Johnson v. Maxwell

113 So. 2d 27, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 1185
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 27, 1959
DocketNo. 8990
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 113 So. 2d 27 (Johnson v. Maxwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Maxwell, 113 So. 2d 27, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1959).

Opinion

HARDY, Judge.

This is a suit by plaintiff against his employer and the latter’s insurer for the allowance of workmen’s compensation as for total permanent disability, together with penalties. From judgment in favor of plaintiff awarding compensation at the rate of $30 per week for the period extending from July 3, 1956 to October 24, 1957, subject to a credit for compensation previously paid, the defendants have appealed. Plaintiff has answered the appeal, praying for an increase in the benefits awarded to a period not exceeding 400 weeks.

To plaintiff’s original petition defendants interposed an exception of no right and no cause of action, which was sustained by the trial judge with leave for plaintiff to amend. Following the filing of two supplemental [28]*28and amended petitions, defendants again filed an identical exception which, according to the minutes, was overruled, whereupon answer was filed, and trial was had upon the merits. At the beginning of trial, in further support of their exception, counsel for defendants entered a general objection to any testimony “ * * * which was referred to the merits.”

Before this court counsel for defendants re-urge the exception on the ground that neither plaintiff’s original petition nor his amended petitions contain any factual allegations either of an accident or of an injury resulting from a causal relationship between plaintiff’s occupation and his claimed disability, as defined by LSA-R.S. 23:1021.

The applicable portions of the noted statutory provision relate to the meaning ascribed to the terms “accident” and “injury”. The definitions are specifically set forth as follows:

“(1) ‘Accident’ means an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.”
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“(7) ‘Injury’ and ‘Personal Injuries' includes only injuries by violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infections as naturally result therefrom.”

The jurisprudence of the State has conclusively established the term “accident” as including and comprehending the breakdown or impairment of a diseased organ or the exaggeration of a pre-existing physical defect.

In the instant case plaintiff alleged in his original petition that he was accidentally injured while in the employ of the defendant, Maxwell, and that the injury:

“ * * * occurred during the course, because of, and arose out of his said employment.”

Further allegations of plaintiff’s petition averred that his injury consisted of a fistula-in-ano and that his specific employment was as driver of a heavy lumber delivery truck which weighed approximately 30,000 pounds, fully loaded.

After filing of defendant’s exception, plaintiff filed an amended petition, which related only to the amount of his wages, and subsequently filed a second and supplemental and amended petition in which he amended the allegation of his original petition relating to the injury as follows:

“Petitioner amends article 4 of his original petition so that said article shall now allege as follows:
“That said injury consisted of and was a fistula-in-ano (a rectal fistula), which had developed during and because of the employment of plaintiff by defendant, Carroll W. Maxwell. That petitioner first noticed a slight or minor pain which was located on or at the outside of his rectum slightly on the right side, approximately two (2) months prior to July 3, 1956. That he told his employer about that pain a few days after he first felt it. That such pain would come and go periodically up to the date of July 3, 1956, on which date he felt more severe pain in said location than previously, and that he was working on said date when he felt such pain. During the two months prior to July 4, 1956 he was working regularly at his employment, which was that of driving a heavy lumber delivery truck, which when fully loaded weighed approximately 30,000 pounds. That during said period he was driving said truck an average of 1,000 miles per week, without a helper.
“That on July 4, 1956, early in the morning, he still felt pain in the stated location, which pain grew very severe during that day and he developed a temperature of approximately 103 degrees that afternoon. Finally, because [29]*29the pain grew so intense and because of his temperature, petitioner’s wife telephoned defendant Maxwell late that afternoon about petitioner’s condition and told him that petitioner needed to see a doctor. That if he, Maxwell, did not have any special doctor he wanted petitioner to consult, she would take petitioner to Dr. Eustis D. Wilson in Alexandria, La. That Maxwell stated he had no preference and it would suit him for petitioner to consult Dr. Wilson, which was done on July 5, 1956.
“That petitioner had been employed by defendant Maxwell for about five or six years before July 3, 1956, during which time his regular work was driving the said heavy lumber truck. That he never had any pain, as above described, before the approximately two months preceding July 3, 1956.”

Our examination of plaintiff’s pleadings persuades us that they failed to properly allege either the occurrence of an accident or an injury attributable to and causally connected with plaintiff’s employment. This finding would ordinarily require the rendition of a judgment sustaining defendant’s exception. However, in view of the fact that this is a compensation action, under which, by direction of the Legislature and by the interpretation of our courts, a plaintiff is entitled to the utmost consideration and should be accorded every reasonable opportunity to prosecute his claim before the courts, such a decree would not justify dismissal of plaintiff’s suit, but only a remand for the purpose of permitting adequate amendment of his pleadings. As further reason for avoiding such action, inasmuch as it appears, despite the minute entry, that defendants’ exception was referred to the merits and the case has been fully tried, we feel that it is proper to determine the issue presented on the merits and thus avoid the delay which would be suffered by all parties by reason of the alternative action of sustaining the exception and remanding the case for further amendment of plaintiff’s pleadings.

The issue presented by defendants’ exception relates to plaintiff’s failure to allege the occurrence of an accident or a causal relationship between the injury suffered and the employment. The merits of the case present, as the sole issue on this appeal, the factual question as to whether plaintiff has proved, by an adequate preponderance of the evidence, a relationship between his employment and the injury and the resultant disability of which he complains. The presentation of the issue in this form, of course, eliminates any consideration of the occurrence of an accident in the nature of an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently, which is not so much as contended by plaintiff.

The facts in connection' with this case were set forth by the district judge in considerable detail in his written reasons for judgment, as follows:

“Plaintiff had been employed by the defendant lumber company for about 5 years as a driver of a heavy lumber truck. He states that he drove the truck 5 or 6 days a week from 10 to 18-hours per day.

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Related

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Bluebook (online)
113 So. 2d 27, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 1185, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-maxwell-lactapp-1959.