Johnson v. May and Miller-Leach

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: April 9, 2026
• Docket: N25C-03-225 CLS, N25C-09-010 CLS
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

VERNE JOHNSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N25C-03-225 CLS, ) C.A. No. N25C-09-010 CLS1 FELISIA MAY and JALEESA ) MILLER-LEACH, ) ) Defendants. ) )

Submitted: April 7, 2026 Decided: April 9, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Converted to Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANTED.

Verne Johnson, Pro se Plaintiff.

Felisia May & Jaleesa Miller-Leach, Pro se Defendants.

SCOTT, J.

1 C.A. No. N25C-03-225 CLS is consolidated with C.A. No. N25C-09-010. See infra n.2. Docket items from C.A. No. 25C-03-225 CLS are cited as “D.I. (225) __,” and docket items from C.A. No. N25C-09-010 CLS are cited as “D.I. (010) __.” This matter arises from a Protection from Abuse Order (“PFA”) entered by the

Delaware Family Court in March 2021 against Plaintiff. Before the Court is

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss2 under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The

Court finds it necessary to consider “matters outside the pleading[s]”3 in resolving

the Motion, therefore Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss shall be treated as one for

Summary Judgment under Superior Court Civil Rule 56.4 For the following reasons,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, converted to Summary Judgment by the Court, is

GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. The Parties Pro se Plaintiff, Verne Johnson (“Plaintiff”), resides in New Jersey.5

Pro se Defendants, Felisia May (“May”) and Jaleesa Miller-Leach (“Miller”)

(collectively, “Defendants”), reside in Delaware.6

2 The Court is consolidating C.A. No. N25C-03-225 and C.A. No. N25C-09-010 under Superior Court Civil Rule 42(a) because: Plaintiff intended to join Felisia May as a defendant but filed separately; the Complaints against Defendants raise similar questions of fact and law; and it tends to avoid unnecessary costs and delays. See generally Compl., D.I. (225) 1 (“Compl. I”); Compl., D.I. (010) 1 (“Compl. II”); see also Pl.’s Resp. to Def. May’s Mot. to Dismiss and Mot. for a Protective Order D.I. (010) 12, ¶ 8 (“Pl.’s Resp.”). 3 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). 4 See Briefing Schedule, D.I. (225) 16; D.I. (010) 34 (notifying the parties that the Court shall consider the Motion to Dismiss as one for Summary Judgment given the exhibits provided by all parties). 5 Pl.’s Case Information Statement, D.I. (010) 2. 6 Def. May’s Case Information Statement, D.I. (010) 9; Def. Miller’s Case Information Statement, D.I. (225) 4. II. Factual Background and Procedural Background This case stems from a complicated and unfortunate family history among the

parties. Plaintiff and Miller are half-sisters who share a father, and May is Miller’s

mother with no relation to Plaintiff.

On January 12, 2021, May filed a PFA petition in Delaware Family Court

against Plaintiff for directing harassing and threatening posts on social media

towards May, and appearing at May’s church.7 Family Court dismissed the petition

on February 16, 2021, because it lacked jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. § 901(12) given

that May and Plaintiff are not related within the meaning of the statute.8

That same day, Miller also filed a PFA petition against Plaintiff for harassing

and threatening Miller and her family on social media, in addition to following

Miller and her family to church.9 May emailed the PFA petition to Family Court “on

behalf of . . . Miller.”10

On March 25, 2021, Family Court entered a default PFA Order (the “PFA

Order”) against Plaintiff, who failed to appear at the hearing. The PFA Order

prohibited Plaintiff from being within 100 yards of Miller, Miller’s work, home, and

7 Compl. II, Ex. F. 8 Pl.’s Court-Ordered Mot. for Court-Ordered Evaluation of Def. May, D.I. (010) 15, Ex. D. 9 Id. 10 Compl. II, Ex. B. church; and threatening or harassing Miller and her family members, including

May.11 The PFA Order expired on March 25, 2023.12

On April 6, 2021, Plaintiff requested a review of the PFA Order, which was

denied by Family Court on June 1, 2021.13 On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a police

report with the Sommerville Police Department regarding purported harassment

from May.14 The police report narrative states that Plaintiff advised the officer that

“May filed for another protection order against [Plaintiff] on behalf of her daughter,

Jaleesa Miller[.]”15 A few weeks later, on June 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to

