Johnson v. Mock
This text of 506 P.2d 1068 (Johnson v. Mock) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This quiet title action brought in the superior court in Gila County tests the validity of a treasurer’s deed held by the John-sons. After trial to the court sitting without a jury, the court determined that the treasurer’s deed was invalid.
The governing facts are uncontroverted and a stipulation as to facts and admission of documents was filed. A sketch of the factual background reveals that the subject property was owned by the appellees and sold by them under a contract of sale to Mr. and Mrs. Seaton in September of 1961. As down payment for the subject property, the Seatons conveyed to the appellees another property, also situated in Gila County. The Seatons defaulted on the contract and forfeited their interest in the subject property by execution of a quit cláim deed recorded April 5, 1963. The quit claim containing the appellees’ address in Phoenix was not picked up on the county tax rolls. 1 Consequently, beginning in 1962, the tax statements pertaining to the subj ect property were sent to the Seatons and were ignored by them. Subsequent to the Seatons’ forfeiture of the subject property, the appellees did not receive tax statements *284 on the subject property, but explained that two tax statements were received annually on the trade property, a single land parcel. They contend that the two statements misled them to believe that one was for the subject property, since the taxes were paid without closely inspecting the tax statements. The property taxes became delinquent, and the treasurer of Gila County sold the subject property to the State of Arizona for nonpayment of the 1962 taxes by treasurer’s certificate of purchase.
On December 24, 1968, the appellants paid $1,919.94 (representing 1962 and subsequent taxes, penalties and interest) to the county treasurer for an assignment of the certificate of purchase. The property remained unredeemed for five years and the appellants applied for a treasurer’s deed. 2 The treasurer mailed a notice of application for treasurer’s deed to the Seatons.. The appellees, not appearing on the tax rolls as owners, were not sent such notice, nor did the treasurer post the notice on the subject property as required by statute. 3 Notice was published in the Arizona Silverbelt, a Gila County weekly newspaper with which the appellees were not acquainted. The appellees first learned of' the situation when notified by their tenant on the subject property that the appellants had advised that they had acquired the property.
The appellees contacted the appellants-through the treasurer’s office and attempted, unsuccessfully, to settle the matter. The appellees tendered the appellants a. quit claim deed and $5.00 pursuant to A.R. S. § 12-1103, subsec. B, and receiving no-response within 20 days, filed this quiet ti— *285 tie action. The appellants answered and counterclaimed seeking to quiet title in themselves.
The appellants contend that the trial court erred in determining that the treasurer’s deed was invalid. Secondly, they assert error in the trial court’s failure to impress a lien on the subject property to secure repayment to them of the amounts they had paid to the county treasurer for the property.
The first question rises or falls on the sufficiency of notice to the appellees that their property would be lost for nonpayment of taxes. Appellants’ position is that the notice requirement was fulfilled since the treasurer did mail a notice, as provided in the statute, to the owner of the property “. . . as such owner is shown on the current tax roll at his last known address . . . . ” ARS. § 42-456 set forth in footnote 2, supra. The argument is made that the construction of the statute urged by the appellees, i. e., requiring notice to the true owner, would require a finding that the language defining “owner” is superfluous. Furthermore, the appellants contend such a construction would not permit the treasurer to rely on the tax roll in sending out notices, and would defeat the legislative purpose to expedite performance of the trearurer’s duties.
Appellants rely heavily on Consolidated Motors, Inc. v. Skousen, 56 Ariz. 481, 109 P.2d 41 (1941), where the Arizona Supreme Court noted that the notice of tax sale required to be published by the predecessor of A.R.S. § 42-388 conferred jurisdiction to proceed with the sale. It further commented that the statute expressly provides that a mistake in regard to the name of the real owner either in the assessment or in the sale was immaterial so long as the notice specifically identified the property and the amount of the taxes. The court in Consolidated Motors was considering the notice procedure for proceedings prior to tax sale which, of course, does not operate to deprive the owner of his property as does a duly issued treasurer’s deed. A special dispensatory statute, A.R.S. § 42-392, appears to govern tax sales:
“. . .no sale shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the property was assessed or advertised in the name of a person other than the rightful owner, or to a person unknown, . . . . ”
No comparable statute is applicable to the statutes relating to perfection of tax title.
In Laz v. Southwestern Land Co., 97 Ariz. 69, 397 P.2d 52 (1964), our Supreme Court, considering a situation more akin to the one before us, held that a mortgagee of property sold at a regular assessment sale was entitled to actual notice where the mortgagee’s name and address were readily ascertainable. The court rejected an “in rem” argument, similar to the appellants’ argument that the land owed the taxes, citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). The court quoted at length from Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 83 S.Ct. 279, 9 L.Ed.2d 255 (1962), on the importance of parties receiving notice of proceedings directly affecting their legally protected interests. In Mullane the court noted, “Where the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.” 339 U.S. at 318, 70 S.Ct. at 659, 94 L.Ed. at 877.
In the case before us, the appellees’ interest in the property was obvious through the recording of the quit claim deed to the appellees from the Seatons. Their address appeared in that document and was readily available for purposes of directing notice to the appellees.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
506 P.2d 1068, 19 Ariz. App. 283, 1973 Ariz. App. LEXIS 507, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-mock-arizctapp-1973.