Callahan, J.
The petitioner, Alphonso Johnson, is in the custody of the respondent warden of the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers. His incarceration resulted from his conviction of a crime committed in Connecticut for which he was originally sentenced on February 16,1979, to a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years nor more than forty years. His sentence was later modified to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years nor more than twenty years.
While the petitioner was in custody in Connecticut, but prior to his Connecticut conviction, prosecuting officials in New York notified the Connecticut authorities of criminal charges pending against the petitioner in New York and asked that a detainer be lodged against [793]*793the petitioner pertaining to those charges. On March 5, 1979, following the petitioner’s conviction and sentencing in Connecticut, the New York authorities requested temporary custody of the petitioner pursuant to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).1 On March 16,1979, the petitioner was notified by Connecticut officials of the request for his temporary custody by New York prosecuting authorities and was asked to sign a form waiving extradition. The petitioner refused to sign such a waiver. Thereafter, on April 2, 1979, the governor of Connecticut was notified of New York’s request that it be granted temporary custody of the petitioner for the purpose of placing the petitioner on trial in New York on New York’s outstanding criminal charges. On April 19,1979, the governor of Connecticut gave notice that she did not disapprove of New York’s request. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers, General Statutes § 54-186, Art. IV (a). Accordingly, on August 9,1979, temporary custody of the petitioner was transferred to the New York authorities.
The petitioner’s trial on New York’s criminal charges commenced on April 4, 1980. On May 7, 1980, he was convicted of those charges, and on September 5,1980, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in New York of not less than fifteen years nor more than life. He was thereafter returned to Connecticut to complete the service of his Connecticut sentence. Subsequently, the New York authorities lodged a detainer with the respondent warden based on the petitioner’s conviction in New York. The petitioner appealed his New York conviction in the courts of that state without success, until his appeal rights were exhausted in 1983. Therefore, when the petitioner is paroled or discharged from his Connecticut sentence, if the New York [794]*794detainer filed against him is valid, he will be turned over to the New York authorities to serve his sentence in that state.
The petitioner, however, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court in Connecticut. In his petition he alleged that the New York detainer that is lodged against him as a result of his New York conviction should be dismissed and removed from his file because his presence in New York for trial was obtained by a procedure that was in violation of Article IV of the I AD.
The habeas court, as a threshold issue, found that it had the authority to dismiss the New York detainer if the procedure used to obtain the petitioner’s presence in New York for trial violated the IAD. See Remick v. Lopes, 203 Conn. 494, 498-99, 525 A.2d 502 (1987). The habeas court went on to find that the holding of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S. Ct. 703, 66 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1981), which was decided while the petitioner’s New York conviction was on direct review, required a pretransfer hearing for the petitioner before he could lawfully be transferred to New York for trial.
Cuyler v. Adams, supra, was an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19832 for the alleged violation, by Pennsylvania officials, of the respondent Adams’s [795]*795rights under the IAD. The IAD is a uniform act that, as previously noted, is codified in Connecticut as General Statutes § 54-186. In Cuyler, the United States Supreme Court determined that Article IV of the IAD,3 which provides for the involuntary transfer of prisoners serving a term of imprisonment in one state to another state for trial on pending criminal charges, requires [796]*796that such prisoner be afforded a pretransfer hearing substantially in accord with § 10 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, prior to the transfer of the prisoner from the sending state to the receiving state.4 The Cuyler court found that the respondent Adams, who had not been afforded such a hearing, stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cuyler v. Adams, supra, 450.
The habeas court, relying primarily on Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, reh. denied, 490 U.S. 1031, 109 S. Ct. 1771, 104 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1989), determined that Cuyler, which was decided after the petitioner had been transferred to, and tried, convicted and sentenced in New York, but while his case was still on direct review, was to be given retroactive effect and therefore was to be applied to the petitioner’s habeas claim.5 The habeas court concluded that the application of Cuyler to the petitioner’s [797]*797claim required the dismissal of New York’s postconviction detainer lodged at Somers because the petitioner had failed to receive a pretransfer hearing prior to his removal to New York. We disagree.
Teague v. Lane, supra, holds generally that, with certain exceptions not pertinent here, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be announced in or applied to cases that are on collateral review. The court in Teague also reiterated the view it had expressed in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987), that “ 'failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Teague v. Lane, supra, 304. The Teague court made clear, however, as did the Griffith court, that the court had reference to constitutional rules of criminal procedure when it mandated the application of newly announced rules of criminal procedure to cases still on direct review at the time the rules were announced. See Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 979, 108 S. Ct. 1277, 99 L. Ed. 2d 488, reh. denied, 486 U.S. 1018, 108 S. Ct. 1759, 100 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1988).6
Cuyler v. Adams,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Callahan, J.
The petitioner, Alphonso Johnson, is in the custody of the respondent warden of the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers. His incarceration resulted from his conviction of a crime committed in Connecticut for which he was originally sentenced on February 16,1979, to a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years nor more than forty years. His sentence was later modified to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years nor more than twenty years.