Modify, Extend, or Vacate the PFA Order, which was denied.16

Later that year, on November 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a PFA against Miller,

which was denied by Family Court on December 1, 2021.17 Plaintiff also filed two

other PFA petitions against Miller in August 2025 and October 2025, both of which

were also denied.18

11 Def. May’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. (010) 9, Ex. A (“MTD”). 12 Id. 13 Compl. I Ex. A. 14 MTD, Ex. I. 15 Id. 16 Compl. I, Ex. A. 17 Id. 18 In an Order dated December 10, 2025, Family Court denied the October 2025 PFA petition and found that Plaintiff could not proceed with claims against May because she was not a party to the action, and barred any claims against Miller that were adjudicated or could have been adjudicated in the PFA denied on December 1, 2021. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A. Between the instant litigation and the Family Court proceedings, May and

Plaintiff were also involved in litigation in the Superior Court of New Jersey in 2023.

The lawsuit arose from a complaint filed by Plaintiff’s mother against May. May

then filed a third-party complaint against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff filed a counterclaim

against May, alleging that she was “entitled to file a lawsuit against . . . May for

punitive damages, as the defamation attempt of murder was and is intentional and

malicious.”19 All parties involved in the New Jersey litigation signed a stipulation

of settlement to dismiss “[a]ll claims and counterclaims . . . with prejudice” on May

28, 2024.20

Across all of Plaintiff’s pleadings and filings, Plaintiff continues to raise the

same issues, including that: (1) May threw Plaintiff down the stairs to try to kill her

in 1988; (2) Miller is abusing the PFA Order to infringe on Plaintiff’s ability to

attend church; (3) May illegally filed the PFA Order; (4) the PFA Order is

defamatory; and (5) Miller lied to obtain the PFA Order.

On March 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint in this Court against

Miller (the “Miller Complaint”), alleging that Miller falsely filed the PFA Order

entered on March 25, 2021.21 The Miller Complaint asserts claims for defamation,

19 MTD, Ex. D-1. 20 Id. at Ex. D. 21 Id. at 1. slander, fraud, discrimination, and filing with malicious intent.22 Miller answered

the Miller Complaint on April 4, 2025, denying the allegations.23

On July 31, 2025, Plaintiff “stumbled across an email that show[ed] . . .

[Miller’s] mother, Felisia L. May[,] . . . illegally filed the . . . PFA Order[.]”24 Based

on this, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Extension claiming that the email constitutes

new evidence, and asked the Court to add May as a party.25 Before the Court could

respond, however, Plaintiff filed a separate Complaint against May on September 3,

2025 (the “May Complaint”).26 Similar to the Miller Complaint, the May Complaint

alleges that May “illegally sen[t]/fil[ed] a false PFA Order on behalf of . . . Miller[,]”

and asserts claims for defamation, slander, malicious filing of a PFA order, and

fraud.27

On September 16, 2025, May filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,

arguing that the Complaint is barred by res judicata, barred by the statute of

limitations, and fails to state a claim for relief.28 Plaintiff responded in opposition

and moved for a protective order on October 20, 2025.29 In addition, Plaintiff filed

a Motion to Vacate the PFA Order in Family Court on October 20, 2025, arguing

22 Id. 23 Def. Miller’s Answ., D.I. (225) 4. 24 Pl.’s Mot. for an Extension, New Evidence has Presented Itself, D.I. (225) 7. 25 Id. 26 See generally Compl. II; Pl.’s Notice Withdrawing Mot. for an Extension, D.I. (225) 8. 27 Compl. II at 1–2. 28 See generally MTD. 29 See generally Pl.’s Resp. that Defendants infringed on her First Amendment rights to freedom of religion, and

that Miller “made multiple false and defamatory statements before the Court

regarding Plaintiff’s mental state and spiritual identity.”30

Over the next 11 days, the parties continued to file motions with the Court.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Indefinite Civil Protection, Motion for Court-Ordered

Mental Health Evaluation of May, Motion to Stay the Proceedings Pending Family

Court Matters, Motion to Enter Exhibits Under Seal, and Motion to Bar Defendants

from Contacting or Discussing Civil Matters with Plaintiff’s Father.31 May also filed

a Reply Brief and Motion for an Indefinite Civil Protective Order.32

Given that the filings raised similar questions of law and fact, and Plaintiff

indicated in her Response to May’s Motion to Dismiss that that she intended to join

May as a party to the action against Miller, but filed a separate claim before the Court

could address the request,33 the Court held a hearing with all parties on November

4, 2025.

