Johnston v. Callery

39 A. 73, 184 Pa. 146, 1898 Pa. LEXIS 872
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania·Decided January 3, 1898·No. Appeal, No. 139·Published·Cited by 13 cases

Opinion

Opinion by

Me. Justice Geeen,

When this case was here before, 173 Pa. 129. it was upon the sufficiency of an affidavit of defense to prevent judgment. The statement of cause of action claimed judgment for the amount of the purchase money stipulated in the agreement for the sale of the land, and the affidavit of defense claimed that the stipulation of the agreement which provided for a title clear of all incumbrances had been violated, and that the plaintiffs were unable to convey such a title. The incumbrance alleged in the affidavit was that which was created by the survey and location of a branch railroad of the Pittsburg & Connellsville Railroad over the land in question, at a time anterior to the execution of the contract of sale. All the particulars of the survey and location were set forth in the affidavit, including a formal adoption of the location by the resolution of the directors of the railroad company of April 4, A. D. 1892. The affidavit also set forth a notice from the counsel of the railroad company by letter dated May 19, 1893, to the effect that the company had surveyed and located the said branch railroad, sometime before, over the property, and that if the defendant purchased the property he would have to take it subject to the right of the railroad company to appropriate the right of way for the road over the land. The plaintiffs having entered a rule for judgment notwithstanding the,, affidavit, the court below discharged the rule, whereupon the [151] plaintiffs took an appeal to this Court. But we sustained the court below and practically said that if on the trial, the facts set out in the affidavit were established by testimony, the defendant would have made out a good defense. On the trial the defendant gave evidence to prove all the matters alleged in the affidavit of defense, and so far as we can discover there was no lack of testimony as to any of them. The case was submitted to the jury on the question whether there had been an actual location of the railroad over the property prior to the agreement of sale, and the court ruled that if there had been it constituted an incumbrance on the plaintiffs’ title, and the defendant would not be bound to take the land. So far as the evidence is concerned we do not understand that there is any dispute, and the learned counsel for the appellants concede that such is the case, in their printed argument. Their contention seemingly is that there was no evidence of a survey or any entry on the ground having been made prior to the contract, and that no notice had been served on the owners, and that on May 1, 1898, there was nothing but a paper location, evidenced only by the passage of a resolution on April 4,1892, unknown to all but the officers of the company. As to this resolution they contend it was rescinded by a later resolution, adopted on February 20,1895, and they argue from these premises that no incumbrance was imposed upon the property at the date of the contract.

In view of the testimony taken on the trial, and of the decisions of this Court as to what constitutes a good location, we cannot consider these contentions as at all tenable. We have so recently defined what is a good location of the route of a railroad that a brief citation from our latest decision on the subject, will be sufficient. In the case of Williamsport R. Co. v. Phila., etc., Railroad Co., 141 Pa. 407, our Brother Williams, delivering the opinion said: “ The successive steps contemplated by the act of 1849 and subsequent legislation, as necessary to vest a title to the roadway in the corporation, are these:

“1. A preliminary entry on the lands of private owners for the purpose of exploration. This is made by engineers and surveyors who run and mark out one or more experimental lines, and who report their work with such maps and profiles as may be necessary to present it properly to the company that employs them.

[152] “ 2. A selection and adoption of a line, or one of the lines so run, as and for the proposed railroad. This is done by the corporation, and it requires the action in some form of the board of directors. This makes what was before experimental and open, a fixed and definite location. It fastens a servitude upon the property affected thereby, and so takes from the owner and appropriates to the use of the corporation.

“3. Payment to the owner for what is taken and the consequences of the taking, or security that it shall he made when the amount due him is legally ascertained.

“ The title of the owner is not divested until the last of these steps has been taken, (citing authorities). As against him the corporation can acquire only a conditional title hy its act of location, which ripens into an absolute one upon making compensation. As to third persons and rival corporations, however, the action of the company adopting a definite location is enough to give title. . . . The act of location is at the same time the act of appropriation. The space covered by the line as located is thereby seized and appropriated to the purposes of the construction and operation of the railroad, by virtue of the power of eminent domain, and nothing remains to he done except to compensate the owner. After the act of location by the company, the owner or the company may proceed at once to secure an ascertainment of damages.”

It will be observed now, that the selection and adoption of a line by the directors “ fastens a servitude upon the property affected thereby, and so takes from the owner and appropriates to the use of the corporation.” All of this was repeated and reaffirmed in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Sterrett, in Johnston v. Callery (this same case), 173 Pa. 129.

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Johnston v. Callery, 39 A. 73, 184 Pa. 146, 1898 Pa. LEXIS 872 (Pa. 1898).

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