Johnson v. Mayor C. of Savannah

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Johnson v. Mayor C. of Savannah

17 S.E.2d 280, 66 Ga. App. 217, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 182

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedOctober 4, 1941

Docket29043.

StatusPublished

This text of 17 S.E.2d 280 (Johnson v. Mayor C. of Savannah) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Johnson v. Mayor C. of Savannah, 17 S.E.2d 280, 66 Ga. App. 217, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 1941).

Pincite

Opinion

Felton, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The sole question is whether the petition sets out sufficient facts to authorize the conclusion that the bridge leading from Bay Street to the second story of the building on Factor’s 'Walk, No. 308, was a part of the public sidewalks of the City of Savannah. It is not alleged in the petition that the City erected or maintained the bridge. The city’s contention is that in the absence of such an allegation it folloAvs that the bridges were erected by the owners of the buildings for their own convenience and that of their customers, and not for the benefit of the general public. If this is true the case would come under the ruling in City of Atlanta v. Keiser, 50 Ga. App. 600 (179 S. E. 192). If the bridge was not a public sidewalk, or its equivalent, the city would not be liable to a person upon the bridge for the purpose of negotiating with city authorities on the subject of a matter involving a governmental function, such as Avas involved in this case. The situation would be the same as if the plaintiff had attempted to go to No. 308 by way of a private stairAvay leading from the sidewalk to No. 308, one story above, pro-Added of course that the stairway was not shown to be a part of a public sidewalk. If the bridge was a part of the public sideAvalks of the City of Savannah the city would be liable for the alleged negligence regardless of what the plaintiff’s purpose was in crossing the bridge. It would be liable if the plaintiff had been going to No. 308 on her own private business, Avhether the city rented the building or not.

The city contends that the petition shows on its face that the bridge in question was not a part of the public sidewalks of the *221 city. This contention is not well founded. The petition alleges that “there is no other way to get from Bay Street to the said buildings across Factor’s Walk except by use of such bridges.” If this allegation is true by reason of the fact that it is necessary for the public to use a part or all of the bridge in question in order to go from Bay Street to the level of Factor’s Walk, it would seem that the bridge so used would be a part of the public sidewalks of the city whether the city erected or maintained the bridge or not, as the bridge would be a part of a public way leading from one public sidewalk to another public sidewalk across a public street, and under such circumstances it would be the duty of the city to provide for the safety of the bridge. This court can not anticipate what the evidence in the case will be, and must be governed by the allegations of the petition. The above-quoted allegation, together with others relating to the public use of the bridge, are sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. The petition set forth a cause of action and the court erred in sustaining the general demurrer and in dismissing the action.

Judgment reversed.

Stephens, P. J., and Sutton, J., concur.

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Felton, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The sole question is whether the petition sets out sufficient facts to authorize the conclusion that the bridge leading from Bay Street to the second story of the building on Factor’s 'Walk, No. 308, was a part of the public sidewalks of the City of Savannah. It is not alleged in the petition that the City erected or maintained the bridge. The city’s contention is that in the absence of such an allegation it folloAvs that the bridges were erected by the owners of the buildings for their own convenience and that of their customers, and not for the benefit of the general public. If this is true the case would come under the ruling in City of Atlanta v. Keiser, 50 Ga. App. 600 (179 S. E. 192). If the bridge was not a public sidewalk, or its equivalent, the city would not be liable to a person upon the bridge for the purpose of negotiating with city authorities on the subject of a matter involving a governmental function, such as Avas involved in this case. The situation would be the same as if the plaintiff had attempted to go to No. 308 by way of a private stairAvay leading from the sidewalk to No. 308, one story above, pro-Added of course that the stairway was not shown to be a part of a public sidewalk. If the bridge was a part of the public sideAvalks of the City of Savannah the city would be liable for the alleged negligence regardless of what the plaintiff’s purpose was in crossing the bridge. It would be liable if the plaintiff had been going to No. 308 on her own private business, Avhether the city rented the building or not.

The city contends that the petition shows on its face that the bridge in question was not a part of the public sidewalks of the *221 city. This contention is not well founded. The petition alleges that “there is no other way to get from Bay Street to the said buildings across Factor’s Walk except by use of such bridges.” If this allegation is true by reason of the fact that it is necessary for the public to use a part or all of the bridge in question in order to go from Bay Street to the level of Factor’s Walk, it would seem that the bridge so used would be a part of the public sidewalks of the city whether the city erected or maintained the bridge or not, as the bridge would be a part of a public way leading from one public sidewalk to another public sidewalk across a public street, and under such circumstances it would be the duty of the city to provide for the safety of the bridge. This court can not anticipate what the evidence in the case will be, and must be governed by the allegations of the petition. The above-quoted allegation, together with others relating to the public use of the bridge, are sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. The petition set forth a cause of action and the court erred in sustaining the general demurrer and in dismissing the action.

Judgment reversed.

Stephens, P. J., and Sutton, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

17 S.E.2d 280, 66 Ga. App. 217, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 182, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-mayor-c-of-savannah-gactapp-1941.

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