Upon further review of the record, the Court finds that in resolving the Motion

to Dismiss, it is necessary to consider matters outside the pleadings.34 Accordingly,

on December 3, 2025, the Court notified all parties that it would treat the Motion to

30 Pl.’s Mot. to Stay Proceedings Pending Family Court Matters, D.I. (010) 16, Ex. A. 31 D.I. (010) 13, 15, 16, 17, 22. 32 D.I. (010) 20, 21. 33 Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 8. 34 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). Dismiss as one for Summary Judgment.35 The Court gave the parties until January

2, 2026, to provide any other information regarding the issue of whether the PFA

Order has already been litigated. Defendants then filed a combined Motion for

Summary Judgment on December 22, 2025, making the same arguments as the

Motion to Dismiss.36 Plaintiff did not file any supplemental information or motions

before January 2, 2026.

On April 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel, Response in Opposition

to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, a Supplemental Statement and

Exhibit Report, and a Framing of Evidence and Clarification of Record.37 Plaintiff’s

filings add no new information and the Response to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment is untimely. Nevertheless, the matter is now ripe for decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment under Superior Court

Civil Rule 56 falls on the moving party to demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”38 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party must

sufficiently establish the “existence of one or more genuine issues of material

35 See supra n.2. 36 Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. (010) 28. 37 Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, D.I. (010) 17; Pl.’s Opp. To Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. D.I. (010) 18; Pl.’s Supplemental Statement and Exhibit Support D.I. (010) 19; Pl.’s Framing of Evidence and Clarification of Record, D.I. (010) 20. 38 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). fact.”39 Summary judgment will not be granted if there is a material fact in dispute

or if “it seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the

application of the law to the circumstances.”40 “All facts and reasonable inferences

must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”41

DISCUSSION As previously mentioned, the Court considers the matters of C.A. No. N25C-

03-225 and C.A. No. N25C-09-010 consolidated under Superior Court Civil Rule

42(a) because the cases raise common questions of law and fact, and the Court finds

it necessary to promote judicial efficiency and avoid unnecessary costs and delays.42

Otherwise, the Court finds that dismissal is warranted here because Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, Plaintiff’s

claims against Miller are also barred by res judicata.

I. The statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants. Under 10 Del. C. § 8119, there is “[n]o action for the recovery of damages

upon a claim for alleged personal injuries . . . after the expiration of [two] years from

39 Quality Elec. Co., Inc. v. E. States Const. Serv., Inc., 663 A.2d 488, 1995 WL 379125, at *3–4 (Del. June 19, 1995) (TABLE); see also Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 681 (Del. 1979). 40 Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469–70 (Del. 1962); see also CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 2015 WL 3863225, at *1 (Del. Super. June 8, 2015). 41 Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., Inc., 517 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 1986) (citing Mechell v. Plamer, 343 A.2d 620, 621 (Del. 1975); Allstate Auto Leasing Co. v. Caldwell, 394 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. Super. 1978)). 42 For the reasons stated on the record, all motions filed were denied except the Motion to Dismiss. the date upon which it is claimed that such alleged injuries were sustained[.]”

Generally, “an ‘injury’ is ‘sustained’ when a wrongful act or omission occurs.”43

Although Plaintiff attempts to assert that she filed the lawsuits in a “timely

manner,”44 it is undisputed that Family Court entered the PFA Order on March 25,

2021, but Plaintiff did not file the instant Complaints relating to said Order until

March 2025 and September 2025—well over two years from the date the alleged

injuries were sustained.

Further, as it pertains to Miller, even if Plaintiff did not know about the PFA

Order when it was entered by default in March 2021, the Family Court docket (filed

by Plaintiff) makes clear that Plaintiff requested a review of the PFA Order just nine

days after it was entered. Thus, Plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries as to Miller as

early as April 6, 2021. Consequently, the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s claims

against Miller ran on April 6, 2023, at the latest.

To the extent Plaintiff seems to argue that the “time of discovery exception”45

to the statute of limitations applies to the claims against May, such an argument is

unpersuasive. Although she explains in the Motion for an Extension that she

“stumbled” upon the email where May sent the PFA petition on behalf of Miller, the

43 Brown v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 820 A.2d 362, 366 (Del. 2003) (citing McNutt v. Del. Racing Ass’n, 294 A.2d 838, 839 (Del. 1972)). 44 Pl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 8, 20. 45 See Brown, 820 A.2d at 366 (citing Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968)). Court finds that there are numerous undisputed facts from the record indicating

Plaintiff was aware in 2021 that May sent Miller’s PFA petition via email.

