1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SCOTT JOHNSON, No. 2:14-cv-01454-MCE-AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 14 AZIZUR REHMAN and OMAR GHAITH, 15 Defendants. 16
17 Through this suit, Plaintiff Scott Johnson (“Plaintiff”) sought damages and 18 injunctive relief against Defendants Azizur Rehman and Omar Ghaith (collectively, 19 “Defendants”) for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 20 § 12101, et seq., and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (“Unruh 21 Act”). Plaintiff had encountered various physical barriers when attempting to access 22 Defendant Ghaith’s store on Defendant Rehman’s property in Sacramento, California. 23 On July 8, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, awarding 24 injunctive relief and statutory damages in the amount of $8,000. ECF Nos. 50, 51. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 Plaintiff now moves for attorney’s fees, ECF No. 52, and that motion is GRANTED 2 in part. Plaintiff is entitled to $12,775 in attorney’s fees and $2,585.54 in litigation 3 expenses.1 4 5 STANDARD 6 7 Both the ADA and Unruh Civil Rights Act permit the prevailing party in disability 8 access litigation to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Section 12205 of the 9 ADA authorizes a court, in its discretion, to “allow the prevailing party, other than the 10 United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs.” 11 42 U.S.C. § 12205. “[A] prevailing plaintiff under a statute so worded ‘should ordinarily 12 recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award 13 unjust.’” Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) 14 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)). Furthermore, violations of the 15 Unruh Civil Rights Act entitle a plaintiff to “any attorney’s fees that may be determined by 16 the court.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52. 17 “A reasonable fee is that which is ‘sufficient to induce a capable attorney to 18 undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case.’” K.M. ex rel. Bright v. 19 Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1297 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Perdue v. 20 Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010)). The court calculates the amount of 21 attorney’s fees by calculating a “lodestar” and “multiplying the number of hours 22 reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” McCown v. City of 23 Fontana Fire Dep’t, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). The appropriate number of 24 hours includes all time “reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in 25 the same manner than an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for 26 all time reasonably expended on a matter.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431. However, in 27 1 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, this matter has been 28 submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). 1 calculating the lodestar, “the district court should exclude hours ‘that are excessive, 2 redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” McCown, 565 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Hensley, 3 461 U.S. at 434). Although district judges “need not, and should not, become green- 4 eyeshade accountants,” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011), the court should provide 5 some indication of how it arrived at its conclusions, see Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 6 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) (“When the district court makes its award, it must 7 explain how it came up with the amount.”). 8 As a general rule, in determining the lodestar figure, “the court should defer to the 9 winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend 10 on the case.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. However, the party seeking an award of 11 attorney’s fees bears the burden of producing documentary evidence demonstrating “the 12 number of hours spent, and how it determined the hourly rate(s) requested.” McCown, 13 565 F.3d at 1102. Then the burden shifts to the opposing party to submit evidence 14 “challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts 15 asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Ruff v. Cty. of Kings, 16 700 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 17 Because the lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable, “a multiplier may be 18 used to adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward only in rare and exceptional 19 cases, supported by both specific evidence on the record and detailed findings by the 20 lower courts that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” Van 21 Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 22 omitted). 23 24 ANALYSIS 25 26 Plaintiff seeks $29,514.50 in attorney’s fees and $2,585.54 in litigation expenses. 27 Other than generally alleging that the fees are grossly excessive, the only specific 28 objection Defendants pose to the requested fees is that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover 1 costs for an expert witness and court reporter copies. Defs.’ Opp., ECF No. 57, at 5-6. 2 Defendants fail to mount any concrete challenge to billed tasks for which reimbursement 3 is sought.2 However, the Court finds that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff are 4 excessive. 5 A. Reasonable Hours 6 Defendants contend that the fees are grossly excessive because Plaintiff 7 employed eight attorneys and sought only $4,000-8,000 in statutory fees. Defs.’ Opp., 8 ECF No. 57, at 5. Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive. “A district court may not set 9 the fee based on speculation as to how other firms would have staffed the case.” 10 Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1114. Since this is the only argument advanced as to the 11 reasonableness of the time spent in litigating this matter, Defendants’ challenge on that 12 basis is rejected. 