Johnson v. Rodriguez

Fifth Circuit

Johnson v. Rodriguez

260 F.3d 493, 2001 WL 845180

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedAugust 28, 2001

Docket00-50443, 00-50570

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 260 F.3d 493 (Johnson v. Rodriguez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Johnson v. Rodriguez, 260 F.3d 493, 2001 WL 845180 (5th Cir. 2001).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

The chairmen and members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles and of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, in their official capacities, appeal from the judgment below awarding attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel in this class action by Texas prisoners. Following our reversal on the merits of the prisoners’ constitutional claims, see Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299 (5th Cir.1997), the magistrate judge ordered the defendants to pay $471,946.05 in attorneys’ fees and expenses, finding that the prisoners were a prevailing party pursuant to the “catalyst theory” of legal relief. The Supreme Court has since rejected reliance on the “catalyst theory” as a basis for awarding attorney’s fees under fee-shifting statutes authorizing awards to the “prevailing party.” See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., 531 U.S. 1004, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). Accordingly, we reverse the magistrate judge’s determination that the prisoner class is a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Finding no other basis on which attorneys’ fees might be awarded, we vacate the magistrate judge’s order.

The remaining issues in this appeal are whether it was appropriate for the magistrate judge to retain Daniel Johnson as class representative and whether the magistrate judge was required to dismiss the remaining prisoners’ claims as moot. At oral argument, counsel for both parties agreed that resolution of these issues is of no consequence if we vacate the award of attorneys’ fees. Both parties recognize that the class members’ claims are moot in light of the Board’s voluntary adoption and retention of an administrative rule prohibiting the complained of conduct. Because there is no judicial relief left for the prisoner class to pursue, we need not address the question of whether Daniel Johnson is a proper class representative.

We therefore VACATE the award of attorneys’ fees and REMAND the case to the magistrate judge with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. We DISMISS as moot Johnson’s cross-appeal for increased attorneys’ fees.

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions; cross-appeal DISMISSED.

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PER CURIAM:

The chairmen and members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles and of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, in their official capacities, appeal from the judgment below awarding attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel in this class action by Texas prisoners. Following our reversal on the merits of the prisoners’ constitutional claims, see Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299 (5th Cir.1997), the magistrate judge ordered the defendants to pay $471,946.05 in attorneys’ fees and expenses, finding that the prisoners were a prevailing party pursuant to the “catalyst theory” of legal relief. The Supreme Court has since rejected reliance on the “catalyst theory” as a basis for awarding attorney’s fees under fee-shifting statutes authorizing awards to the “prevailing party.” See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., 531 U.S. 1004, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). Accordingly, we reverse the magistrate judge’s determination that the prisoner class is a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Finding no other basis on which attorneys’ fees might be awarded, we vacate the magistrate judge’s order.

The remaining issues in this appeal are whether it was appropriate for the magistrate judge to retain Daniel Johnson as class representative and whether the magistrate judge was required to dismiss the remaining prisoners’ claims as moot. At oral argument, counsel for both parties agreed that resolution of these issues is of no consequence if we vacate the award of attorneys’ fees. Both parties recognize that the class members’ claims are moot in light of the Board’s voluntary adoption and retention of an administrative rule prohibiting the complained of conduct. Because there is no judicial relief left for the prisoner class to pursue, we need not address the question of whether Daniel Johnson is a proper class representative.

We therefore VACATE the award of attorneys’ fees and REMAND the case to the magistrate judge with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. We DISMISS as moot Johnson’s cross-appeal for increased attorneys’ fees.

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions; cross-appeal DISMISSED.

260 F.3d 493 (Fifth Circuit, 2001)

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260 F.3d 493, 2001 WL 845180, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-rodriguez-ca5-2001.

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