ORDER
PAUL, Chief Judge:
On January 12, 1996, the Court ordered the parties in this cause to fully brief the status of the burden of proof in the strict scrutiny context (Doc. 117). The. following parties filed briefs on the issue: Plaintiffs (Doc. 122); Defendant-Intervenors Cummings and Brown (Doc. 123); Defendanb-Intervenor United States (Doc. 125); Defendant Mortham (Doc. 126); and Defendant-Intervenor NAACP (Doc. 128). Not surprisingly, Plaintiffs argue that since they have proven that Florida’s Third Congressional District was drawn primarily for race-conscious reasons, Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors bear the burden of proving that the Third District passes strict scrutiny. On the other hand, Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors argue that Plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of proof on all issues, and that Defendants’ burden at the strict scrutiny stage is one of production only.
DISCUSSION:
The Supreme Court recently addressed the distinction between the burden of persuasion and the burden of production. The burden of persuasion, also known as the burden of proof, is “the notion that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of persuasion must lose.” Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, — U.S.-,-, 114 S.Ct. 2251, 2255-56, 129 L.Ed.2d 221, 228-29 (1994). In contrast, the burden of production is “a party’s obligation to come forward with evidence to support its claim.” Id.; see also United States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 204 n. 6 (3d Cir.1977) (“The burden of persuasion includes the burden of establishing before a fact-finder that a given proposition is correct. The burden of production deals with the burden of coming forward with enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact.”). “The distinction is now very generally accepted, although often blurred by careless speech.” Greenwich, supra, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2256, 129 L.Ed.2d at 229. (quoting Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592, 594, 43 S.Ct. 219, 220, 67 L.Ed. 419, 422 (1923)). This appears to be an occasion when the parties have blurred the distinctions between these burdens.
There has been a great deal of confusion among the parties about the appropriate trial burdens in this cause. The parties have had difficulty in reconciling what seem to be two competing black letter rules: first, that plain[1576] tiffs ordinarily bear the burden of proving all the essential elements of their prima facie cases; and second, that when strict scrutiny applies, the government defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that the challenged government action is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. The Court will clarify this matter, as discussed below.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that once a plaintiff establishes that governmental action was based on a suspect classification, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the classification is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling governmental interest. E.g., Miller v. Johnson, - U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490, 132 L.Ed.2d 762, 782 (1995) (“To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.”) (emphasis supplied); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 132 L.Ed.2d 158, 180 (1995) (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand than any governmental actor justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”) (emphasis supplied); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227, 104 S.Ct. 2312, 2319, 81 L.Ed.2d 175, 184 (1984) (“To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must show that [the challenged law] furthers a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically available”) (emphasis supplied); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2395, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 799 (1982) (“With respect to [suspect] classification, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”) (emphasis supplied); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2756, 57 L.Ed.2d 750, 781 (1978) (‘We have held that in order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interests.”) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1287-88, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 32-33 (1973) (“[S]trict scrutiny means that the State’s system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry a ‘heavy burden of justification,’ that the State must demonstrate that its [racial classification] has been structured with ‘precision,’ and is ‘tailored’ narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the ‘less drastic means’ for effectuating its objectives.”) (emphasis supplied); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d 274, 284 (1972) (“In sum, [the] laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are ‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’ ... [A] heavy burden of justification is on the State.”) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 615 (1969)); see also Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir.1992) (“If the challenged law burdens a fundamental constitutional right, then the law can survive only if the State demonstrates that the law advances a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.”) (emphasis supplied); Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 263 (8th Cir.1990) (“[T]he strict scrutiny test requires the government to prove that it has a compelling interest in the classification it has selected.”) (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919, 111 S.Ct. 1307, 113 L.Ed.2d 241 (1991).
Likewise, even when the challenged governmental action is evaluated under the less stringent “intermediate scrutiny” test, the Supreme Court has held that the government is required to demonstrate that its actions are substantially related to an important governmental objective. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1098 (1982) (“[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an ‘exceeding persuasive justification’ for the classification.”); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, [1577] 450 U.S. 455, 461, 101 S.Ct. 1195, 1199, 67 L.Ed.2d 428, 434 (1981) (same); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151, 100 S.Ct. 1540, 1545, 64 L.Ed.2d 107, 115 (1980) (“The burden ... is on those defending the discrimination to make out the claimed justification.”).
