Johnson v. Maker Ecosystem Growth Holdings, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedFebruary 22, 2023
Docket3:20-cv-02569
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Maker Ecosystem Growth Holdings, Inc. (Johnson v. Maker Ecosystem Growth Holdings, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Maker Ecosystem Growth Holdings, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 PETER JOHNSON, Case No. 20-cv-02569-MMC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 10 MAKER ECOSYSTEM GROWTH HOLDINGS, INC., NKA METRONYM, 11 INC., a foreign corporation; and MAKER ECOSYSTEM GROWTH 12 FOUNDATION, a foreign corporation, 13 Defendants.

14 Before the Court is defendant Maker Ecosystem Growth Holding, Inc., NKA 15 Metronym Inc. (“Metronym”), and Maker Ecosystem Growth Foundation’s (“Maker 16 Growth”) Motion, filed October 31, 2022, “to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Class 17 Action Complaint.” Plaintiff Peter Johnson has filed opposition, to which defendants have 18 replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to 19 the motion, the Court rules as follows.1 20 BACKGROUND 21 Defendants are “two affiliated foreign companies” that, according to plaintiff, 22 “collectively operate, run, and manage the Maker Ecosystem, a cryptocurrency platform” 23 (see Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SAC”) at 1, Dkt. No. 69), and, in the 24 course thereof, committed acts constituting “neglect and malfeasance” (see SAC ¶ 3). In 25 particular, plaintiff alleges the following events occurred. 26 27 1 Defendants2 “developed a digital currency” called DAI (see SAC ¶ 13) and, in 2 connection therewith, a “protocol and various applications necessary for minting, 3 collateralizing, and transacting the DAI[,]” namely, the “Maker Protocol” (see SAC ¶ 13). 4 The Maker Protocol “involves the collateralization of digital assets” to “create a stable 5 coin—DAI—which is a decentralized, unbiased, collateral-backed cryptocurrency soft- 6 pegged to the US Dollar.” (See SAC ¶ 14 (internal quotations omitted).) Once created, 7 DAI “is a store of value, a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a standard of 8 deferred payment” that is “meant to be exchanged digitally between peers in exchange 9 for other digital assets or services, just like US Dollars may be exchanged for goods and 10 services.” (See SAC ¶ 15.) 11 Defendants also developed the Maker Decentralized Autonomous Organization 12 (“MakerDAO”) which “enables holders of its governance token, MKR, to manage the 13 MakerDAO organization through a system of scientific governance involving Executive 14 Voting and Governance Polling to ensure its stability, transparency, and efficiency.” (See 15 SAC ¶ 16 (internal quotation and alterations omitted).) In other words, MakerDAO “sets 16 all of the rules and regulations” which rules and regulations are “‘codified’ as the Maker 17 Protocol.” (See SAC at ¶ 18.) The Maker Protocol, in turn, governs transactions in DAI. 18 (See SAC at ¶ 18.) 19 A “distinguishing characteristic” of DAI is that, pursuant to the Maker Protocol, “it 20 must be collateralized by another digital currency,” primarily, Ethereum (“ETH”). (See 21 SAC ¶ 19.) In practice, this means “an individual or entity wishing to transact in or 22 otherwise procure DAI” must take one of the following actions to obtain the currency: (1) 23 “trade ETH (or other Ethereum tokens) directly for DAI through Maker’s ‘Oasis’ portal”; (2) 24 “purchase DAI with USD via cryptocurrency exchanges”; or, as relevant to the instant 25 action, (3) “create a collateralized debt position (‘CDP’), thereby becoming a Vault 26 Holder.” (See SAC ¶ 19.) Where an individual seeks to obtain DAI through a CDP, they 27 1 may “purchase $10,000 of ETH from an exchange, deposit that ETH into a CDP contract 2 as collateral,” and then “borrow against their collateralized debt position by withdrawing 3 DAI.” (See SAC ¶ 19.) 4 The Maker Protocol requires Vault Holders to maintain a 150% collateral-to-debt 5 ratio (the “Liquidation Ratio”). (See SAC ¶¶ 19-20.) When the value of a Vault Holder’s 6 collateral drops, leaving the Vault Holder’s DAI undercollateralized under the Liquidation 7 Ratio, a “liquidation event” is triggered (see SAC ¶ 22), whereby “the Vault Holder’s 8 collateral . . . is auctioned off to settle the debt with the Maker Protocol, with the balance 9 of the ETH being returned to the Vault Holder” (see SAC ¶ 23). Defendants use a “price 10 feed mechanism” called “oracles” to “monitor the price of ETH and thereby inform the 11 Maker Protocol at large whether a given Vault Holder’s DAI becomes 12 undercollateralized.” (See SAC ¶ 23 (internal quotation omitted).) 