Johnson v. Maker Ecosystem Growth Holdings, Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided February 22, 2023·No. 3:20-cv-02569·Unknown

Opinion

PETER JOHNSON, Case No. 20-cv-02569-MMC

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO v. DISMISS SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT HOLDINGS, INC., NKA METRONYM, INC., a foreign corporation; and MAKER ECOSYSTEM GROWTH FOUNDATION, a foreign corporation, Defendants.

Before the Court is defendant Maker Ecosystem Growth Holding, Inc., NKA Metronym Inc. (“Metronym”), and Maker Ecosystem Growth Foundation’s (“Maker Growth”) Motion, filed October 31, 2022, “to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Class Action Complaint.” Plaintiff Peter Johnson has filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court rules as follows.1 BACKGROUND Defendants are “two affiliated foreign companies” that, according to plaintiff, “collectively operate, run, and manage the Maker Ecosystem, a cryptocurrency platform” (see Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SAC”) at 1, Dkt. No. 69), and, in the course thereof, committed acts constituting “neglect and malfeasance” (see SAC ¶ 3). In particular, plaintiff alleges the following events occurred. Defendants2 “developed a digital currency” called DAI (see SAC ¶ 13) and, in connection therewith, a “protocol and various applications necessary for minting, collateralizing, and transacting the DAI[,]” namely, the “Maker Protocol” (see SAC ¶ 13). The Maker Protocol “involves the collateralization of digital assets” to “create a stable coin—DAI—which is a decentralized, unbiased, collateral-backed cryptocurrency soft- pegged to the US Dollar.” (See SAC ¶ 14 (internal quotations omitted).) Once created, DAI “is a store of value, a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a standard of deferred payment” that is “meant to be exchanged digitally between peers in exchange for other digital assets or services, just like US Dollars may be exchanged for goods and services.” (See SAC ¶ 15.) Defendants also developed the Maker Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“MakerDAO”) which “enables holders of its governance token, MKR, to manage the MakerDAO organization through a system of scientific governance involving Executive Voting and Governance Polling to ensure its stability, transparency, and efficiency.” (See SAC ¶ 16 (internal quotation and alterations omitted).) In other words, MakerDAO “sets all of the rules and regulations” which rules and regulations are “‘codified’ as the Maker Protocol.” (See SAC at ¶ 18.) The Maker Protocol, in turn, governs transactions in DAI. (See SAC at ¶ 18.) A “distinguishing characteristic” of DAI is that, pursuant to the Maker Protocol, “it must be collateralized by another digital currency,” primarily, Ethereum (“ETH”). (See SAC ¶ 19.) In practice, this means “an individual or entity wishing to transact in or otherwise procure DAI” must take one of the following actions to obtain the currency: (1) “trade ETH (or other Ethereum tokens) directly for DAI through Maker’s ‘Oasis’ portal”; (2) “purchase DAI with USD via cryptocurrency exchanges”; or, as relevant to the instant action, (3) “create a collateralized debt position (‘CDP’), thereby becoming a Vault Holder.” (See SAC ¶ 19.) Where an individual seeks to obtain DAI through a CDP, they may “purchase $10,000 of ETH from an exchange, deposit that ETH into a CDP contract as collateral,” and then “borrow against their collateralized debt position by withdrawing DAI.” (See SAC ¶ 19.) The Maker Protocol requires Vault Holders to maintain a 150% collateral-to-debt ratio (the “Liquidation Ratio”). (See SAC ¶¶ 19-20.) When the value of a Vault Holder’s collateral drops, leaving the Vault Holder’s DAI undercollateralized under the Liquidation Ratio, a “liquidation event” is triggered (see SAC ¶ 22), whereby “the Vault Holder’s collateral . . . is auctioned off to settle the debt with the Maker Protocol, with the balance of the ETH being returned to the Vault Holder” (see SAC ¶ 23). Defendants use a “price feed mechanism” called “oracles” to “monitor the price of ETH and thereby inform the Maker Protocol at large whether a given Vault Holder’s DAI becomes undercollateralized.” (See SAC ¶ 23 (internal quotation omitted).) Plaintiff is an “early investor in ETH” who was “among a handful of early Maker adopters and evangelists” and a Vault Holder as of March 12, 2020, a date “now known as ‘Black Thursday.’” (See SAC ¶¶ 1, 4.) According to plaintiff, “[t]he Maker Foundation and other third-party user interfaces repeatedly advertised and represented to Vault Holders users that, because their CDPs would be significantly overcollateralized, liquidation events would only result in a 13% liquidation penalty applied against the drawn DAI amount, after which the remaining collateral would be returned to the user” (see SAC ¶ 24 (emphasis omitted)), but, instead, Vault Holders, including plaintiff, “lost 100% of their collateral” when, on Black Thursday, the price of ETH dropped “significantly and rapidly” (see SAC ¶¶ 26, 33). Plaintiff attributes his losses to two features of the Maker Protocol’s liquidation process. First, plaintiff alleges, “the Maker Protocol’s utilized oracles . . . failed to maintain accurate and updated prices, resulting in price reporting at levels much higher than the actual spot price of ETH.” (See SAC ¶ 30.) Second, plaintiff alleges, defendants “severely limited who could participate” in the auction process, limiting i.e., “‘persons’ who run . . . liquidation-specific” algorithms (“bots”) on the Maker Protocol. (See SAC ¶ 32.) Consequently, on Black Thursday, “only four Keepers (running multiple bots) were active[,]” and, after one “ran into technical issues and wasn’t able to operate” and “[t]he majority of the other[s] . . . quickly ran out of DAI liquidity and were frozen out of bidding for several hours,” two Keeper bots “were able to successfully place numerous $0 bids on liquidated ETH collateral” and “won hundreds of auctions at no cost.” (See SAC ¶ 32.) According to plaintiff, defendants “envisioned this very scenario” as early as 2017, but, “[d]espite that foresight . . . did little or nothing to sufficiently incentivize the creation and maintenance of adequate Keepers.” (See SAC ¶¶ 35-36.) Based on the above, plaintiff asserts, on behalf of himself and a putative class, three Claims for Relief, titled, respectively, “Negligence,” “Intentional Misrepresentation,” and “Negligent Misrepresentation.” By the instant motion, defendants seek an order dismissing the above-titled action in its entirety, on the asserted grounds that (1) Maker Growth is not a proper defendant because it has been dissolved, and therefore lacks capacity to be sued, and (2) plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support each of his claims for relief. The Court first turns to plaintiff’s claims against Maker Growth. A. Claims Against Maker Growth Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against Maker Growth, a company “incorporated in the Cayman Islands” (see Decl. of Steven Becker in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Becker Decl.”) ¶ 3), on the ground it was dissolved prior to the filing of the SAC (see Becker Decl. ¶ 4). “Capacity to sue or be sued is determined . . . for a corporation, by the law under which it was organized[.]” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(2). Courts that have considered the question have found corporations organized under Cayman Islands law lack the capacity to be sued once it has been dissolved. See, e.g., In re Bos. Generating LLC, 617 B.R. LLC, 2021 WL 4150523 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2021) (finding, where Cayman Islands corporation had been dissolved, such entity, under Cayman Islands law, “cannot be sued”); Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 342 F. Supp. 3d 404, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (applying Rule 17(b)(2) to “Cayman Islands exempted company”; finding, under Ca

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Johnson v. Maker Ecosystem Growth Holdings, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2023).

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