The Delaware Supreme Court has applied the time for discovery exception

“by interpreting [the limitations period] to run at the time the plaintiff is on notice

that he or she has sustained a tortious injury”—i.e., when the plaintiff “should have

discovered the injury.”46 The Supreme Court instructs that to apply this exception,

“the court must conduct a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether a plaintiff was

blamelessly ignorant of a potential claim or dilatory in pursuing the action.”47

The record here shows that Plaintiff was on actual notice that May sent

Miller’s PFA petition to Family Court before, or as soon as, June 3, 2021 based on

the Sommerville Police Department report. The police report narrative indicates that

Plaintiff advised the intake officer that May filed the PFA on behalf of Miller.

Additionally, while Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension stated that she “stumbled”

upon the email, that does not explain why it would be appropriate for the Court to

find her blamelessly ignorant for not “stumbling” upon it sooner. On this record,

there is no dispute of material fact that Plaintiff was dilatory in pursuing the action

against May. Thus, the Complaints against Defendants are barred by the statute of

limitations.

46 Id. at 366 (citing Layton, 246 A.2d at 796). 47 Id. at 368. II. Res judicata bars Plaintiff’s claims against Miller. Although Defendants’ Motion can be resolved on statute of limitations

grounds, the Court also concludes that that the claims against Miller are barred by

res judicata based on the litigation in Family Court concerning the PFA Order. Under

Delaware law, res judicata prohibits a later-filed claim where:

(1) the original court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (2) the parties to the original action were the same as those parties, or in privity, in the case at bar; (3) the original cause of action or the issues decided was the same as the case at bar; (4) the issues in the prior action must have been decided adversely to the appellants in the case at bar; and (5) the decree in the prior action was a final decree.48 First, Family Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the PFA Order and

over Miller.49 Second, Plaintiff and Miller were parties to the original action. Third,

Plaintiff’s claims against Miller in this litigation stem from the “same transaction

that formed the basis of the prior adjudication”—the entry of the PFA Order.50

Plaintiff’s claims stem from issues that could have been raised and decided in Family

Court given the Review of the Commissioner’s Order in April 2021, the Motions to

Vacate in 2021 and 2025, and the PFA petitions filed against Miller in November

2021, August 2025, and October 2025. Fourth, any issues raised by the PFA Order

have been decided against Plaintiff. Finally, the PFA Order “was a final judgment

48 RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Educ. Loan Trust IV, 87 A.3d 632, 643 (Del. 2014) (quoting LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 192 (Del. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 49 10 Del. C. § 1048; 10 Del. C. § 901(12). 50 RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC, 87 A.3d at 645 (quoting 417 A.2d 378, 381 (Del. Ch. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). for res judicata purposes because the Family Court’s initial determination that the

alleged [abuse] . . . occurred was not subject to later modification.”51 Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims against Miller are barred by res judicata. Hence, the doctrine of

res judicata bars any claims against Miller.

III. Plaintiff is enjoined from filing future claims without leave of the Court. If the Court “finds that a litigant has abused the judicial process by filing

frivolous or malicious litigation, the [C]ourt may enjoin that litigant from filing

future claims without leave of the Court.”52 When the litigant is enjoined, that

litigant must request to file a claim in addition to an accompanying affidavit

certifying that:

(1) The claims sought to be litigated have never been raised or disposed of before in any court; (2) The facts alleged are true and correct; (3) The affiant has made a diligent and good faith effort to determine what relevant case law controls the legal issues raised; (4) The affiant has no reason to believe the claims are foreclosed by controlled law; and (5) The affiant understands that the affidavit is made under penalty of perjury.53

In the five years that Plaintiff has attempted to litigate the same issues time

and again, Plaintiff has abused the judicial process. Plaintiff has filed similar claims

in two states and three different courts and recently attempted to litigate the same

51 Cassidy v. Cassidy, 689 A.2d 1182, 1185 (Del. 1997) (internal citation omitted). 52 10 Del. C. § 8803(e). 53 Id. issues in Family Court and Superior Court at the same time. The claims are legally

and factually meritless, and the Court is not the appropriate forum to address

Plaintiff’s grievances as to this matter. Consequently, the Court enjoins Plaintiff

from filing a claim without leave of the Court in the future.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, converted to summary

judgment, is GRANTED and this action is dismissed with prejudice. Any filings

from the parties following the January 2, 2026 deadline to submit additional

information are now MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Calvin Scott Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.