Page 1 of 21 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION WESLEY I. JOHNSON, D.O.C. #055448, Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF OFFICER RAYNARD, Defendant. _________________________/
SECOND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner incarcerated in the Florida Department of Corrections. He is proceeding with in forma pauperis status, ECF Nos. 7-8,
and the operative pleading is his second amended complaint, ECF No. 11. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered a hemorrhagic stroke while in his dormitory at Gulf Correctional Institution. ECF No. 11 at 9. He was taken
to the infirmary, but the nurses said there was nothing wrong with him and directed him to return to the dormitory. Id. Plaintiff says he could not comply with that order because he was experiencing right side paralysis. Id. He was then placed in a “strip cell,” unattended, for 8-10 hours. Id. at Page 2 of 21 9-10. The next morning, Defendant Raynard1 and a nurse came into his cell and ordered Plaintiff to get his “old ass up,” with the nurse again saying
there was nothing wrong with him.2 Id. at 10. Once again, Plaintiff said he was “unable to move.” Id. Defendant Raynard then said he would get Plaintiff up “and began stomping on the plaintiff’s right arm, leg, and shoulder, ordering him to get up.” Id. Plaintiff then responded
inappropriately and disrespectfully, which allegedly led to Defendant Raynard repeatedly punching Plaintiff in the face. Id. Plaintiff said he “suffered contusions and lacerations to his right arm, right leg, right
shoulder and upper back, face, and head from beating” inflicted by the Defendant. Id. Plaintiff claims the Defendant used unnecessary and excessive force against him “while he was partially paralyzed and incapable of offering any resistance which would have necessitated such
force.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that he “exhausted his
1 Plaintiff sued three nurses (names unknown) as well. ECF No. 11. However, Plaintiff subsequently voluntarily dismissed those Defendants from this case, see ECF Nos. 45 and 47, leaving Officer Raynard as the sole Defendant. 2 To be clear, Plaintiff alleged that the incident happened in July 2022, ECF No. 11 at 9, but he has since clarified that the events at issue took place on June 11, 2022. ECF No. 48 at 1; ECF No. 43 at 2. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 3 of 21 administrative remedies with respect to all claims and defendants, except where doing so would have been fruitless.” Id. at 11.
After service of process, Defendant Raynard filed a motion to dismiss, ECF No. 27, raising failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the claim against the Defendant in his official capacity. Specifically,
Defendant said that Plaintiff “made “no specific factual allegation of his exhaustion” steps in the second amended complaint. Id. at 3. Defendant then argued that Plaintiff did not complete any of the three-steps necessary
for exhaustion and his grievance record shows no grievances were filed during the relevant time frame. Id. at 4. Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 29, by claiming that inmates “must exhaust available remedies but need no exhaust
unavailable ones.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff said he attempted to exhaust administrative remedies and filed multiple grievances but never received a response. Id. at 2. He argued that the grievance process was not
available to him. In ruling on the motion to dismiss, Defendant’s first argument was rejected because a prisoner is not required to present factual allegations Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 4 of 21 concerning exhaustion in the complaint. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (“We conclude that failure to
exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”). Additionally, because the Court is required to accept Plaintiff’s version of the facts as true when ruling on a motion to dismiss, and because Plaintiff
claimed that he did not have an available grievance process to exhaust, the motion to dismiss was denied - without objection - as to the issue of exhaustion. ECF Nos. 30, 31.