Moreover, when applying the strict-scrutiny test in other areas of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has consistently required the government to demonstrate that the challenged actions are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. E.g. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 1852, 119 L.Ed.2d 5, 15 (1992) (“To survive strict scrutiny ... a State must do more than assert a compelling state interest, it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest.”) (emphasis supplied); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1019, 103 L.Ed.2d 271, 281 (1989) (“If the challenged law burdens the rights of political parties and their members, it can survive constitutional scrutiny only if the State shows that it advances a compelling state interest.”) (emphasis supplied); Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1611, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, 899 (1990) (“Once it has been shown that a government regulation or criminal prohibition burdens the free exercise of religion, we have consistently asked the government to demonstrate that unbending application of its regulation to the religious objector ‘is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest,’ or represents ‘the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.’”) (O’Conner, J., concurring); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1049, 94 L.Ed.2d 190, 197 (1987) (state laws burdening religions “must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest”); see also Fulani v. Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (11th Cir.1992) (“Under strict-scrutiny analysis, once a plaintiff has demonstrated the burden on her fundamental right, the state must show ‘that the law advances a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.’ ”).
In apparent contrast to these decisions, every post-Shaw three-judge court addressing the burden of proof issue has spoken with a single voice: in an equal protection challenge to a redistricting plan, the government’s burden to overcome strict scrutiny in its use of a race-based redistricting plan is one of production only, not persuasion. The courts reached this conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that a law or other governmental action “that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional.” City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1504, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980).
For example, in Shaw v. Hunt, the court described the burden of proof as follows:
[I]n a Shaw-like challenge to a race-based redistricting plan, as in any other sort of Equal Protection case, the state’s burden at the strict scrutiny stage is producing evidence that the plan’s use of race is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest, and that plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court either that the proffered justification is not compelling or that the Plan is not narrowly tailored to further it.
861 F.Supp. 408, 436 (E.D.N.C.1994), probable jurisdiction noted, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2639, 132 L.Ed.2d 878 (1995).
In Vera v. Richards, the Southern District of Texas likewise held that
[w]e agree with the courts in Hays and in Shaw on remand that a Shaw claim should be proved by the method typical of equal protection analysis. Plaintiffs are obliged to present evidence in support of their racial gerrymandering claim as outlined in Shaw. Defendants then have the burden to produce evidence that any districts found to racially gerrymandered were dictated by a compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to further that interest.... As in all Constitutional cases, the plaintiffs retain the ultimate burden of proof.
861 F.Supp. 1304, 1336-37 (S.D.Tex.1994), probable jurisdiction noted by Bush v. Vera, [1578] — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2639, 132 L.Ed.2d 877 (1995).
Similarly, in Quilter v. Voinovich, the court held that when the burden shifts to defendants at the strict scrutiny stage, “the Defendants’ shifted burden is one of production only.” In contrast, “[t]he Plaintiffs still bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the Defendants did not have a compelling state interest that justified their use of race in the reapportionment process” or that the redistrieting plan “was not narrowly tailored to meet such an interest.” 912 F.Supp. 1006, 1018 (N.D.Ohio 1995) appeal dismissed, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 42, 133 L.Ed.2d 9 (1995).
Finally, in Johnson v. Miller, a three-judge panel within this Circuit held that
the burden of proof as to whether race was the overriding consideration behind the current districting plan rested squarely with the Plaintiffs. At the strict scrutiny stage, we agree with the court in Shaw v. Hunt that, while burdens of production shift to the Defendants, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Plaintiffs .... Plaintiffs still bear the burden of persuading the court that the State’s evidence did not support a finding that the redistrieting plan was narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
864 F.Supp. 1354, 1378-79 (S.D.Ga.1994), aff'd, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (citations omitted). Indeed, on appeal the Supreme Court and all parties to the Miller litigation did not give any indication that the burdens in a Shaw challenge should be otherwise.
The Court finds that these decisions correctly state the allocation of trial burdens in a .Stew-type challenge to a redistrieting plan, and are not inconsistent with the nature of strict scrutiny review. Specifically, the Court holds that Plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of persuasion on all essential elements of their case: namely, that the Third District was the product of predominately race-conscious districting, and that the Third District fails to pass strict scrutiny. However, in so holding, the Court further finds that Plaintiffs bear only the burden of production on the first issue, while the Defendants seeking to sustain the constitutionality of the Third District bear the burden of production on the second. Cf. Vera v. Richards, 861 F.Supp. at 1342 (“Because, as we have concluded, the plaintiffs’ burden of production extends solely to the race-consciousness of the districts combined with the disregard of traditional districting criteria, then the State has the burden of producing evidence of narrowly tailoring to achieve its compelling state interest.”).
In Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court described in detail the nature of a plaintiffs burden of production in a Stew-type challenge:
The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominating factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations. These principles inform the plaintiffs burden of proof at trial.
