Johnson v. New York Line Insurance

109 Iowa 708
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedApril 8, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 109 Iowa 708 (Johnson v. New York Line Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. New York Line Insurance, 109 Iowa 708 (iowa 1899).

Opinion

Waterman, J.

There is but little controversy between the parties as to the facts; none as to the following matters: On December 27, 1890, the defendant company issued to one Frank O. Johnson itsi policy of insurance on his life for the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars'. This policy was assigned to plaintiff in the year 1895, and on September 28, 1896, Johnson died. The annual premium provided for in the contract was onei thousand and sixty dollars, and it was payable in advance on the 11th day of November in each year. The policy contains the usual provisions for forfeiture in ease the premiums are mot paid when due. Johnson paid the premium due on November 11, 1892, and thereafter made no payments. After Johnson’s death, and on the 20th day of February, 1897, plaintiff tendered to defend-ant 1 the amount of the past-due premiums, with interest to that date, which it' declined to accept. Theret-aften this action was brought. The defendant company was duly incorporated under the laws of the state of New York, and the policy was issued in that state,- and by the terms of the application the contract was to be construed by the laws thereof. It was therefore a New York contract. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 48; Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195 (9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41).

II. Plaintiff claims that the policy in. suit was not forfeited by the failure of the assured to pay the premiums which became due after November 11, 1892, and before Johnson’s death, for the the reason that at and prior to the time of the issuance of such policy there was in force in the State of New York a statute (Laws 1877, [710]*710c. 321, section 1) which provided: “No life insurance company doing business in tire sta.te of New York shall have power to declare forfeited or lapsed any policy hereafter issued or renewed by reason of non-payment of any annual premium or interest or any portion thereof except as hereafter provided.” We shall not set out the law in terms. It 2 is enough to- say that after default, in order to declare a forfeiture, it requires the company to mail a written or printed notice to the assured, at his last known postoffice, stating the amount due, and the place where, and the person to whom, it is payable, and, further, that, if the amount due is not paid within thirty days after mailing the notice, “the policy and all payments thereon will become forfeited and void. In case the payments demanded by such notice shall be madei within thirty days limited therefor, the same shall be taken to' be in full compliance with, the requirements of the policy, in respect to the payment of said premium or interest, anything therein contained! to the contrary notwithstanding. But no such policy shall in any case be forfeited or lapsed until the expiration of thirty days after the mailing of such notice. Provided, however, that a notice stating when the premium will fall due, and, if not paid, the policy and all payments thereon will become forfeited and void, served in the manner herein provided, at least thirty and not more than sixty days prior to the day when the premium is payable, shall have the same effect as the notice hereinbefore provided for.” In Baxter v. Insurance Co., 119 N. Y. 454 (23 N. E. Rep. 1049), the court, in speaking of this statute and its effect upon a policy of life insurance issued under it, said, “This statute was a part of the contract in question, and governed the rights and liabilities of the parties, in precisely the same way and to the same extent as if all its terms and conditions had been actually incorporated into the policy.” In that case the defendant was claiming a forfeiture of the policy for nonpayment of the premium when due. It was not shown [711]*711that the notice required by law had been given. The court continues as follows: “There was no proof given at the trial by either party to show whether this notice (the one required by statute) had been served or not. It is obvious that this statute, when imported into the contract, modified its conditions in very material respects. The duration and validity of the policy are not then dependent upon payment of the premium on the day named therein, but upon the payment within thirty days after the notice had been given. * * * The statute prescribes this notice as a necessary condition of forfeiture, and, unless it was served, the assured was not in default, because payment within thirty days after notice is to be taken as a full compliance with the conditions as to payment of premium. * * * Before defendant could raise any question in regard to the nonpayment of the August premium, it was necessary to show that it had complied with the statute by serving the notice, as this step' was essential in order to put the assured in default, or to raise any point based on his omission to pay the last quarterly premium.” See also De Frece v. Insurance Co., 136 N. Y. 151 (32 N. E. Rep. 556); Phelan v. Insurance Co., 113 N. Y. 147 (20 N. E. Rep. 827). In Griffith v. Insurance Co., 101 Cal. 627 (36 Pac. Rep. 113), the sains statute is considered, a,nd the interpretation given it by the courts of New York is adopted. We do not understand that the general 3 principles announced in these cases, are disputed by appellee. Its contention is that they have no application to the contract here involved, because the policy sued upon was, at the request of the assured, converted into a paid up policy for a fixed term, which term expired before the assured died. Several further defenses are urged, but the conclusion we reach on the one just stated renders it unnecessary that we consider the others.

In order to present intelligibly the points made by the parties, and¡ particularly by appellant, it may be well to say something further as to the statutes of New York on the [712]*712subject of life' insurance, and with, relation to some other terms of the policy in suit. There was in force in that state, when this contract was made, a statute which we shall style the “net-reserve law,” giving to holders of life insurance policies, which had been in force three full years, the benefit of the net reserve on their lapsed or forfeited policies, by extending the life of the policy beyond the time of the default, in this way: The reserve on such policies, “computed according to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at the rate of four and one-half per cent, per annum, shall on demand made, with surrender of the policy within six months after such lapse or forfeiture, be taken as a single premium of life insurance at the published rates of the corporation at the time the policy was issued, and shall be applied, as shall have been agreed in the application or policy, either to continue the insurance of the policy in force at the full amount so long as such single premium will purchase temporary insurance for the amount, at the age of the insured at the time of the lapse or forfeiture, or to purchase upon the same life at the same age paid up insurance. * * *” Laws 1879, chapter 347, section lj Laws 1892, chapter 690, section 88. By the terms of the statute these provisions could be waived by a proper indorsement on the policy. Such an indorsement was made on the policy in suit, in these words: “Notice.

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Bluebook (online)
109 Iowa 708, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-new-york-line-insurance-iowa-1899.