Johnson v. Shinn

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 1, 2025
• Docket: 24-41
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 1 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD JOHNSON, No. 24-41 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:21-cv-00559-MTL-ESW v. MEMORANDUM* DAVID SHINN, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry, Director of ADOC; THOMAS HIGGINSON, Deputy Warden; SHANNON THIELMAN, Deputy Warden; CHRIS O'CONNER, Mayor; CHARLES RYAN, former Director of ADOC; PATRICK O'BRIEN, Deputy Warden; HOPE PING, Deputy Warden; LUIS MATOS, Mayor; LEVI BRASS, Special Security Unit Officer,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 15, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, BENNETT, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Plaintiff Richard Johnson, currently in the custody of the State of Arizona,

sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations

arising from a September 2020 hearing that validated him as a member of a Security

Threat Group (“STG”). On statutory screening, the district court narrowed the suit

to Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against the members of Johnson’s

validation hearing committee: Thomas Higginson, Shannon Thielman, and Chris

O’Connor (“Defendants”). The district court granted summary judgment to

Defendants. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, we review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Curley v.

City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2014). “We may affirm on any

basis supported by the record.” Fisher v. Kealoha, 855 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir.

2017) (per curiam). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

A procedural due process claim consists of two elements: “(1) a deprivation

of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of

adequate procedural protections.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th

Cir. 1998). As we have previously held, Johnson “has a liberty interest in avoiding

assignment to maximum custody as a consequence of his STG validation.”1 Johnson

1 Defendants argue that Johnson no longer possessed this liberty interest by his third validation hearing in September 2020 because he had already been validated as an STG member and assigned to maximum custody. Regardless of Johnson’s status at the time, Defendants had agreed to provide him with a third hearing before a new committee to remedy alleged due process violations at his first and second

2 24-41 v. Ryan, 55 F.4th 1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2022). But we conclude that Johnson’s third

validation hearing did not violate due process.

1. Defendants did not improperly rely on evidence without indicia of

reliability to validate Johnson. “Due process guarantees . . . that the evidence used

to validate [a prisoner] meet the ‘some evidence’ evidentiary standard.” Castro v.

Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1314 (9th Cir. 2013). Under this “minimally stringent”

test, we do not “reweigh the evidence,” but ask only “whether there is any evidence

in the record that could support the conclusion.” Id. (quoting Powell v. Gomez, 33

F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994); Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Arizona’s prison regulations list and define fourteen categories of evidence that can

support STG validation, each assigned a point value. The regulations require ten

points across at least two categories to validate a prisoner. Johnson argues that this

means the “some evidence” standard applied to Arizona prisoners requires “some

evidence” that the prisoner accrued at least ten points across two categories. But one

state’s “procedure beyond what the [Federal] Constitution demands” cannot be

“convert[ed] . . . into a substantive federal requirement.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562

U.S. 216, 220–21 (2011) (per curiam). The question remains “whether there is any

validation hearings. As Johnson points out, the third hearing could not have served its intended remedial purpose absent the possibility that it could have vacated Johnson’s validation. Johnson therefore retained a liberty interest in “avoiding assignment to maximum custody as a consequence of his STG validation.” Johnson v. Ryan, 55 F.4th 1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2022).

3 24-41 evidence in the record that could support the conclusion” that a prisoner is a member

of an STG. Castro, 712 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287).

Defendants relied on evidence in three categories to validate Johnson as a

member of the Warrior Society, a Native American STG: a “roll call” list of Native

American STG members (five points), a letter addressed to him from a validated

Warrior Society member (two points), and a “micro note” from Johnson (seven

points). Even if we were to hypothetically credit Johnson’s denial of possession of

the “roll call” list,2 the other items meet the “some evidence” standard. Johnson’s

remaining challenges to the letter and the micro note—including that neither

discusses Warrior Society business—go to the weight that the committee should

have given each item. But “we do not reweigh evidence when determining whether

there is ‘some evidence’ for due process purposes.” Johnson, 55 F.4th at 1188.

2. Defendants did not deny Johnson a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

At the hearing, Johnson presented a defense, accompanied by a 52-slide

presentation. Johnson argues that Defendant Higginson’s reading of the

committee’s findings from a prewritten statement shows that Defendants prejudged

the evidence, rendering his defense meaningless. Even viewed in the light most

favorable to Johnson, Defendants’ reliance on a prewritten or tentative ruling does

not raise a genuine factual dispute over whether the hearing’s outcome was

2 Defendants contend the roll call list was found in Johnson’s property box.

4 24-41 predetermined.

3. Defendants did not fail to explain their validation decision. While the

parties debate the adequacy of Defendant Higginson’s oral explanation at the end of

the hearing, the committee also provided Johnson a written explanation. The “Result

of STG Validation Hearing” form, signed by Johnson, describes in writing “the

evidence relied upon and the reasons for the . . . action taken.” Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974) (holding prisoners in disciplinary proceedings are entitled

to such a written statement). This more than satisfies due process in the context of

administrative segregation. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100–01

(9th Cir. 1986) (holding due process does not require “a written decision describing

the reasons for placing [a] prisoner in administrative segregation”), abrogated in

part on other grounds by, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Johnson, 55 F.4th

at 1181 (noting the segregation of gang affiliates “is not a disciplinary measure, but

an administrative strategy designed to preserve order in the prison and protect the

safety of all inmates” (quoting Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.

1997))).

AFFIRMED.

5 24-41