Johnson v. Starbucks Corporation

Opinion

SCOTT JOHNSON, No. 2:18-cv-02472-TLN-KJN Plaintiff, v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, a Washington Corporation; and DOES 1-10,

Defendants. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Scott Johnson’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Stay Case Pending Resolution of Appeal. (ECF No. 19.) Defendant Starbucks Corporation (“Starbucks”) opposed Plaintiff’s motion, and Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 20–21.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay is DENIED. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// Plaintiff is a quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility. (ECF No. 1 at 1–2.) Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants Starbucks and First California Investments on September 11, 2018, alleging violations of the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), California Civil Code §§ 51–53. (ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he encountered two unlawful barriers to access at the Starbucks café located at 4701 Madison Avenue in Sacramento, California. First, Plaintiff asserts the café’s transaction counter is crowded with merchandise and displays that impermissibly narrow the clear width of the countertop. (Id. at 3.) Second, Plaintiff claims the paths of travel from the parking lot to the café’s entrance and within the café itself are obstructed such that Plaintiff is denied full and equal access with his wheelchair. (Id. at 3–4.) Each Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint.1 (ECF Nos. 6, 11, 13.) On May 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to stay proceedings pending appeal of two related cases: Johnson v. Blackhawk Centercal, No. 3:17-cv-02454-WHA (“Blackhawk”) and Kong v. Mana Investments Company LLC, No. 8:18-cv-01615-DOC-DFM (“Mana”).2 (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff argues a stay would lead to an efficient resolution of his claims because there is no factual dispute and the cases pending before the Ninth Circuit involve a common defendant, identical issues, and the same statutory and regulatory challenges as the instant case. (ECF No. 19-1 at 3.) Only Starbucks opposed Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 20.) On July 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 21.) On July 26, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss Defendant First California Investments with prejudice based on a settlement agreement entered into by Plaintiff and First

1 Starbucks filed both an Answer and an Amended Answer.

2 Blackhawk proceeds on Plaintiff’s claim that the transaction countertop at the Starbucks café in Danville, California was crowded with merchandise and displays, and Starbucks failed to “maintain” the counter so as to render it accessible, in violation of the ADA and the Unruh Act. Plaintiff currently appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment for Starbucks. (ECF No. 19-3.) Mana proceeds on the same ADA-transaction counter claim with respect to a Starbucks café in Stanton, California and is under appeal on the same grounds. (ECF No. 19-6.) California Investments resolving the exterior path-of-travel claim. (ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff additionally stipulated to “move forward against Defendant Starbucks Corporation on his claim related to the transaction counters only.” (Id. at 2.) Pursuant to the stipulation, the Court dismissed First California Investments with prejudice.3 (ECF No. 24.) On April 17, 2020, the parties filed a Joint Status Report, in which they clarified they intended to proceed on Plaintiff’s interior path-of-travel and transaction counter claims against Starbucks. (ECF No. 36.) The Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to issue a stay. “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket .... [This] calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936). More specifically, “[w]here it is proposed that a pending proceeding be stayed, the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay must be weighed.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). “[I]f there is even a fair possibility that the stay … will work damage to someone else,” the moving party must show hardship or inequity will result absent a stay in order for the stay to be proper. Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. When considering a motion to stay, courts within the Ninth Circuit have considered three factors: (1) potential prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) hardship and inequity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; and (3) the orderly course of justice. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55); see also Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 980 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1997). A stay should be denied if it “would require both parties to simply sit and wait for months on the sidelines of their own action … [foreclosing] any possibility of the parties resolving their dispute in a timely fashion or of the Court disposing of issues unrelated to those on appeal …” Dister v. Apple-Bay E., Inc., No. 07-cv-01377 SBA, 2007

