, or from preventing him from going on the property of Mr. Johnston to repair or clean out the raceway or abate any nuisance, accidental or otherwise, to his rights in the premises, or to prevent any obstruction to his enjoyment of the easement.

In Dewey v. Bellows, 9 IV. H. 282, a defendant was held liable for increasing the size of a flume, although it was more advantageous to the plaintiff. In Dickerson v. Grand Junction Canal Co., 15 Beau. 260, on a motion for an injunction for the violation of a covenant as to the joint use of waters, it was held to be no answer, to say that the alterations would not be injurious, or even to prove that they were beneficial to the complainants; and see S. C., 7 Exch. 281; 8 Bars, on Cont. *318. In Jewett v. Whitney, 1¡3 Me. 21f2, the defendant entered on plaintiff’s lands, and with the connivance of his co-tenants, tore down plaintiff’s mill, which was almost worthless, and erected another mill, worth $2,000, in its place.—Held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover, not only the lands and mill, but nominal damages for the trespass.—Rep.

[448]*448. The complainant’s property appears to have been made up of several tracts conveyed to him by different persons. One of the tracts, the one lying next to the defendant’s land on which his mill stands, was conveyed by the defendant to the complainant on or about July 1st, 1872, and contains about three and one-half acres. The deed from the defendant to the complainant for it contains the following reservation: “Excepting and reserving to the party of the first part, his heirs and assigns,' the right of the raceway, as now opened, leading to the pond below, with all necessary rights [449]*449to enter upon said premises along the line of the same for the purpose of cleaning it out and keeping it in repair, as heretofore granted.” The next tract adjoins that land on the northeast, and is part of a tract of land conveyed by Lewis M. Force to Zaehariah Webster, in 1835, of which the tract of three and one-half acres above mentioned was ajso part-. The deed from Force to Webster contains the following reservation: “ The said Lewis M. Force reserves the width of thirty feet across the said lot above conveyed, where the race now- runs, nine chains and five links in length, and forty-five and a half links in width, for the use of his mill, with the full privilege of ingress, egress and regress to and from the same; to amend, repair and keep in order the said mill-race running across the same, unto the said Lewis M. Force, his heirs and assigns forever, as long as the same may be used and occupied by the said Lewis M. Force, his heirs and assigns.” When, in 1835, Force conveyed to Webster, the former was the owner of the defendant’s mill. He derived his title from Eden S. Webster, by deed dated October 27th, 1834, which conveyed to him a tract of 41.93 acres, including the tract above mentioned conveyed in 1835 by Force to Zaehariah Webster. By that deed Eden S. Webster conveyed to Force, with the land, the privilege of keeping the dam the same height as it then was on the lands of Daniel Shotwmll, on the northeasterly side of the property conveyed, to raise the water for the use.of-the mill. Eden S. Webster obtained his title to that property and privilege by sundry mesne conveyances from Elijah Shotwell, who obtained the privilege from Daniel Shotwell. Elijah owned the land which after-wards became the property of Lewis M. Force, adjoining the property of Daniel. By deed dated May 8th, 1824, Daniel conveyed to Elijah half of the dam and pond on his land, with half of the water and water privileges thereto belonging, situate on Green brook, for the purpose of a saw-mill erected on Elijah’s land, as it then stood; the dam to be raised no higher than it then was, without the consent. [450]*450of the parties. By deed of the same date, Elijah conveyed to Daniel half of the saw-mill and race, together with half of the water privileges and water-courses belonging to the saw-mill on Elijah’s land (the defendant’s mill), with the privilege of a walk on the race-bank to the saw-mill from the, dam erected for the saw-mill as it then stood; the dam to be raised no higher than it then was, without the consent of the parties, and the race to be and remain as it then stood. Elijah and Daniel thus became owners in common of the water privileges, including the pond, dam and raceway, and also of the mill. The contiguous lands were in the several ownership of each. June 23d, 1824, Daniel conveyed his light in the mill and privileges to William P.

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Bluebook (online)
32 N.J. Eq. 446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnston-v-hyde-njch-1880.