515 U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2488, 132 L.Ed.2d at 779-80 (emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs have met their burden of production on summary judgment, by showing that Florida’s Third Congressional District was the product of racial gerrymandering (see Doc. 91 at 48-52, 54, 58). Since the Defendants were unable to rebut this showing, Plaintiffs likewise carried their burden of persuasion on this essential element of their prima facie case. To this extent, then, the Plaintiffs have already satisfied their burden of proof at trial, even though they ultimately bear the burden of persuasion on every essential element of their ease. Cf. Miller, 515 U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2488 (see emphasized text above).
In contrast, Defendants have not yet met their burden of production. Defendants’ burden of production at trial requires Defendants to produce evidence justifying the ne[1579] cessity for predominately race-conscious dis-tricting in the Third District. As a result, Defendants must produce evidence at trial demonstrating that the Third District survives under strict scrutiny, the “most rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional review.” Miller, supra, 515 U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2490, 132 L.Ed.2d at 782. Defendants’ burden of production is therefore not a light one, and is in fact very much akin to an affirmative defense.1 See supra cases cited at pages-of this order.
The reason for this heavy burden of production is because “the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.” City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 109 S.Ct. 706, 721, 102 L.Ed.2d 854, 881-82 (1989). Furthermore, in the equal protection context, the Supreme Court has declared that whenever any person can prove that “the government treats [that] person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.” Adarand, supra, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2114, 132 L.Ed.2d at 183. Since “[express racial classifications are immediately suspect because, ‘absent searching judicial inquiry ..., there is simply no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial polities.’ ” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,-, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2824, 125 L.Ed.2d 511, 526 (1993) (quoting Richmond, supra, 488 U.S. at 493, 109 S.Ct. at 721, 102 L.Ed.2d at 881). In other words, “racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification _ [E]ven ‘the most rigid scrutiny’ can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification.” Adarand, supra, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2117, 132 L.Ed.2d at 188 (citations omitted). It is for these reasons that racial classifications are “presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification” by the state. Shaw, supra, 509 U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2825, 125 L.Ed.2d at 526 (quoting Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292, 60 L.Ed.2d 870, 883 (1979)).
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this position just last year in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). The Adarand Court first detailed the three general propositions with respect to governmental racial classifications:
First, skepticism: any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive the most searching examination. Second, consistency: the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependant on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification, i.e. all racial classifications renewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized. And third, congruence: equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.
[1580] — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2110, 132 L.Ed.2d at 179-80 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then explained: “Taken together, these three propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
Relaxing the government defendants’ burden in justifying the use of racial classifications in this case would run counter to the very purpose of strict scrutiny review. Moreover, in the case sub judice, Defendants bear a particularly high burden of producing evidence demonstrating that the Third District passes strict scrutiny, since the Third District and the redistricting plan adopted by a three-judge panel of this Court must be “held to stricter standards” than a district included in a plan adopted by a state legislature. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 2497, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978) (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977)).
What is particularly troubling about the case at bar is that Defendants and Defendanfi-Intervenors have attempted, through discovery, to shift to Plaintiffs the burden of producing evidence demonstrating that the Third District fails to pass strict scrutiny.2 Nowhere is this strategy more obvious than in Defendant-Intervenor United States’ December 23, 1995 notice of deposition duces tecum, whereby the Government requested that the Plaintiffs produce documents that prove the Third Congressional District fails to pass strict scrutiny (see Pls.’ Attach, to Doc. 105). In fact, even if the Government’s request for production complied with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — which it did not (see Doc. 111 at 2 n. 1) — any such request must be limited to whatever rebuttal evidence Plaintiffs plan to use at trial that is germane to the strict scrutiny analysis. Since Plaintiffs do not bear the burden of production on this issue, if they choose not to present any such rebuttal evidence at trial, then they obviously would not have any deposed or documentary evidence to provide to Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors in the course of discovery.
In sum, at trial Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors bear the burden of producing evidence demonstrating there is “a strong basis in evidence” that the DeGran-dy court’s predominant use of race-conscious districting satisfies strict scrutiny3. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1848, 90 L.Ed.2d 260, 270 (1986) (emphasis supplied). To the extent that Plaintiffs have any burden at all at this stage of the proceedings, it is merely one of rebutting the evidence put forward by Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors on the strict scrutiny issue, and persuading the Court that Defendants have not made a sufficient showing to satisfy strict scrutiny review. Thus, Plaintiffs can prevail at trial even if they fail to produce any witnesses or put forward any evidence, if they can persuade the Court that Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors have not sufficiently produced evidence demonstrating that the Third District is narrowly tailored to further a [1581] compelling governmental interest4. Of course, the Plaintiffs’ failure to put on any rebuttal evidence at all may be a calculated gamble that fails, if the Defendants have otherwise presented sufficient evidence showing that the Third District passes strict scrutiny.