13 B. Reasonable Rates 14 Although Defendants do not specifically contest the hourly rates, the Court finds 15 that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff’s attorneys—ranging from $400-595—are 16 excessive. In similar cases involving the same plaintiff and law firm, this Court found 17 Mark Potter’s $350 rate unreasonable; now Potter requests a hourly rate of $595. See 18 Johnson v. Kamboj LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2016 WL 1043719, at *3 (E.D. 19 Cal. Mar. 16, 2016); Johnson v. Bourbon Prop., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-02949-MCE-AC, 2019 20 WL 1426340, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2019). Instead, the Court found $300-325 per 21 hour to be reasonable and granted attorney’s fees on that basis. Id. The Court here 22 finds that a reasonable rate for Potter is $325 per hour. See Bourbon Prop., 2019 WL 23 1426340, at *3; Johnson v. Warren, No. 2:14-cv-1497-MCE-AC, 2019 WL 1773518, at *2 24 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2019). 25 The Court also finds that Phyl Grace’s $500 rate is unreasonable. However, 26 because Grace has practiced for over 22 years with the last decade exclusively focused
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SCOTT JOHNSON, No. 2:14-cv-01454-MCE-AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 14 AZIZUR REHMAN and OMAR GHAITH, 15 Defendants. 16
17 Through this suit, Plaintiff Scott Johnson (“Plaintiff”) sought damages and 18 injunctive relief against Defendants Azizur Rehman and Omar Ghaith (collectively, 19 “Defendants”) for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 20 § 12101, et seq., and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (“Unruh 21 Act”). Plaintiff had encountered various physical barriers when attempting to access 22 Defendant Ghaith’s store on Defendant Rehman’s property in Sacramento, California. 23 On July 8, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, awarding 24 injunctive relief and statutory damages in the amount of $8,000. ECF Nos. 50, 51. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 Plaintiff now moves for attorney’s fees, ECF No. 52, and that motion is GRANTED 2 in part. Plaintiff is entitled to $12,775 in attorney’s fees and $2,585.54 in litigation 3 expenses.1 4 5 STANDARD 6 7 Both the ADA and Unruh Civil Rights Act permit the prevailing party in disability 8 access litigation to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Section 12205 of the 9 ADA authorizes a court, in its discretion, to “allow the prevailing party, other than the 10 United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs.” 11 42 U.S.C. § 12205. “[A] prevailing plaintiff under a statute so worded ‘should ordinarily 12 recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award 13 unjust.’” Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) 14 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)). Furthermore, violations of the 15 Unruh Civil Rights Act entitle a plaintiff to “any attorney’s fees that may be determined by 16 the court.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52. 17 “A reasonable fee is that which is ‘sufficient to induce a capable attorney to 18 undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case.’” K.M. ex rel. Bright v. 19 Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1297 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Perdue v. 20 Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010)). The court calculates the amount of 21 attorney’s fees by calculating a “lodestar” and “multiplying the number of hours 22 reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” McCown v. City of 23 Fontana Fire Dep’t, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). The appropriate number of 24 hours includes all time “reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in 25 the same manner than an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for 26 all time reasonably expended on a matter.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431. However, in 27 1 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, this matter has been 28 submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). 1 calculating the lodestar, “the district court should exclude hours ‘that are excessive, 2 redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” McCown, 565 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Hensley, 3 461 U.S. at 434). Although district judges “need not, and should not, become green- 4 eyeshade accountants,” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011), the court should provide 5 some indication of how it arrived at its conclusions, see Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 6 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) (“When the district court makes its award, it must 7 explain how it came up with the amount.”). 8 As a general rule, in determining the lodestar figure, “the court should defer to the 9 winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend 10 on the case.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. However, the party seeking an award of 11 attorney’s fees bears the burden of producing documentary evidence demonstrating “the 12 number of hours spent, and how it determined the hourly rate(s) requested.” McCown, 13 565 F.3d at 1102. Then the burden shifts to the opposing party to submit evidence 14 “challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts 15 asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Ruff v. Cty. of Kings, 16 700 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 17 Because the lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable, “a multiplier may be 18 used to adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward only in rare and exceptional 19 cases, supported by both specific evidence on the record and detailed findings by the 20 lower courts that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” Van 21 Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 22 omitted). 23 24 ANALYSIS 25 26 Plaintiff seeks $29,514.50 in attorney’s fees and $2,585.54 in litigation expenses. 