The parties were then provided an opportunity to conduct discovery, ECF No. 34, and at the conclusion of the discovery period, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 36-37, 39. Defendant’s motion does not address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims; instead, Defendant once
again raised the issue of exhaustion. Plaintiff was advised of his obligation to respond to the motion, ECF No. 40, and Plaintiff responded by filing an amended response in opposition to the motion, ECF No. 46, along with an
amended declaration, ECF No. 48. The Court was then confronted with conflicting declarations. Plaintiff presented evidence to show that he attempted to exhaust administrative Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 5 of 21 remedies which were unavailable, and Defendant presented evidence to show he did not. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was held to resolve the
dispute as to exhaustion and determine the proper ruling on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 50-53. That is because the issue of whether a prisoner failed “to properly exhaust available administrative remedies under the PLRA should be treated as a matter in
abatement.” Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008) (cited in Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008)). Such a “defense is treated ‘like a defense for lack of jurisdiction,’ although it is not
a jurisdictional matter.” Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374 (cited in Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082). Notably, the Court is permitted to “make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.” Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082 (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1373–74, 1376).3
3 “Where exhaustion . . . is treated as a matter in abatement and not an adjudication on the merits, it is proper for a judge to consider facts outside of the pleadings and to resolve factual disputes so long as the factual disputes do not decide the merits and the parties have sufficient opportunity to develop a record.” Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376. See also Springs v. Gielow, No. 3:14cv105-MCR-EMT, 2015 WL 1458273, at 28 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2015) (citing Taylor v. Watkins, 623 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2010), and Smith v. Wang, 452 F. App’x 292 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)) (other citations omitted); see also Davis v. Sknee, No. 7:16-CV-237, 2017 WL 11457295, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 9986808 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 10, 2018). Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 6 of 21 The evidentiary hearing was held on June 10, 2025. ECF No. 53. Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties were permitted to file
supplemental evidence. ECF No. 54. At this point, all relevant evidence has been submitted and the summary judgment motion is ready for a ruling. Standard of Review
“Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter in abatement and not generally an adjudication on the merits, an exhaustion defense . . . is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment;
instead, it ‘should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for summary judgment.’” Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374–75 (quotation omitted). “Where exhaustion—like jurisdiction, venue, and service of process—is treated as a matter in abatement and not an
adjudication on the merits, it is proper for a judge to consider facts outside of the pleadings and to resolve factual disputes so long as the factual disputes do not decide the merits and the parties have sufficient
opportunity to develop a record.” 530 F.3d at 1376. There is no need for “jury trials to resolve factual disputes over the preliminary issue of
Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 7 of 21 exhaustion” as the facts pertaining to exhaustion do not bear on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 1376-77.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The parties were provided sufficient time to develop the record and provide all relevant information to the Court and it is appropriate for this Court to act “as the factfinder” in determining whether Plaintiff had access to the grievance
process to report his alleged physical abuse by Defendant Raynard. 530 F.3d at 1377. An issue of fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the case.
Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A party must show more than the existence of a “metaphysical doubt” regarding the material facts, Matsushita Elec. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 8 of 21 Indus. Co., LTD. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), and a “scintilla” of evidence is
insufficient. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Record Evidence Plaintiff had a stroke on June 11, 2022,4 and was, thereafter, transported to the hospital where he remained for 4½ days. ECF No. 48 at
1. Plaintiff was returned to Gulf Correctional Institution only for a day and a half before being transferred to the infirmary at Calhoun Correctional Institution on June 17, 2022. Id. For the first week there, Plaintiff testified5 that he was “kept in bed” and continued to experience “mild paralysis” on
the right side. Id. at 2. Plaintiff however, testified in the hearing that he writes with his left hand.
4 Plaintiff testified in the hearing that the date of the underlying incident was June 11th and not in July as alleged in the second amended complaint. 5 Plaintiff’s amended declaration, ECF No. 48, constitutes admissible testimony as his statements were sworn under penalty of perjury. Id. at 2.. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 9 of 21 On June 27, 2022, Plaintiff sent an inmate request to the warden, seeking an extension of time to file a grievance concerning the June 11th
events. Id. at 2. He said that he did not request a specific length of time for the extension, he merely advised that he was recovering from a stroke and was in the infirmary. He received no response. Plaintiff testified in the evidentiary hearing that he does not have a copy of that request because
such a request, as well as an informal grievance, is submitted on a single sheet of paper. An inmate will only have a copy if the DOC responds. Plaintiff said that he filed an informal grievance on July 23, 2022,
even though he had not received a response to his request for additional time. ECF No. 48 at 2. During the hearing, Plaintiff explained that he turned it in to the officer who was supervising the infirmary that day. Plaintiff does not know the name of that officer as they rotated on a regular
basis. Plaintiff did not retain a copy, nor make himself an identical written copy, of this informal grievance. Plaintiff then submitted a second informal grievance on August 10,
2022. ECF No. 48 at 2. He testified that he did so in the same manner as the first grievance - handing it to the supervising officer. Both of those grievances were submitted while Plaintiff was housed at Calhoun C.I. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 10 of 21 Again, Plaintiff did not retain a copy, nor make himself an identical written copy, of this informal grievance.