Ordinarily the order of presentation at trial requires plaintiffs to present their cases first, followed by the defendants (including the presentation of any affirmative defenses), and concluded by the plaintiffs’ rebuttal. Plaintiffs then bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court or fact-finder that they have proven their prima facie case, while defendants bear the burden of persuasion on their affirmative defenses.
However, it is also well established that a trial court has broad discretion to exercise control over the order of presentation at trial. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1334-35, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976); United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1371 (11th Cir.1994); Jones v. Dugger, 928 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 875, 112 S.Ct. 216, 116 L.Ed.2d 174 (1991). See also Fed.R.Evid. 611(a) (trial courts “shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence”); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1429 (9th Cir.1994) (“District courts have broad discretion in deciding the order in which evidence may be presented at trial”), cert. granted in part, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 39, 132 L.Ed.2d 920 (1995); United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir.1991) (trial court has substantial discretion to control mode and order of interrogating witnesses), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1328, 127 L.Ed.2d 675 (1994). As a result, if the evidence will be more clearly presented by requiring a particular party to come forward first, a trial court may alter the order of presentation at trial. Cf. Anderson v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 509 F.2d 1119, 1131 (2d Cir.1974) (“[T]he district judge, in conducting a criminal or civil trial, acts as more than a mere moderator or umpire.... His function is to set the tone of the proceedings and exercise sufficient control to insure that the trial will be an orderly one in which the [fact-finder] will have the evidence clearly presented”) (internal citations omitted). There will be no error in changing the order of presentation, so long as the court does not shift the ultimate burden of proof or persuasion to the other party, Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 765 (Fed.Cir.1987) (“The order of presentation of evidence by the parties is a matter of trial management ... [T]he procedural requirements of the court for one party and then the other to come forward with evidence does not shift the ultimate burden of proof or persuasion on an issue back and forth.”) (emphasis supplied), and still gives the defendants an opportunity to move for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)5 after plaintiffs have put on their case, cf. CMS Software Design Sys., Inc. v. Info Designs, Inc., 785 F.2d 1246, 1248 (5th Cir.1986) (“Rule 41(b) authorizes dismissal at the close of the presentation of plaintiffs evidence or at the close of all evidence. We do not read it as requiring the court to award judgment only at the precisely stated points in trial ...”). Indeed, trial judges have not hesitated to change the order of presentation at trial where the circumstances warranted such a change. See, e.g., United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178, 193-94 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 788, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 722 F.Supp. 592, 594 (N.D.Cal.1988), vacated in part on other grounds, 882 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076, 110 S.Ct. 1125, 107 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1990).
[1582] In the case at bar, the only remaining trial issue is whether the Third District survives under strict scrutiny. As detailed at great length above, Defendants, the parties attempting to sustain the constitutionality of the Third District, bear the burden of production on this issue. Consequently, the Court deems it necessary to alter the traditional order of presentation at trial for two reasons: first, for clarity of the presentation of evidence at trial; and second, to require the Defendants to initially justify the governmental action at issue in this case — namely, the racial gerrymandering of the Third District — as strict scrutiny jurisprudence clearly dictates. However, it must be emphasized that in so doing, the Court is not altering the trial burdens of the respective parties. Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors will still bear the burden of production on the strict scrutiny issue, while Plaintiffs will still bear the ultimate burden of persuasion on the strict scrutiny issue.6
Accordingly, the trial of this matter will be conducted as follows: Since the only remaining issue is whether the Third District passes strict scrutiny, Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors will first put on evidence, if any, to meet their burden of production. Plaintiffs will then be allowed to put on rebuttal evidence, if any, to counter the Defendants’ case. Finally, Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors will be given an opportunity to rebut the Plaintiffs’ evidence. Since the Plaintiffs at all times bear the burden of persuasion on every essential element of their prima facie case, Plaintiffs will then have the burden of persuading the Court that the Third District cannot survive under strict scrutiny review. If Defendants and Defen-danUntervenors believe that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of persuasion at the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ case, then they may move for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) at that time.7
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors bear the burden of producing evidence at trial that demonstrates the Third District passes strict scrutiny. Plaintiffs bear the burden of persuading the Court that Defendants have faded to meet their burden.
The order of presentation at trial is altered and subject to the procedural limitations set out above.
DONE AND ORDERED.