While the petitioner was in custody in Connecticut, but prior to his Connecticut conviction, prosecuting officials in New York notified the Connecticut authorities of criminal charges pending against the petitioner in New York and asked that a detainer be lodged against [793]*793the petitioner pertaining to those charges. On March 5, 1979, following the petitioner’s conviction and sentencing in Connecticut, the New York authorities requested temporary custody of the petitioner pursuant to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).1 On March 16,1979, the petitioner was notified by Connecticut officials of the request for his temporary custody by New York prosecuting authorities and was asked to sign a form waiving extradition. The petitioner refused to sign such a waiver. Thereafter, on April 2, 1979, the governor of Connecticut was notified of New York’s request that it be granted temporary custody of the petitioner for the purpose of placing the petitioner on trial in New York on New York’s outstanding criminal charges. On April 19,1979, the governor of Connecticut gave notice that she did not disapprove of New York’s request. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers, General Statutes § 54-186, Art. IV (a). Accordingly, on August 9,1979, temporary custody of the petitioner was transferred to the New York authorities.
The petitioner’s trial on New York’s criminal charges commenced on April 4, 1980. On May 7, 1980, he was convicted of those charges, and on September 5,1980, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in New York of not less than fifteen years nor more than life. He was thereafter returned to Connecticut to complete the service of his Connecticut sentence. Subsequently, the New York authorities lodged a detainer with the respondent warden based on the petitioner’s conviction in New York. The petitioner appealed his New York conviction in the courts of that state without success, until his appeal rights were exhausted in 1983. Therefore, when the petitioner is paroled or discharged from his Connecticut sentence, if the New York [794]*794detainer filed against him is valid, he will be turned over to the New York authorities to serve his sentence in that state.
The petitioner, however, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court in Connecticut. In his petition he alleged that the New York detainer that is lodged against him as a result of his New York conviction should be dismissed and removed from his file because his presence in New York for trial was obtained by a procedure that was in violation of Article IV of the I AD.
The habeas court, as a threshold issue, found that it had the authority to dismiss the New York detainer if the procedure used to obtain the petitioner’s presence in New York for trial violated the IAD. See Remick v. Lopes, 203 Conn. 494, 498-99, 525 A.2d 502 (1987). The habeas court went on to find that the holding of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S. Ct. 703, 66 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1981), which was decided while the petitioner’s New York conviction was on direct review, required a pretransfer hearing for the petitioner before he could lawfully be transferred to New York for trial.
Cuyler v. Adams, supra, was an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19832 for the alleged violation, by Pennsylvania officials, of the respondent Adams’s [795]*795rights under the IAD. The IAD is a uniform act that, as previously noted, is codified in Connecticut as General Statutes § 54-186. In Cuyler, the United States Supreme Court determined that Article IV of the IAD,3 which provides for the involuntary transfer of prisoners serving a term of imprisonment in one state to another state for trial on pending criminal charges, requires [796]*796that such prisoner be afforded a pretransfer hearing substantially in accord with § 10 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, prior to the transfer of the prisoner from the sending state to the receiving state.4 The Cuyler court found that the respondent Adams, who had not been afforded such a hearing, stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cuyler v. Adams, supra, 450.
The habeas court, relying primarily on Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, reh. denied, 490 U.S. 1031, 109 S. Ct. 1771, 104 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1989), determined that Cuyler, which was decided after the petitioner had been transferred to, and tried, convicted and sentenced in New York, but while his case was still on direct review, was to be given retroactive effect and therefore was to be applied to the petitioner’s habeas claim.5 The habeas court concluded that the application of Cuyler to the petitioner’s [797]*797claim required the dismissal of New York’s postconviction detainer lodged at Somers because the petitioner had failed to receive a pretransfer hearing prior to his removal to New York. We disagree.
Teague v. Lane, supra, holds generally that, with certain exceptions not pertinent here, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be announced in or applied to cases that are on collateral review. The court in Teague also reiterated the view it had expressed in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987), that “ 'failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Teague v. Lane, supra, 304. The Teague court made clear, however, as did the Griffith court, that the court had reference to constitutional rules of criminal procedure when it mandated the application of newly announced rules of criminal procedure to cases still on direct review at the time the rules were announced. See Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 979, 108 S. Ct. 1277, 99 L. Ed. 2d 488, reh. denied, 486 U.S. 1018, 108 S. Ct. 1759, 100 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1988).6
Cuyler v. Adams, supra, was not decided on constitutional grounds. Cuyler resolved a conflict among divided federal courts of appeal and state courts as to [798]*798the proper statutory construction of Article IV of the IAD. Id., 435-36. There is nothing in Cuyler to suggest a constitutional basis for the rule it announced relating to the construction of Article IV. Further, there is nothing in Teague or Griffith that suggests that nonconstitutional rules of criminal procedure are to be given retroactive effect. “There is no reason to apply the Griffith [or Teague] constitutional retroactivity holding here as the [IAD] is ‘nothing more than a set of procedural rules . . . .’ United States v. Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907, 98 S. Ct. 3097, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1138 (1978). Therefore, a violation of the [IAD] is not an infringement of a constitutional right.” Diggs v. Owens, supra, 442. Because we conclude that Cuyler did not announce a constitutional procedural rule, the habeas court should not have accorded Cuyler retroactive application to the petitioner under Teague and Griffith.
Furthermore, Cuyler was a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It was not a habeas corpus proceeding or a criminal case. The most that can be said for Cuyler, therefore, is that it is precedent for the proposition that the petitioner may have a viable § 1983 claim. We have been unable to find any authority, however, nor has the petitioner directed us to any, that suggests that Cuyler requires dismissal of a posteonviction detainer in a habeas action because of the lack of a pretransfer hearing.
The judgment of the habeas corpus court is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the habeas corpus petition.
In this opinion Peters, C. J., Covello and F. X. Hennessy, Js., concurred.