Johnson v. Manning

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Johnson v. Manning

80 N.Y.S. 738

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 6, 1903

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 80 N.Y.S. 738 (Johnson v. Manning) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Johnson v. Manning, 80 N.Y.S. 738 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1903).

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Opinion

JENICS, J.

The petition of the defendant shows that the judgment was recovered upon default. Under the present practice such an appeal in the first instance would not lie. Section 257, Municipal Court Act (chapter 580, Laws 1902). But at the time this action was begun, and when the judgment was obtained, the plaintiff had the right of appeal from an order opening the default and setting aside his judgment. Beebe v. Nassau Show Case Co., 41 App. Div. 456, 58 N. Y. Supp. 769. I think that this right was preserved in this case by section [739]*739361 of the municipal court act. Without passing upon the various objections raised to the practice of the respondent, I think that there is one which is fatal. Section 1367 of the consolidation act (Laws 1882, c. 410; now repealed by the present municipal court act) provides that the order should recite the grounds upon which it was granted. I think that this requirement was substantial for the purpose of apprising the Appellate Court of the grounds of the decision brought up for review. As the present order fails to recite and to contain the grounds for it, I advise that it be reversed, unless within 10 days the respondent procure an amendment to the order.

Order of the municipal court reversed in accordance with the opinion of JENKS, J. All concur.

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JENICS, J.

The petition of the defendant shows that the judgment was recovered upon default. Under the present practice such an appeal in the first instance would not lie. Section 257, Municipal Court Act (chapter 580, Laws 1902). But at the time this action was begun, and when the judgment was obtained, the plaintiff had the right of appeal from an order opening the default and setting aside his judgment. Beebe v. Nassau Show Case Co., 41 App. Div. 456, 58 N. Y. Supp. 769. I think that this right was preserved in this case by section [739]*739361 of the municipal court act. Without passing upon the various objections raised to the practice of the respondent, I think that there is one which is fatal. Section 1367 of the consolidation act (Laws 1882, c. 410; now repealed by the present municipal court act) provides that the order should recite the grounds upon which it was granted. I think that this requirement was substantial for the purpose of apprising the Appellate Court of the grounds of the decision brought up for review. As the present order fails to recite and to contain the grounds for it, I advise that it be reversed, unless within 10 days the respondent procure an amendment to the order.

Order of the municipal court reversed in accordance with the opinion of JENKS, J. All concur.

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Bluebook (online)

80 N.Y.S. 738, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-manning-nyappdiv-1903.

Opinion

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