3 Despite Plaintiff’s stipulation to proceed against Starbucks “on his claim related to the transaction counters only,” the Court noted the parties’ stipulation was unclear as to Plaintiff’s interior path-of-travel claim and ordered the parties to submit an updated status report clarifying which claims remained at issue against Starbucks following the parties’ July 26, 2019 joint stipulation. (ECF No. 35.) WL 4045429, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2007). A. Prejudice and Hardship to the Parties Here, the Court will have to adjudicate the interior path-of-travel issue regardless of the outcomes of Blackhawk and Mana, which only address the transaction counter issue. (ECF No. 20 at 3.) Starbucks correctly notes a stay would prevent the Court from disposing of the issues not related to Blackhawk and Mana and would prejudice Starbucks by needlessly drawing out the litigation. (Id.) On the other hand, the Court finds that Plaintiff would suffer little hardship from proceeding with his case, as the parties must still conduct discovery on the path-of-travel claim. Moreover, Plaintiff brought this lawsuit and therefore should be prepared to litigate it to its conclusion. Plaintiff has made no argument that he would suffer any kind of hardship or inequity if a stay is not granted here and has therefore failed to meet his burden.4 Accordingly, the first two factors weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay. B. Orderly Course of Justice The orderly course of justice is “measured in terms of the simplifying of complicating issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected from a stay.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the Court finds that the orderly course of justice does not warrant a stay. First, Plaintiff overstates the likelihood that the outcomes of Blackhawk and Mana will control the resolution of this matter. It is possible that the transaction counter issue here is factually distinguishable from those at the other Starbucks locations. Further, while the above- mentioned appeals may resolve one issue present in this case, “[a] motion to stay … does not 4 For the first time in his reply, Plaintiff alternatively requests the Court bifurcate the claims, leaving the transaction counter claim to be determined by the outcome of Blackhawk and Mana and proceeding with the path-of-travel claim. (ECF No. 21 at 3.) However, the Court notes that the Unruh Civil Rights Act provides for attorney’s fees and a statutory minimum of $4,000 per visit, regardless of how many barriers exist when Plaintiff visits, and therefore a partial stay could result in double recovery for Plaintiff. This too, would unduly prejudice Starbucks. Further, a partial stay would “unnecessarily prolong the process and waste judicial resources supervising two phases of discovery.” See Rosas v. GEICO Cas. Co., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1128 (D. Nev. 2019). hinge only on considerations of judicial economy.” ASUSTek Comput. Inc. v. Ricoh Co., No. 07- cv-01942 MHP, 2007 WL 4190689, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 255); see also Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[C]ase management standing alone is not necessarily a sufficient ground to stay proceedings.”). Moreover, as previously discussed, a stay would likely damage and prejudice Starbucks by unnecessarily delaying resolution of these proceedings. Such costs outweigh any savings in judicial economy. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 256 (reversing the lower court decision largely because the stay would result in undue delay). Plaintiff next argues the Court should grant the instant motion because he has filed dozens of other cases against Starbucks regarding the countertop issue and those cases have been stayed. (ECF No. 21 at 2.) This argument is unavailing. The Court notes that in the cases Plaintiff appears to reference, his motions to stay were simply granted as a result of either joint stipulation or non-opposition by the respective defendants.5 Notably, when opposed, Plaintiff’s motions to stay were denied. See Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:18-cv-02956-JAM-AC, 2019 WL 4034479 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019); Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:18-cv-01886-WBS-EFB, 2019 WL 3202849 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 16, 2019). In those cases, as here, the action involved additional issues not addressed by Blackhawk and Mana. See Id. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) modifies the way courts are instructed to apply agency interpretations of regulations and statutes, therefore creating a novel issue of law for which the Court must wait for the Ninth Circuit to interpret. (ECF No. 21 at 3.) Plaintiff’s argument is misguided because Kisor did not overrule Auer or Seminole Rock

5 See, e.g., Johnson v. Mack Plaza Co. L.P., No. 2:17-cv-01125-TLN-EFB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020); Johnson v. Brixton Sherwood, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-02082-TLN-EFB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2020); Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:16-cv-02792-TLN-KJN (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2020); Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:18-cv-02460-KJM-KJN (E.D. Cal. Jun. 21, 2019); Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:16-cv-02489-MCE-EFB (E.D. Cal. Jun. 20, 2019); Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:17-cv-02521-MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal. Jun. 19, 2019); Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:17-cv-01718-KJM-KJN (E.D. Cal. Jun. 19, 2019); Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:16-cv- 02820-MCE-KJN (E.D. Cal. Jun. 18, 2019); Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:18-cv-01885- MCE-AC (E.D. Cal. Jun. 12, 2019); Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:18-cv-00395-JAM-EFB (E.D. Cal. Jun. 5, 2019). deference. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–15, 2418 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). Rather, Kisor limited the deference afforded to an agency’s interpretation of its own guidelines. 6 Id. at 2415. Under Kisor, deference to the agency’s interpretation (here, the ADA guidelines) is given if the agency’s regulation is genuinely ambiguous and if the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Id. at 2414– 15. If the regulation is not ambiguous, the “regulation then must mean what it means—and the court must give it effect, as the court would any law.” Id. at 2415. In sum, Kisor’s guidance is clear: should the Department of Justice file an amicus brief interpreting the accessibility guidelines in this case for either the transaction counter claim or the interior path-of-travel claim, the Court will assess how much deference to afford the agency’s interpretation. But the case is not yet at that juncture. Moreover, it is uncertain whether the interior path-of-travel issue will also trigger an interpretation of the accessibility guidelines. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (ECF No. 19) is hereby DENIED. DATED: April 27, 2020 6 Before Kisor, courts were required to “give an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416; see also Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 878 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is controlling unless “‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ or where there are grounds to believe that the interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment of the matter in question’”).