Plaintiff was transferred to Wakulla Correctional Institution Annex later that same day, August 10th. ECF No. 48 at 2. While there, Plaintiff testified that he filed two more informal grievances on August 24, 2022. Id. Plaintiff said one grievance was addressed to the warden at Wakulla C.I.
where he was currently housed, and the other was addressed to the warden at Gulf C.I. where the event occurred. Id. Plaintiff testified that those grievances were placed in the grievance box by the chow hall.
Plaintiff did not retain a copy, nor make himself an identical written copy, of either of those informal grievances. Id. Plaintiff also testified that in his informal grievances, he complained about being placed in isolation for about 10 hours after suffering a stroke
and that the next morning, Defendant Raynard came into his cell with a nurse and physically attacked him for not getting up as directed. Plaintiff said he also mentioned that he had previously requested an extension of
time. Further, as for the August 24th grievances, Plaintiff said he mentioned that he had filed prior grievances but had not received a response. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 11 of 21 Plaintiff acknowledged in the hearing that he had previously filed grievances over the years, sometimes receiving a response and
sometimes not. He said if he did not get a response, he “mostly” just threw them away and lost interest in pursuing them. He admitted awareness of the grievance process - that if prison officials do not respond, he could proceed to the next level or go to court.
John Alan McManes testified at the hearing as well. Mr. McManes is the chief of policy management and inmate appeals for the Department of Corrections. He explained the grievance process and testified that a
record of all grievances are maintained in the Department’s system. He said there were no grievances logged or created about the incident. The only grievance filed close in time to the incident was an informal grievance on September 23, 2022, and that was about a classification matter. ECF
No. 39-1 at 3. That grievance was denied. On October 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed an informal grievance about a tablet issue. Id. That grievance was approved. Id. Plaintiff filed another informal grievance on October 10,
2022, about inmate banking, and that grievance was denied. Id. Between September 2022 and 2023, Plaintiff filed 19 informal grievances, 6 of which were approved. ECF No. 39-1 at 3-4. Although the evidence revealed Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 12 of 21 Plaintiff had filed formal grievances and grievance appeals, none were filed between June and December 2022. ECF No. 39-1 at 6, 8.
Mr. McManes testified that Department rules require the collection of grievances from all areas of an institution, Monday through Friday. Grievances are either placed in secured locked boxes, or staff collect grievances in segregated housing units and in the infirmary. McManes
also said that they highly discourage inmates from handing grievances to security staff to keep the grievance process as secure as possible. Plaintiff, however, testified that the person he gave his grievance to while
he was in the infirmary at Calhoun C.I. was the officer in charge and not an official collecting grievances. Plaintiff was asked why he could not have filed his informal grievance on June 27th instead of requesting an extension of time. He said that he
was not sure how he “wanted to word it.” He also said that he hoped the request for the extension of time would stop the clock, although he knew there was a time limit for filing the grievance. Plaintiff also acknowledged
that he filed four informal grievances and never filed a formal grievance. He testified that he did not believe he would get a response because the
Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 13 of 21 issue concerned an officer. He said he could not figure out what else to do, so he decided to file this case because he could not force a response.
