Johnson v. Ramos

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 25, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-10361
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Ramos (Johnson v. Ramos) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Ramos, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JINJA J.J. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, 20-CV-10361 (LLS) -against- ORDERTO AMEND RIKERS ISLAND (R.M.S.C.), et al., Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Rose M. Singer Center (RMSC) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendantcorrectionofficers violated her rights.By order datedFebruary 2, 2021,the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceedIFP.See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007).The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude”in pro se cases,id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred during a two-week period, from October 14, 2020,to October 27, 2020, when Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner at the RMSC on Rikers Island. The following facts are taken from the complaint, verbatim: This officer only wrote me up, after I was irate to other inmates antagonizing me for 2 weeks. None of these inmate[s] received any type of discipline for their actions before and after. Paper trial will show after 3 of these female[s] ran up on me while I was using the toilet, to fight, I ask to be removed, felt my life was being threatened, a week before this officer gave me an infraction. I even made numbers ‘311’ calls to try to report this unfair officer. Most of all charges are ‘B.S.’ I didn’t disrespect in fact this is the only officer I’ve even disrespected. I didn’t disrespect her until she became disrespectful with statements like ‘now she want protection.’ Her response when I asked her not tolet others in while I showered because of the incident a few days earlier when the 3 inmates approached me inthe bathroom to fight. (ECF 1, at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Captain Eddy “falsified a report stating I refused infraction or to sign, when this option was never given to me.” (Id.at 5.) Attached to the complaint are documents showing that Plaintiff was found guilty of five charges and sentenced to punitive segregated housing. (See id.at 7-15.) Plaintiff appealed the guilty verdict and filed a petition under Article 78, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801, in Bronx County Supreme Court. In that proceeding, she submitted a statement in which she alleged that she “did get disrespectful after the officer threatened to pepper spray [her],” but she believed the officer “targeted” her because she is gay.(Id.at 10.) Plaintiff also alleged that she had not been notified of the infraction until November 2, 2020, until ahearing onthe infractionwas held. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that as a result of these events, she suffered “emotional distress [and] defamation of character,” as well as the “risk of harm from inmate with Officer Ramos ‘turning her cheek,’ hate crime because of sexuality (homophobia).” (Id.) She seeks money damages. DISCUSSION A. RMSC and Department of Correction (DOC) Plaintiff’s claims against the RMSC and the DOCmust be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). B. Excessive Force

Because Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner at the time of the events described in her complaint, her claims arise under the Eighth Amendmentto the United States Constitution.See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). The Court construes the complaint as asserting an excessive force claim, that is,that one of the defendants violated Plaintiff’srights under the Eighth Amendment by usingpepper spray. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, and bars the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Phelps v. Kapnolas,

Related

Whitley v. Albers
475 U.S. 312 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson
576 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Phelps v. Kapnolas
308 F.3d 180 (Second Circuit, 2002)
Scott v. Coughlin
344 F.3d 282 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Jenkins v. City of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Miller
818 F.3d 49 (Second Circuit, 2016)
Randle v. Alexander
960 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D. New York, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. Ramos, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-ramos-nysd-2021.