Johnson v. Wireman

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9g □□ _ MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANYAR_y)@5? GREG JOHNSON, : 8 Bs! OO Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-cv-02254 v. -|(SAPORITO, MJ.) DARRELL WIREMAN, et all, oe . : Defendants. fp he . oe

‘This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff s motion for an award of costs and attorney fees. (Doc. 99.) ps In his second amended complaint, the plaintiff sought monetary □□ damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the violation of

his federal constitutional and statutory rights in connection with requests for religious accommodations so he could observe dreligious fast. □ in December 2014, December 2015, and December 2016. ne he □□ ~ On March 7. 2019 we entered a memorandum and ordes granting. □ summary judgment to the defendants on certain claims and dismissing the rest.! (Doc. 95; Doe. 96.) In relevant part, we dismissed the plaintiff

1 Johnson v. Wireman, Civil Action No. /1:15-cv-02254, 2019 WL □□ □□ (continued on next page) □

claims for injunctive relief as moot because he had been: released from prison during the pendency of this action, we dismissed his § 1983 damages claims against tiwo defendants—Morris L. Houser and J ames Eckard—for lack of personal involvement, ‘and we granted summary judgment to the other individual defendants—Darrell Wireman, Ulrich Klemm, Shawn Kephart, and Tabb Bickell wit respect to the plaintiff 8 1988 damages claims against them for fail re to exhaust available ‘administrative remedies. oe The plaintiff appealed and, ultimately, the Third Cireuit affirmed

our decision in part and vacated it in part.? (Doc. 106: Doc. 107.) In particular, the appellate court affirmed our grant of summary judgment □□ --with respect to the 2014 fast but vacated it with respect to the 2015 fast. also vacated our dismissal of the claims against Houser and Eckard for □ lack of personal involvement. The case was then remanded to us for further proceedings. oe ee oe □□

1383575 (MLD. Pa. Mar. 27, 2019), aff'd in part and revd in part, 809 Fed. App’x 97 (8d Cir. 2020). . 2 Johnson v. Wireman, 809 Fed. App’x 97 (3d Cir. 2020). . 8 None of the other claims are addressed in the appellate decision. We presume our disposition of those claims was not challenged by □□□ plaintiff on appeal. □□ □

The instant motion, filed before that appeal was either taken or decided, seeks an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “Under 42 US.C. § 1988(b), courts may, in their discretion, grantia ‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ to a ‘prevailing party’ in certain federal ‘actions, including those proceeding under AQ U.S.C. § 1983” or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized| Persons Act. ar 2000 RLUIPA”). Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 Bae 286, 292, (3d Cir. 2016). The plaintiff contends that, despite the dismissal of all claims against him, he is a “prevailing party” with respect:to his RLUIPA claim because the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections changed its policies during the course of this litigation to accommodate observance of the □ December fast by inmates who share the same faith as the plaintiff.‘ But □

“in order to be a ‘prevailing party,” a party must be ‘successful in the □□ sense that it has ben awarded some relief by a court.” John T. ex rel. Paul □ T. v. Delaware Cty. Intermediate Unit, 18 Fat 545, 556 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original); see also Buckhannon Bad. & Care Home, Inc. □□□

The plaintiff himself wins oxcluded from these accommodations in December 2016 because he had already participated in observance of the traditional Ramadan fast earlier that same year. The plaintiff was briefly permitted this accommodation for the December 2017 fast, but he was released from prison a few days into the month/ong fast.

West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 582 U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001): Raab, 333 F.3d at 292-938. To be eligible to make 4 prevailing-party claim under § 1988, the plaintiff must, ata minimum, be able to “= point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant. The change must. judicially sanctioned and must achieve □□ some of the benefit the party sought in bringing suit. Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Ine... Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 228 (3d Cir, 201 1) (en banc) (citations, internal quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). “A defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.” Buckhannon, 532 US. □ at 605; see also Raab, _ F.3d at 293; Singer, 650 F.3d at 232, . □

Here, the plaintiff has not obtained an enforceable judgment on the □□ merits of his claims, ‘not was the policy change to which he points obtained by a settle ment-agreéement between a partiag to this litigation, much less a judicially sanctioned one. See Buckhannon, 532 US. at 604; "Raab, 833 F.3d at 293-94; Singer, 650 F.3d at 231-32. Indeed, the legal theory upon which he relies is essentially the ks same “catalyst theory” □□

explicitly rejected. by the Supreme Court 4 the United States in Buckhannon. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605; Singer, 650 F.3d at 231—

Accordingly, we are compelled by thi precedent to deny the plaintiff's motion, as he has failed sreskei that he is, as yet, a □ “prevailing party” for the purpose of ‘42 USC. § 1988). Based on the Third Cireuit’s decision on : apipéal. ices Cek vacated . and remanded certain of the plaintiff’ § 1983 sain for further proceedings, the motion will be denied without prejudice to Le futur such motion, □ ‘An appropriate onder follows. mo . oes ws ee ee

Dated: September 29 2 2020 we et □□ aapaile □□□ □□□ TS GOSEPHF. SAPORITOSR. oe oe United States Magistrate Judge □□