Johnson v. Shreveport Properties, Inc.

35 So. 2d 25, 213 La. 485, 1948 La. LEXIS 860
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMarch 22, 1948
DocketNo. 38244.
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 35 So. 2d 25 (Johnson v. Shreveport Properties, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Shreveport Properties, Inc., 35 So. 2d 25, 213 La. 485, 1948 La. LEXIS 860 (La. 1948).

Opinion

HAMITER, Justice.

In the instant case W. Harry Johnson sues to recover double the amount of earnest money ($5000) deposited by him under and in connection with his alleged agreement to purchase real estate owned by Shreveport Properties, Inc. Those made defendants are the said owner, its real estate agent, Newton B. Stoer, with whom the deposit was made, the Protective Committee for W. K. Henderson Iron Works and Supply Company, Ltd. (which owned all the outstanding capital stock of Shreveport Properties, Inc.), and the individual members of that committee.

In a companion case styled Newton B. Stoer v. Shreveport Properties, Inc., et al, La.Sup., 35 So.2d 31, 1 the plaintiff therein seeks a judgment of $3625 against the named owner corporation, and also against the mentioned committee and its members, for a realtor’s commission or fee allegedly earned by him in arranging a sale of the real estate for Shreveport Properties, Inc., to W. Harry Johnson.

The actions were consolidated, and tried together on their merits, in the district court; but separate judgments were rendered. The demands of W. Harry Johnson were rejected except as to Newton B. Stoer, against whom there was judgment in the sum of $5000, the amount of the deposit placed with him. Stoer’s suit was dismissed as to all defendants.

From the judgments Stoer and Johnson appealed. Appellees have answered the appeals, praying that their exceptions of no cause of action, urged in the district court, be maintained.

We find no merit in the exceptions. Under them it is first contended that the pleadings of both appellants show conclusively that Johnson’s offer to purchase was not accepted. The petition in each case alleges an acceptance of the offer, and the documents annexed thereto lend support to the allegation. Secondly, under the exceptions, it is argued (quoting from the brief of appellees’ counsel) that:

“But there is another reason why said exceptions of no cause of action should have been maintained, as to Mr. Johnson. His petition alleges — through the attach *489 ment of his offer, of date January 30, 1943, that he was to have fifteen days, after delivery of the abstracts to him, for examination of the title and consummation of the sale.

“He then alleges that he requested that the abstracts be delivered to his attorneys and that they were so delivered on March 4, 1943, and that the attorneys approved the title on March 16, 1943. That left Mr. Johnson but three days, or until March 19, 1943, to consummate the sale (even had his •offer been accepted — which is not the case) but your Honors will find no allegation that Mr. Johnson made any attempt to consummate the sale within the fifteen days .after delivery of the abstracts, nor any allegation that said period of fifteen days was extended. On the contrary, he alleges that it was not until April 13, 1943 — forty days .after delivery of the abstracts — that he signified his readiness to take title. Now, we respectfully submit that it is elementary, in Louisiana, that a plaintiff must show that he has complied with the terms and ■conditions of his contract before he can recover thereon. * * * ”

If time were of the essence of the contract under consideration the argument thus .made might be effective. But the pleadings, which are being assailed, together •with the annexed documents, do not show •that to be true. In fact, incidentally, on the trial of the case it was clearly and definitely ■disclosed that the fifteen day period stipulated for the consummation of the sale was of no importance and further that it had been waived by the parties.

At to the merits of the litigation the record reveals that for some time prior to January 30, 1943, the real estate in question, which is situated in Shreveport and consists of three separate tracts, belonged to Shreveport Properties, Inc. All of the outstanding capital stock of that corporation was owned by a group known as the “Protective Committee for W. K. Henderson Iron Works and Supply Company, Ltd., First Mortgage Six and One-half Percent Serial Gold Bonds, Dated: June 1, 1928.” This Protective Committee also owned all of the debts due by the corporation. C. G. Rives, Jr., occupied the dual capacity of President of Shreveport Properties, Inc., and of Chairman of the Protective Committee.

On June 29, 1942, C. G. Rives, Jr., to the knowledge of the other members of the Protective Committee, granted to Newton B. Stoer, a licensed real estate broker of Shreveport, an exclusive listing for the sale of the property. The written authorization provided for selling it either in whole or in part; fixed a price for the sale of the tracts separately and another and different one ($158,500) for selling them collectively; and stipulated a commission to be paid the broker, being certain percentages of the sale price. The listing was accepted by Stoer in a letter of July 2, 1942.

Pursuant to the employment contract, Stoer endeavored to interest various pros *491 'pects in purchasing the property, and kept Rives informed as to his progress. Among these prospects was W. Harry Johnson. Regarding his negotiations with Johnson, Stoer, on January 25, 1943, wrote the following to Rives:

“My main reason in writing this letter to you is to tell you that I have had another contact with W. Harry Johnson regarding the purchase of the property, and although he made it clear that he was not definitely making the offer, he intimated that he likely would pay the sum of $135,000.00 for all of the property involved. It was understood that I was to make this information known to you and upon receipt of a letter from you after your consideration of this information, I am to contact Mr. Johnson again.

“I will appreciate it if you will consider what I have said herein and write me about you consideration of it in such a manner that if need be, I can let Mr. Johnson read your letter; however, if you find it advisable, you might write a second letter of explanation going into detail to guide me in representing you.”

To this suggestion Rives gave a telephone reply, obviously favoring the reception and entertaining of a proposal by Johnson to purchase, for in Stoer’s next letter to Rives, dated January 30, 1943, he commented:

“Enclosed you will find the offer to purchase the Shreveport Properties, Inc., property, the former W. K. Henderson Iron & Supply Works property, located here in Shreveport, as per long-distam.ce telephone instructions from you.

“The offer is sent to you in triplicate signed by the purchaser. I respectfully request that those in authority sign all three (3) copies and affix the date at the time it is signed. You are to retain one (1) copy for your files and return two (2) copies to me, one to be delivered to the purchaser and the other to be filed in our office with the escrow feature, wherein I hold the deposit of Five thousand and no/100 Dollars ($5,-000) subject to the terms of the contract.

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Bluebook (online)
35 So. 2d 25, 213 La. 485, 1948 La. LEXIS 860, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-shreveport-properties-inc-la-1948.