Johnson v. Karoo

49 F. 651, 1892 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47
CourtDistrict Court, D. Washington
DecidedFebruary 15, 1892
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 49 F. 651 (Johnson v. Karoo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Karoo, 49 F. 651, 1892 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47 (washd 1892).

Opinion

Hanford, District Judge.

I have very carefully read the testimony and given consideration to the pleadings in this case, and am now ready to announce my conclusions.

I think the court is justified, and in fact required, to take jurisdiction of this case, although it is a suit for seamen’s wages against a foreign vessel, for three reasons: (1) There is no British consul at the port of Tacoma, and the consul at Port Townsend, where the nearest consul resides, after being called upon to investigate and adjust the matters of difference between the master and crew, made no response to the request of the seamen except to make a demand for payment of or security for his fees and expenses, with which demand they were not able to comply; but (2) even if the consul had been willing, or had in fact assumed jurisdiction, the case is not one which could be taken out of the jurisdiction of the United States court, properly. Two of the libelants are American citizens, and entitled to sue in the courts of their own country for the determination and adjudication of their rights. (3) All of the libelants but three have been brought to this country without having been lawfully bound by any contract of shipment. They are perfectly free to leave the vessel at this port, and demand payment of their wages. They have left the vessel, have demanded payment of their wages, and their demand has been refused. They have been turned out of the vessel destitute, and wages which they have earned by their services have been withheld from them. The}1' are not bound to return to the home of this vessel to sue her, but are entitled in an admiralty court here to have their rights enforced.

I find a wide divergence in the testimony in behalf of the libelants and in behalf of the ship, and have been obliged to weigh the testimony to determine which side was giving the truth, and in so doing have given importance to the facts and circumstances which are clearly established, and about which there can be no doubt. One important circumstance is that this captain left the port of Barry, on this present voyage, having on board one seaman who had not signed the shipping articles for' the voyage in the presence of a shipping commissioner or agent, as required by the laws of the country to which this vessel belongs. Ho gives as an excuse that it was because of the negligence and fault of the commissioner or shipping agent at the port of Barry in not attending to the matter of having the men all sign the shipping articles. This statement is of itself unreasonable and improbable. It is met by the counter-statement that the man being a foreigner, and unable to understand the English language, the shipping agent refused to sign him without the assistance of an interpreter to explain the contract before he signed • the articles, — a statement which is probable, and a full justification of the shipping commissioner’s failure. The vessel proceeded to Bio de [653]*653Janeiro, and there the larger portion of the crew deserted the ship. The captain brought his vessel away from that port with a crew secured there, none of whom signed the shipping articles in the presence of the British consul. It is shown in testimony, and admitted by the captain, that the British consul refusal to sanction the engagement of these men as seamen on this vessel. The captain has entered in his log, and has testified on this trial, and presumably has reported to his owners and the British board of trade, that the reason for the refusal of the British consul to engage these men was that they were not in possession of discharges from the vessels in which they last previously served, and that it was simply an arbitrary and unreasonable piece of stubbornness on the part of the British consul to refuse to sanction the employment of these men. The shipping articles themselves contain an indorsement written by the British consul, signed officially and under, his official seal, in which he makes a statement directly at variance with that of the captain. lie states that the reason he refused to sanction the employment of these men was that it did not appear to him that the men were not deserters from other vessels then in port, and requiring their services to enable them to proceed on their voyages. I feel bound to accept the certificate of the British consul as being the truth of the matter. It was in accordance with his duty and with law, and altogether more probable than that he unreasonably refused to act in a way that would enable this vessel to secure the services of necessary seamen, and proceed on her voyage.

It appears that the captain employed a shipping or boarding-house master at Rio to secure a crew for him; and a part of these libelants were taken on board with their consent, and have served as mariners on this vessel. The signing of the articles on board the .ship, out of the presence of the British consul was a useless formality. The men wore not given their option to sign or not. They were not asked to consent to the terms and conditions contained in the articles, but were taken down into the cabin of the vessel, and the shipping master, a resident of Rio, wrote their names and the other facts about them entered in the shipping articles; and they were told the amount of advance that the captain allowed, all of which was paid to the shipping or hoarding master, and then they were ordered on deck and set to work. This manner of signing shipping articles is not in any sense the making of or entering into a binding contract. These men, by the writing of their names on the shipping articles by the boarding-house master, were not bound to perform the voyage, or remain in the service of the ship any particular time. They are not bound by the rate of wages. They have the fight to leave the vessel in this port, and in leaving her do not become deserters, or forfeit their wages; and they are entitled to .recover on a quantum meruit the reasonable value of their servicies from Rio de Janeiro to this port.

It is clearly established, however, that three of these men taken on board the vessel at Rio were not taken on board for the purpose of making the voyage in the ship with their consent, but they were “shanghaied.” Two of them were inveigled by the boarding-house master, [654]*654whom the captain of the ship employed to get a crew for him on the pretense of working as stevedores, while the vessel was in port at Rio, and under an agreement that they would be paid at the rate of 10 shillings per day for their time. When the vessel was through with their services as stevedores, they requested permission to go on shore, and were refused by the captain. They were unable to go on shore, because the vessel was not at any wharf, but was at a distance from the shore, and there was no boat w’hich they could obtain for the purpose. They were told that they would have to remain in the ship and go in the ship, to which they never consented. These are facts sworn to by them, and not denied or attempted to be denied by the captain in his testimony; and the shipping articles show that somebody else signed for them, — and that was done, as the testimony shows, after they were in fact on board the ship, and detained there against their will. The other man was taken on board the ship by. this boarding-house master simply to assist him in getting out to the vessel, to carry the other men on board, and was left on board the vessel when the boarding-house master went ashore. He reported to the captain before the vessel got out of the harbor, and while she was in tow of the steam-tug, and informed the master that he was not in condition to go to sea, that he had no outfit for the voyage, and had even left his coat on shore.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
49 F. 651, 1892 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-karoo-washd-1892.