13 Plaintiff is an “early investor in ETH” who was “among a handful of early Maker 14 adopters and evangelists” and a Vault Holder as of March 12, 2020, a date “now known 15 as ‘Black Thursday.’” (See SAC ¶¶ 1, 4.) According to plaintiff, “[t]he Maker Foundation 16 and other third-party user interfaces repeatedly advertised and represented to Vault 17 Holders users that, because their CDPs would be significantly overcollateralized, 18 liquidation events would only result in a 13% liquidation penalty applied against the drawn 19 DAI amount, after which the remaining collateral would be returned to the user” (see SAC 20 ¶ 24 (emphasis omitted)), but, instead, Vault Holders, including plaintiff, “lost 100% of 21 their collateral” when, on Black Thursday, the price of ETH dropped “significantly and 22 rapidly” (see SAC ¶¶ 26, 33). 23 Plaintiff attributes his losses to two features of the Maker Protocol’s liquidation 24 process. First, plaintiff alleges, “the Maker Protocol’s utilized oracles . . . failed to 25 maintain accurate and updated prices, resulting in price reporting at levels much higher 26 than the actual spot price of ETH.” (See SAC ¶ 30.) Second, plaintiff alleges, 27 defendants “severely limited who could participate” in the auction process, limiting 1 i.e., “‘persons’ who run . . . liquidation-specific” algorithms (“bots”) on the Maker Protocol. 2 (See SAC ¶ 32.) Consequently, on Black Thursday, “only four Keepers (running multiple 3 bots) were active[,]” and, after one “ran into technical issues and wasn’t able to operate” 4 and “[t]he majority of the other[s] . . . quickly ran out of DAI liquidity and were frozen out 5 of bidding for several hours,” two Keeper bots “were able to successfully place numerous 6 $0 bids on liquidated ETH collateral” and “won hundreds of auctions at no cost.” (See 7 SAC ¶ 32.) According to plaintiff, defendants “envisioned this very scenario” as early as 8 2017, but, “[d]espite that foresight . . . did little or nothing to sufficiently incentivize the 9 creation and maintenance of adequate Keepers.” (See SAC ¶¶ 35-36.) 10 Based on the above, plaintiff asserts, on behalf of himself and a putative class, 11 three Claims for Relief, titled, respectively, “Negligence,” “Intentional Misrepresentation,” 12 and “Negligent Misrepresentation.” 13 DISCUSSION 14 By the instant motion, defendants seek an order dismissing the above-titled action 15 in its entirety, on the asserted grounds that (1) Maker Growth is not a proper defendant 16 because it has been dissolved, and therefore lacks capacity to be sued, and (2) plaintiff 17 has failed to allege facts sufficient to support each of his claims for relief. The Court first 18 turns to plaintiff’s claims against Maker Growth. 19 A. Claims Against Maker Growth 20 Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against Maker Growth, a company 21 “incorporated in the Cayman Islands” (see Decl. of Steven Becker in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. 22 to Dismiss (“Becker Decl.”) ¶ 3), on the ground it was dissolved prior to the filing of the 23 SAC (see Becker Decl. ¶ 4). 24 “Capacity to sue or be sued is determined . . . for a corporation, by the law under 25 which it was organized[.]” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(2). Courts that have considered the 26 question have found corporations organized under Cayman Islands law lack the capacity 27 to be sued once it has been dissolved. See, e.g., In re Bos. Generating LLC, 617 B.R.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court
593 P.2d 838 (California Supreme Court, 1979)
J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory
598 P.2d 60 (California Supreme Court, 1979)
Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP
221 Cal. App. 4th 49 (California Court of Appeal, 2013)
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.
938 P.2d 903 (California Supreme Court, 1997)
Fecht v. Price Co.
70 F.3d 1078 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA
317 F.3d 1097 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Frenzel v. Aliphcom
76 F. Supp. 3d 999 (N.D. California, 2014)
Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
342 F. Supp. 3d 404 (S.D. Illinois, 2018)
Green Desert Oil Group Inc. v. BP West Coast Products LLC
571 F. App'x 633 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. Maker Ecosystem Growth Holdings, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-maker-ecosystem-growth-holdings-inc-cand-2023.