Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc.

346 F. Supp. 3d 1159
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Illinois
DecidedNovember 29, 2018
DocketNo. 14 CV 2028
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 346 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (illinoised 2018).

Opinion

Manish S. Shah, United States District Judge *1160Defendant's motion for reconsideration [318] is granted.

STATEMENT

Yahoo!'s PC2SMS service caused a text message to be sent to Rachel Johnson by pulling her number from a database of stored numbers-an address book-and then automatically sending that number a text message. See Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc. , No. 14 CV 2028, 2014 WL 7005102, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2014) ; Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc. , No. 14 CV 2028, 2016 WL 25711, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016). Johnson sued Yahoo! for violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Johnson's theory is that Yahoo!'s service was an automatic telephone dialing system and using an ATDS to text her violated the TCPA. In an earlier order, I denied Yahoo!'s motion for summary judgment because of disputes over whether PC2SMS was an ATDS under the authoritative agency interpretation of the TCPA. See Johnson , 2014 WL 7005102, at *6. Yahoo! asks for reconsideration and for entry of summary judgment based on recent interpretations of the definition of an ATDS.

In my first ruling, I relied on FCC decisions from 2003, 2008, and 2012 that interpreted ATDS to include systems that dialed numbers pulled from a stored list without human intervention. See Johnson , 2014 WL 7005102, at *3 (citing 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14091-93 (2003) ; 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 559, 566-67 (2008) ; 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 15391, 15392 n.5 (2012) ). At the time, I didn't agree with the FCC's reading of the statute, but I was bound by it. See id. at *3 & n.7 (citing CE Design, Ltd. v. Prism Business Media, Inc. , 606 F.3d 443, 450 (7th Cir. 2010) ). The statute defines an ATDS to be equipment that has the capacity "to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). If the equipment pulls numbers from a stored list that was not generated by a random or sequential number generator (and does not have the capacity to generate random or sequential numbers), the equipment does not fit the statutory definition. But the FCC had a more expansive interpretation, and I followed it.

In 2015, the FCC issued another decision interpreting automatic telephone dialing systems. 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 7961 (2015). The Commission reaffirmed its previous statements that "dialing equipment generally has the capacity to store or produce, and dial random or sequential numbers (and thus meets the TCPA's definition of 'autodialer') even if it is not presently used for that purpose, including when the caller is calling a set list of consumers." 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 7961, 7971-74 (2015) (citing the 2003 and 2008 TCPA Orders).

In ACA International v. FCC , 885 F.3d 687, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2018), the court "set aside the Commission's explanation of which devices qualify as an ATDS." The notion that the definition of ATDS includes a device that "can call from a database of telephone numbers generated elsewhere" was incompatible with a definition that required an ATDS to generate random or sequential numbers to be dialed. Id. at 701-03. The Commission's lack of clarity about the qualifying functions of an ATDS, in addition to its unreasonably expansive understanding of "capacity,"1 led the court *1161to "set aside the Commission's treatment of those matters." Id. at 703.

Based on ACA International , Yahoo! asks me to reconsider summary judgment. A non-final ruling may be revised at any time before entry of a judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). A clarification of law that makes clear that a ruling was erroneous provides a compelling reason to reconsider an earlier decision. Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 466 F.3d 570, 572 (7th Cir. 2006). If the premise of my earlier ruling-that PC2SMS might be an ATDS-depended on the FCC's interpretation, and if that interpretation is no longer controlling, then there has been a significant change in the law justifying reconsideration.

Johnson says nothing has changed. When I denied summary judgment in 2014, the FCC had not issued its 2015 order-the only order ACA International set aside. So, Johnson argues, the 2003, 2008, and 2012 orders remain in effect, and I remain bound by them. Johnson is correct that I must apply the FCC's definition of ATDS. Blow v. Bijora , 855 F.3d 793, 802 (7th Cir. 2017).2 And it is also true that the petitions in ACA International sought review only of the 2015 order. ACA International , 885 F.3d at 693. Although its jurisdiction was based on direct-review petitions from the 2015 order, the court's ruling encompassed a review of all "pertinent pronouncements" by the FCC. Id. at 701.

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Bluebook (online)
346 F. Supp. 3d 1159, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-yahoo-inc-illinoised-2018.