Johnson v. OMD

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided May 10, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00580·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

LAUSTEVEION JOHNSON, Case No. 2:20-cv-00580-RFB-VCF Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER ON v. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF No. 8) OMD, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a first amended civil rights complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 8), and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1), a motion request for screening (ECF No. 3), a motion for leave to file an amended complaint (ECF No. 6), a motion for leave to file excess pages (ECF No. 7), a motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 9), a motion for a copy of the motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 10), a motion for release and oral arguments (ECF No. 13), a motion request for oral argument (ECF No. 15), and a motion for mandatory settlement conference (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff paid $350.00 toward the full filing fee for a civil action. (ECF No. 14). The Court now addresses the matter of the filing fee, screens the FAC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and addresses the motions. I. FILING FEE The Court denies Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) because Plaintiff does not qualify for in forma pauperis status. Moreover, Plaintiff seems to acknowledge that he would not have qualified because he later paid a partial filing fee of $350. (ECF No. 14). The Court notes that the full filing fee for a civil action initiated before December 1, 2020, is $400, which includes the $350 filing fee and $50 administrative fee. When an inmate qualifies for in forma pauperis status the $50 administrative fee is waived by the pay the remaining $50 to the Clerk of the Court before this case will proceed. Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person’s claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may therefore be dismissed sua sponte if that person’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). In Plaintiff’s 51-page FAC, he sues 46 defendants and raises 4 claims allegedly spanning from February 2018 through March 2021. (See ECF No. 8). Plaintiff’s nature of the case, which is supposed to be brief, is 24 pages long. (Id. at 8-31). The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s FAC without prejudice with leave to amend because the 51-page FAC does not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

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