Johnson v. Sarwar Hacking Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Johnson v. Sarwar Hacking Corp.

89 A.D.3d 686, 931 N.Y.2d 913

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 1, 2011

StatusPublished

This text of 89 A.D.3d 686 (Johnson v. Sarwar Hacking Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Johnson v. Sarwar Hacking Corp., 89 A.D.3d 686, 931 N.Y.2d 913 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

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Opinion

The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The papers submitted by the defendants failed to adequately address the plaintiffs claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that the plaintiff sustained a medically determined injury or impairment of a nonpermanent nature which prevented her from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted her usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the subject accident (see Reynolds v Wai Sang Leung, 78 AD3d 919, 920 [2010]).

Since the defendants did not sustain their prima facie burden, [687]*687it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (id.).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Mastro, J.E, Dillon, Balkin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

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The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The papers submitted by the defendants failed to adequately address the plaintiffs claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that the plaintiff sustained a medically determined injury or impairment of a nonpermanent nature which prevented her from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted her usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the subject accident (see Reynolds v Wai Sang Leung, 78 AD3d 919, 920 [2010]).

Since the defendants did not sustain their prima facie burden, [687]*687it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (id.).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Mastro, J.E, Dillon, Balkin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

89 A.D.3d 686, 931 N.Y.2d 913, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-sarwar-hacking-corp-nyappdiv-2011.

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