27 Other than generally alleging that the fees are grossly excessive, the only specific 28 objection Defendants pose to the requested fees is that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover 1 costs for an expert witness and court reporter copies. Defs.’ Opp., ECF No. 57, at 5-6. 2 Defendants fail to mount any concrete challenge to billed tasks for which reimbursement 3 is sought.2 However, the Court finds that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff are 4 excessive. 5 A. Reasonable Hours 6 Defendants contend that the fees are grossly excessive because Plaintiff 7 employed eight attorneys and sought only $4,000-8,000 in statutory fees. Defs.’ Opp., 8 ECF No. 57, at 5. Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive. “A district court may not set 9 the fee based on speculation as to how other firms would have staffed the case.” 10 Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1114. Since this is the only argument advanced as to the 11 reasonableness of the time spent in litigating this matter, Defendants’ challenge on that 12 basis is rejected. 13 B. Reasonable Rates 14 Although Defendants do not specifically contest the hourly rates, the Court finds 15 that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff’s attorneys—ranging from $400-595—are 16 excessive. In similar cases involving the same plaintiff and law firm, this Court found 17 Mark Potter’s $350 rate unreasonable; now Potter requests a hourly rate of $595. See 18 Johnson v. Kamboj LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2016 WL 1043719, at *3 (E.D. 19 Cal. Mar. 16, 2016); Johnson v. Bourbon Prop., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-02949-MCE-AC, 2019 20 WL 1426340, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2019). Instead, the Court found $300-325 per 21 hour to be reasonable and granted attorney’s fees on that basis. Id. The Court here 22 finds that a reasonable rate for Potter is $325 per hour. See Bourbon Prop., 2019 WL 23 1426340, at *3; Johnson v. Warren, No. 2:14-cv-1497-MCE-AC, 2019 WL 1773518, at *2 24 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2019). 25 The Court also finds that Phyl Grace’s $500 rate is unreasonable. However, 26 because Grace has practiced for over 22 years with the last decade exclusively focused
27 2 Defendants primarily argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees because he is a “professional plaintiff.” Defs.’ Opp., ECF No. 57, at 1. The Court finds this argument meritless, and it 28 played no role in the Court’s decision. 1 on disability access litigation, the Court finds $300 per hour to be appropriate. See 2 Warren, 2019 WL 1426340, at *2; Johnson v. Brunk, No. 2:14-cv-01277-MCE-EFB, 2019 3 WL 3778711, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019). 4 Rates charged by less experienced associates, however, are also excessive. 5 Plaintiff seeks $450 per hour for three associates (Dennis Price, Amanda Seabock, and 6 Isabel Masanque) and $400 per hour for another three associates (Sara Gunderson, 7 Elliot Montgomery, and Prathima Reddy Price). See Decl. of Mark Potter, ECF No. 52-1, 8 at 3-6. In Kamboj, this Court found rates of $150 for these attorneys reasonable, since 9 “[c]ourts in the Eastern District have regularly approved hourly rates of . . . $150-175 for 10 associates” and their experience made rates “at the lower end for associates” proper. 11 2016 WL 1043719, at *3 (alterations in original) (first quoting Estrada v. iYogi, Inc., 12 No. 2:13-cv-01989-WBS-CKD, 2016 WL 310279, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016); then 13 quoting Johnson v. Wayside Prop. Inc., No. 2:13-1610 WBS AC, 2014 WL 6634324, at 14 *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014)). For similar reasons, the Court finds hourly rates of $175 15 reasonable for these attorneys in this case. 16 Pursuant to the Court’s above modifications, the appropriate lodestar award in 17 this case is $12,775:3 18 Potter: 14.4 x $325 = $4,680 19 Grace: 4 x $300 = $1,200 20 Price: 8.6 x $175 = $1,505 21 Masanque: 5.2 x $175 = $910 22 Seabock: 13.8 x $175 = $ 2,415 23 Gunderson: 11.4 x $175 = $1,995 24 Montgomery: 0.4 x $175 = $70 25 Given the “strong presumption . . . that the lodestar figure represents a 26 reasonable fee,” Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000)
27 3 Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees for Prathima Reddy Price but none of the activities on the billing statement are attributed to her. Because the Court could not determine what work she 28 completed, no fees were awarded to her. 1 | (citation omitted), and since neither Plaintiff nor Defendants seek a multiplier or reduction 2 | of the lodestar, no further adjustment to the lodestar is warranted. 3 C. _Litigation Expenses 4 Plaintiff also seeks $2,585.54 in litigation expenses. Defendants challenge the 5 | costs for an expert witness ($1,660) and court reporter copies ($285). Defs.’ Opp., ECF 6 | No. 57, at 5-6. Such costs are recoverable litigation costs, and therefore, Defendants’ 7 | challenge is rejected. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058 8 | (9th Cir. 2002) (finding § 12205 authorizes the award of expert witness fees). Plaintiff's 9 | requested litigation expenses are reasonable and awarded in full. 10 11 CONCLUSION 12 13 For the reasons provided above, Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees, ECF 14 | No. 52, is GRANTED in part. Defendants shall pay Plaintiff $12,775 in attorney's fees 15 | and $2,585.54 in litigation expenses for a total of $15,360.54. The Clerk of the Court is 16 | directed to file an amended Judgment which not only requires Defendant Rehman to 17 || make the subject property compliant with the ADA and awards the sum of $8,000 in 18 | statutory damages (as previously adjudged on July 8, 2019) but also requires payment 19 | of the aforementioned fees and expenses of $15,360.54. 20 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 21 | Dated: February 18, 2020 22
UNITED STATES DISTRI 24 25 26 27 28