Johnson v. State

14 Ga. 55
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedAugust 15, 1853
DocketNo. 10
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 14 Ga. 55 (Johnson v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. State, 14 Ga. 55 (Ga. 1853).

Opinion

By the Gourt.

Lumpkin, J.

delivering the opinion.

[1.] The first ground which we shall consider in this case,is the motion made to arrest the judgment: 1st. Because the indictment contains no charge for an assault with intent to5 commit a rape; and 2ndly. Because there is no charge in the bill of indictment to support the verdict.

There are two counts in the indictment. The first alleges, that the prisoner, “ with force and arms, on and upon one Susan Stallings, violently and feloniously did make an assault, and her, the said Susan Stallings, did forcible and against her will, ravish and carnally know.” The second charges the defendant with the offence, “of an assault with intent to commit a rape.” For that the accused did, “with force and arms, on and upon the said Susan Stallings, violently and feloniously make an assault, and forcibly and against her will, did her, the said Susan violently attempt to ravish and carnally know.”

The jury found the prisoner guilty of an assault, with intent to commit a rape.

It is insisted, that under neither of these counts was it com[59]*59petent for the jury to render the verdict, which they did; and that, therefore, the judgment of the Court should bo arrested.

We hold it to be a sound as well as a universal rule in criminal pleading, that whenever the defendant is charged with the major offence, and the evidence does not support it — that the jury may convict of any minor offence, which is included in the major, and to which the testimony applies upon the familiar maxim, that ovine majus continet in se minus. If the party comes prepared to defend himself against the greater, of course his proof must necessarily apply to the less. And this rule often, nay, usually operates beneficially for defendants. It gives them certain privileges, as for instance: in challenging jurors, to which they would not bo entitled, if tried directly for the^iinor offence.

And this principle is virtually embodied in the 45th section of the 14th division of the Penal Code, {Gobi 840,) which declares, that upon the trial of an indictment for any offence, the jury may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged in the indictment; but guilty of an attempt to commit such offence, without any special count in said indictment for such attempt.

We hold, therefore, that the verdict of the jurf was good under the first count; which was for rape.

[2] Wo believe it can be maintained, also, under the second count.

The grand jurors, in this Court, charge the prisoner with an assault with intent to commit a rape. And in the body of the eount, it is alleged, that with force and arms he made an assault upon Susan Stallings, and forcible and against her will, attempted to rawsh her. It is argued, that we must look to the body of the count for the character and description of the of-fence ; and ¿hat there the attempt is charged, and not an assault with intent to ravish.

Is there any difference between an assault with attempt to ravish, and an assault with intent to ravish ? We do i^t deny that there is a distinction between an intent and an attempt to do any thing'. The former implies the purpose Only; the latter [60]*60an actual effort to carry that purpose into execution. But the question is, whether in crimes, which require force as an element in their commission, there is any substantial difference between an assault with intent, and an assault with attempt to perpetrate the offence ? We think not.

What is an assault ? It is an attempt to commit a violent injury. Consequently, an assault with intent to commit a rape, is an attempt, by violence to commit a rape. The verdict under this Court was in conformity with the indictment. And we are the better satisfied with this conclusion, as the Code declares that every indictment shall be sufficient, which charges the offence so plainly, that it may be easily understood by the jury. Under the first count, the jury must have understood that the defendant was charged with the offence of r#¡?e. And under the second, with an attempt by violence, to commit the crime.

[3.] The second error assigned is, that the Court in refusing the motion to reject as witnesses, Miss Barker and Mr. Evans, stated in the hearing of the jury, that the facts disclosed, in relation to these witnesses, while they did not render them incompetent, might nevertheless go to the jury to affect then-credit. •

The circumstances were these: — Miss Barker was offered by the defendant to disprove the identity of the accused, who was her brother-in-law. He proved that he wore different clothes, to what was testified to on the trial, by Miss Stallings. She was asked, if she had not been previously informed of what Miss Stallings testified to as to the dress of Johnson ? She admitted she had. And upon this fact being disclosed, the Solicitor General moved to reject her testimony altogether.— But the Court very properly held, that it did not destroy her competency, but that it was a circumstance whi^h might be considered by the jury as affecting her credit.

And we think the Court was right. Who would not repose more confidence in' the statements of Miss Barker, if she had not heftd the representation which Miss Stallings gave of Johnson’s dress ? Read her testimony as it is reported in this [61]*61record, and the propriety of this ruling will be made manifest. She does not swear positively that the defendant did not wear on that day the dark overcoat testified to by the girl, whom he abused: but reasons to show that he probably did not.

Evans stands on a different footing. An order had been passed to exclude all the witnesses from the Court room during the progress of the trial. Evans, not knowing of the order, came into the Court room, and was present during a part of the trial. And on this account, it was moved by the Solicitor General, that his testimony should be excluded. But the Court refused the motion, repeating the same remark which fell from the Court in relation to Miss Barker, namely: that it wras a fact which might go to his credit.

If there be any sense in the rule which allows witnesses to be removed out of hearing, while the rest are testifying, then Mr. Evans, however unintentional on his part, placed himself in a situation to cause the force of his testimony necessarily to be impaired.

[4.] I would remark, that the Civil Law is a system which abounds in restrictions upon the admission of testimony. It extended its prohibition to relations; parents and children; servants and domestics; freedmen and clients ; advocates, attorneys, tutors, curators; persons who had criminal prosecutions with either party; and those, who by eating or drinking with the party, had thrown themselves open to the suspicion of subornation. Still, gr*at discretion was given to the Judge, b^oth in admitting and excluding testimony, and in judging of its weight.

[5.] And formerly in England, whole juries were composed of rude and illiterate men — a system of excluding testimony grew up, more technical and artificial than any to be found in the world. *

[6.]

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Bluebook (online)
14 Ga. 55, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-state-ga-1853.