Notably, Plaintiff also testified in the hearing that he sent handwritten copies of his last two informal grievances to F.D.L.E. and asked the agency to hold the records for him as proof that he had filed. However, Plaintiff said that when he requested a copy later after filing this suit, he was told
that he had to pay to receive public records. Plaintiff said he lacked the financial resources to pay so he could not obtain the copy of his grievance, but he did say that he had a copy of the letter from F.D.L.E. in his cell.6
Following the hearing, Defendant filed an amended status report which advised that counsel contacted FDLE in an effort to obtain a copy of Plaintiff’s request for copies. A public records search was undertaken, but no records were located to confirm a request was received from Plaintiff or
that a request for payment was sent to Plaintiff. ECF No. 57 at 2. Plaintiff did not submit any additional supplementary evidence. However, in reviewing this case, the Court has located several letters
6 At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the parties were informed that they could present additional supplemental evidence. In particular, Plaintiff was directed to search his cell and provide the copy of the letter from FDLE which would substantiate his testimony and the Court could determine that Plaintiff’s grievance raised the issue of Defendant’s alleged conduct. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 14 of 21 which Plaintiff attached to his initial complaint, ECF No. 1, filed on June 28, 2023. One letter was sent by Plaintiff to the attention of the “I.G. Office”
[Inspector General’s Office of the Florida Department of Corrections]. ECF No. 1 at 8. The other letter was directed to the attention of the F.D.L.E. ECF No. 1 at 9. In both letters, Plaintiff said that he wrote to them last year about an incident in which he “was the victim of a battery” by a correctional
officer. Id. at 8-9. He requested to know if the investigation had been completed and, if possible, could he receive a copy of the results and the case number. Id. Both letters have a DOC stamp which reveals they were
provided to prison staff to mail for Plaintiff on June 1, 2023. Id. Plaintiff received responses from the Inspector General’s Office. ECF No. 1 at 10-11. The first letter was dated June 6, 2023, and said that it appeared Plaintiff was making a public records request and that such
requests must first be directed to Plaintiff’s classification officer. Id. at 10. Further, Plaintiff must demonstrate “exceptional need” for the information which must also be “otherwise unavailable.” Id. The second letter was
dated June 13, 2023, and was substantially the same, also from the Inspector General’s Office. Id. at 11.
Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 15 of 21 Analysis In enacting the Prison Litigation Reform Act [PLRA], Congress
mandated that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324-26 (11th Cir. 1998); Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374, n.10. Courts lack discretion to waive this requirement or
provide continuances of prisoner litigation in the event that a claim has not been exhausted prior to filing. Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1325; see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (holding that “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits
about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong”); Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207-08 (11th Cir. 2000).
A prisoner must comply with the process set forth and established by the State’s grievance procedures. See Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, § 1997e(a) of the PLRA requires “proper Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 16 of 21 exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006) (concluding that “proper exhaustion” means complying with the
specific prison grievance requirements, not judicially imposed requirements); Jones, 549 U.S. at 218, 127 S. Ct. 910 (quoted in Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is
required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’”)). Plaintiff is housed within the Florida Department of Corrections which has an administrative grievance program, FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.
The Department’s process outlines that an inmate must proceed through a three-step grievance process, and that process imposes certain time limits. Rule 33-103.011 requires that an informal grievance “[m]ust be received within 20 days of when the incident or action being grieved occurred unless
the inmate” has obtained approval for an extension of time.7 FLA. ADMIN. 7 The Rule shows an inmate may submit a written request “for a 45 day extension to file an informal grievance about being physically restrained during pregnancy, labor or post-partum recovery pursuant to rule 33-602.211, F.A.C.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33- 103.011(1)(a). The request mst be submitted on an Inmate Request form must be “received within 20 days of the application of restraints.” Id. The Rule states that an extension will “be granted when it is clearly demonstrated by the inmate to the satisfaction of the reviewing authority . . . that it was not feasible to file the grievance within the relevant time periods and that the inmate made a good faith effort to file in a timely manner.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.011(2). While it is clear that inmates can request an extension of time, it is not clear that a request would be granted unless Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 17 of 21 CODE R. 33-103.011(1)(a). A formal grievance “[m]ust “be received no later than 15 calendar days from . . . [t]he date on which the incident or action
being grieved occurred if an informal grievance was not filed . . . .” FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.011(1)(b). A grievance appeal “[m]ust be received within 15 calendar days from the date the response to the formal grievance is returned to the inmate.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.011(1)(c).
