Johnson v. Tregle

8 So. 2d 755, 1942 La. App. LEXIS 76
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 29, 1942
DocketNo. 17805.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 8 So. 2d 755 (Johnson v. Tregle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Tregle, 8 So. 2d 755, 1942 La. App. LEXIS 76 (La. Ct. App. 1942).

Opinion

Mathew Johnson, employed by Joseph Tregle as a "general utility" man, the duties of which included the driving of a motor truck owned by defendant and operated in connection with the latter's business, alleges that on November 30, 1940, while so employed and acting within the scope of his employment, he sustained an injury for the consequences of which he is entitled to compensation under our workmen's compensation statute (Act 20 of 1914, as amended) for 65 per centum of his weekly wages of $11, during the period of his disability, not, however, to exceed 400 weeks. Judgment is prayed for accordingly.

For answer, defendant admits plaintiff's employment at wages of $11 per week, as alleged, but denies that plaintiff sustained an accident and injuries as a result of the duties of his employment. He further avers that he received no information or notice of the alleged accident, though admitting that he knew that plaintiff was confined at his home and, subsequently, at the Charity Hospital as a result of illness, the nature of which was unknown to him.

Defendant also asserts that he paid plaintiff various amounts aggregating the sum of $30, for which, it is admitted by plaintiff, defendant is entitled to credit in the event the right of compensation be decreed.

The district court, for written reasons assigned, rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff's suit. Plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal.

In his written reasons for judgment dismissing plaintiff's suit, our learned brother below concluded that the occurrence of the accident was too highly improbable and that, if it did happen, it was improbable that the injuries suffered by plaintiff were a result thereof.

We do not deem it necessary to review in extensive detail the testimony of each witness contained in the record. It is our appreciation that the following is a fair synopsis of the evidence:

On the evening of November 30, 1940, as a part of the duties of his employment, plaintiff was ordered by his employer to call at the residence of one of defendant's customers and to there service merchandise. He drove defendant's truck to the place he was instructed to go, performed his prescribed duties and, while he was returning to his employer's establishment, the motor of the truck became overheated from the lack of water in its radiator. No service stations being available in that neighborhood, plaintiff drove to the nearby residence of his aunt and obtained a bucket of water, which he emptied into the radiator. In so doing, the motor, which he had allowed to run idle, stopped. The self-starter being unusable, he obtained the motor crank and, as he was cranking the motor truck, the crank handle reversed, or "kicked back", causing the hand handle of the crank to strike him violently on his penis. The violence and the effect of the blow was such as to cause him to collapse, and, after the pain had been somewhat relieved, he returned to his employer's establishment and reported the accident to the defendant, the latter dismissing it as a trivial occurrence. It is further shown that plaintiff remained at defendant's establishment and performed his duties, though experiencing continued pain and suffering, and that, when he returned to his home that night, he immediately complained to his wife about the occurrence. It is also shown that plaintiff remained in bed, applying self-medication, but that, on December 5th, his genital organs had become so inflamed and painful that he was transferred to the emergency ward of the Charity Hospital.

The hospital records reflect that at the time that plaintiff was admitted he was in an irrational condition and that the history of his injuries was to the effect that he had received "a blow on his penis three days previous, while cranking a Ford truck". His genital organs were extensively swollen and inflamed and in a gangrenous condition. The diagnosis of the hospital physicians showed that plaintiff was suffering from "urinary extravasation, a stricture of the urethra (urinary channel), generalized lues, broncho pneumonia, with gangrene and considerable sloughing of the penis and *Page 757 scrotum." This condition was described in the hospital report as "post-traumatic". It may be noted at this time that "urinary extravasation" is medically defined to mean a condition due either to trauma, where there is a rupture, or tear, or to inflammation, as a result of which the urine, or a part thereof, leaves the channel provided by nature and burrows into the tissues, thereby producing a chemical reaction, with following extensive infection.

Plaintiff remained in the hospital under treatment for a period of fifty-two days. It is shown that his was considered one of the rarest cases ever experienced by the attending physicians, and that, because of his desperate condition, he was given six separate blood transfusions. In the process of healing, it is shown that a stricture was formed in the urinary channel, preventing normal elimination, as a result of which a perforation had to be made in his lower abdominal wall and a tube inserted therein for urinary discharges. As a result of the gangrenous condition, practically one-third of the skin and tissue of his penis has been destroyed, and this within the area where plaintiff disclosed to the attending physicians that he had received the blow. Following his discharge from the hospital on January 25, 1941, he had received, and was receiving at the time of the trial below, clinical treatment twice each week. It is also shown that plaintiff will have to undergo several surgical operations during the next two years to repair the damage caused and thus permit him to return to his normal gainful status.

There is no dispute between the parties as to the hazardousness of plaintiff's employment. Neither is it questioned that, at the time of the alleged accident, he was performing work within the scope and course of his employment, as defined by our workmen's compensation statutes, supra, and recognized as such by our courts.

The narrow issue presented is: Was there an accident, and, if so, did the accident bring about the injuries complained of? There are no questions of law involved, the issue being resolved strictly into one of fact.

We are not unmindful of the time-honored rule that the findings of a trial court on questions of fact should not be disturbed unless there appears manifest error. In our appreciation of the facts disclosed, we are convinced that plaintiff sustained an accidental injury within the line of his duties and to which he was exposed by the nature of his employment, and that his present condition was brought about as a consequence of such accident.

Plaintiff's testimony as to the accident, the events leading up to and following it, that he received a blow from the truck crank while cranking the vehicle and that this caused him to collapse, is fully corroborated by the testimony of one Gladys Stewart, who was then sitting on the front porch of her home, near the front of which defendant's truck was stopped, or a distance of approximately fifteen feet away. As a consequence of this accident, plaintiff unquestionably experienced severe pain. The effect of the blow required him to remain at home, in bed, for the five succeeding days, and his condition became so desperate that it was necessary for him to be removed to the Charity Hospital, where he remained for fifty-two consecutive days, requiring constant treatment and the use of heroic measures to avoid death. This evidence is uncontradicted and we find nothing in the record which is suggestive of falsehood or which would lead us to question its credibility.

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Bluebook (online)
8 So. 2d 755, 1942 La. App. LEXIS 76, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-tregle-lactapp-1942.