In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff did not proceed through the three steps of the grievance process. Even accepting Plaintiff’s version of facts as true, Plaintiff only contends that he attempted to file four informal
grievances to which he received no response. Plaintiff never took the additional step of filing a formal grievance (or appeal if that were denied). Plaintiff’s incident occurred on June 11, 2022. Pursuant to the rules of the Department, Plaintiff should have submitted an informal grievance
within 20 calendar days, or by July 1, 2022. Plaintiff did not do so. Had Plaintiff submitted an informal grievance instead of a request for an extension of time on June 27th, he would have submitted a timely
grievance. Plaintiff did not do so, however, but - accepting his testimony as true and credible - Plaintiff waited until July 23, 2002, to submit his first related to restraint during pregnancy, labor, or post-partum recovery. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 18 of 21 informal grievance. A grievance submitted on July 23 would be 42 days after the incident and such a grievance would have been denied as
untimely. The evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff did not file a proper grievance within the relevant time frame. At best, Plaintiff filed a request for extension of time within the grievance period. Moreover, even if this
Court were to consider the informal grievances to have been timely filed, Plaintiff did not exhaust all three steps of the grievance process as required. That conclusion necessarily means that Plaintiff did not exhaust
administrative remedies. Notably, at the motion to dismiss stage of this litigation, Plaintiff said he attempted to exhaust administrative remedies but claimed the grievance process was not “available” to him. It is true that the exhaustion
requirement of the PLRA “hinges on the ‘availab[ility]’ of administrative remedies: An inmate . . . must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642, 136 S. Ct.
1850, 1858, 195 L. Ed. 2d 117 (2016). In other words, courts must apply the grievance statute “to the real-world workings of prison grievance
Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 19 of 21 systems.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 643, 136 S. Ct. at 1859. In light of the evidence submitted, however, Plaintiff’s argument must be rejected.
Plaintiff is aware of the grievance process and the steps which must be taken. He presented no evidence that any prison official thwarted or otherwise prevented him from filing a grievance. Instead, the evidence shows only that Plaintiff delayed filing his informal grievance. Since
Plaintiff was physically able to request an extension of time, he could have submitted his informal grievance at that time. He failed to present any legitimate reason for not doing so.
One additional point is worth noting. Even under Plaintiff’s version of the facts, it does not appear that Plaintiff gave his grievance to the appropriate prison official when he was in the infirmary. The evidence revealed that a specific prison official is tasked with collecting grievances
from prisoners in areas where the prisoner cannot physically put a grievance in the secured box. Plaintiff gave his grievance to a supervisor, not the grievance official. Even if one accepts that Plaintiff provided an
informal grievance, his failure to deliver it to the right official may explain why Plaintiff did not receive a response to his informal grievance, even though it was submitted belatedly 42 days after the incident. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 20 of 21 Moreover, the Department’s Rules state that “expiration of a time limit at any step in the process shall entitle the complainant to proceed to the
next step of the grievance process.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.011(4). “If this occurs, the complainant must clearly indicate this fact when filing at the next step.” Id. If the time limit expires at the central office level of review, that is, a grievance appeal, the inmate “shall be
entitled to proceed with judicial remedies as he would have exhausted his administrative remedies.” Id. Plaintiff admits that he never filed a formal grievance or grievance appeal seeking review of any of his informal
grievances. Had Plaintiff properly submitted a timely informal grievance, he could have filed a grievance appeal after the expiration of the 15-day response time. If no response was received to that grievance, Plaintiff could have
then filed an appeal at the central office level of review. However, Plaintiff is not permitted to skip steps in the grievance process and then proceed with judicial remedies. Therefore, because Plaintiff did not exhaust
available administrative remedies, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 36, should be granted and this case closed.
Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF Page 21 of 21 RECOMMENDATION In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that
Defendant Raynard’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 36, be GRANTED and this case be closed because Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on July 21, 2025.
S/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other parties. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. If a party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636. Case No. 4:23cv273-MW-MAF