\ FILED SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM '·
2024 APR 29 PH 3: 56 CLERK Of COURT 2
3 BY:~- 4
5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6
7 MELISSA A. JOHNSON, DOMESTIC CASE NO. DM 0674-12
8 Plaintiff, 9 vs. DECISION AND ORDER 10 Re: Defendant's Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction 11 STEPHEN R. JOHNSON, 12 Defendant. 13 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on October 4, 2023, upon 14
15 Defendant Stephen R. Johnson's ("Defendant") Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction from Guam to
16 Virginia ("Motion"). The parties were present, with Attorney Daron Berman appearing for 17 Defendant and Attorney Catherine Camacho appearing for Plaintiff Melissa A. Johnson 18 ("Plaintiff'). Upon consideration of the briefings and the parties' arguments, the Court will 19 GRANT the Motion. 20
21 BACKGROUND
22 Plaintiff and Defendant were previously married and share a single child, A.J. (D.O.B. 23 02/04/2009). The parties divorced on Guam in September 23, 2012. As part of the divorce, the 24 parties executed a Divorce and Property Settlement Agreement ("Agreement"). The section of 25 · the Agreement entitled "Child Custody" was held to . constitute an initial child custody 26
27 determination pursuant to the Guam Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 28 ("UCCJEA"), 7 GCA §§ 101 et seq. Agreement, at 4. After the parties' divorce, both parties Decision and Order Domestic Case No. DM0674-12,Johnson v. Johnson
relocated from Guam, and neither party had resided in Guam for approximately ten (I 0) years
2 when the Motion was filed on March 17, 2023. At the time of filing, Defendant was a resident
3 of Nevada, and the Plaintiff and the parties' son were residents of Virginia. 4 On February 9, 2023, after Defendant attempted to register and modify the parties' 5 divorce degree in Virginia, the Virginia Court entered an Order dismissing Defendant's petition 6 on the ground that "Guam has and shall exercise continuing jurisdiction." Mot., at 2 (citing 7
8 Deel. of Def. at 'If 7). Defendant then filed the instant Motion on March 17, 2023, requesting that
9 the Court decline jurisdiction in this matter and allow Virginia to exercise and assert jurisdiction 10 over the parties and their domestic related issues in this matter. 11 DISCUSSION 12
13 Guam, like nearly all United States jurisdictions, has adopted the Uniform Child
14 Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"). See 7 GCA ch. 39 (statutory 15 codification of the UCCJEA). The UCCJEA "attempts to foster uniformity among state laws 16 governing jurisdiction over child custody determinations." Koji v. Neves, 2016 Guam 36 'If 32. 17 Under the UCCJEA, a child's "home state" is the state or territory in which a child lived with a 18
19 parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six months immediately before the
20 commencement of a child custody proceeding. 7 GCA § 39102. In this case, both Plaintiff and 21 Defendant had filed for divorce within six months of the commencement of the proceeding. 22 Therefore, Guam was the home state of the minor child when the initial custody orders were 23 made. 24
25 Further, the UCCJEA describes the standard for continuing jurisdiction. The standard for
26 continuing jurisdiction is described as: 27
Page2 of6 Decision and Order Domestic Case No. DM0674-12,Johnson v. Johnson
(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 39201, a court of Guam which has made a child-custody determination consistent with sections 39201 or 2 39203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: (I) A court of Guam determines that neither the child, the child's 3 parents, and any person acting as a parent do not have a significant connection with Guam and that substantial evidem:e is no longer 4 available in Guam concerning the child's care, protection, training, 5 and personal relationships; or (2) A court of Guam or a court of another State determines that the 6 child, the child's parents, and any person acting as 9. parent do not presently reside in Guam. 7
8 7 GCA § 39202 (emphasis added). The goal of the "significant connection" inquiry in
9 considering which State's exercise of jurisdiction on an issue of child custody is in the child's 10 best interest, is to determine which state has superior access to relevant evidence. Stelluto v. II Stelluto, 914 So. 2d 34, 40 (La. 2005). California courts have recognized that under the 12
13 UCCJEA, continuing jurisdiction remains with the state that issued the initial decree if "I) a
14 parent still resides in the decree state and 2) the child continues to have some connection with 15 the decree state, such as visitation." Grahm v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200 16 (2005). The court also explained that "the original state retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction 17 as long as the parent who is exercising visitation rights still lives in the decree state and the 18
19 relationship between that parent and the child has not deteriorated to the point at which the
20 exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable." Id. 21 In this case, the Court finds that the Superior Court of GuEm no longer retains 22 continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. As determined above, Guam was the "home state" of the 23 minor children when the initial custody orders were issued. Further, pursuant to the Child 24
25 Custody section of the Agreement, the Court explicitly made an initial child-custody
26 determination as per 7 GCA § 39201. Because the Court made an initial child-custody 27
Page3of6 Decision and Order Domestic Case No. DM0674-12,Johnson v. Johnson
determination consistent with 7 GCA § 39201, the Court acquired exclusive, continuing
2 jurisdiction pursuant to 7 GCA § 3 9202.
3 However, the parties having left Guam, the Court may only retain exclusive, continuing 4 jurisdiction over the determination until the Court determines that neither the child nor the 5 parties have a significant connection to Guam and that substantial evidence is no longer 6 available in Guam concerning the child's care, protection, training and i:ersonal relationships. 7
8 Because both the parties and the child have not resided in Guam for over ten (10) years, the
9 Court finds that the child and the parties no longer have a significant connection to Guam and, IO the child having lived the majority of his life in Virginia, the Court further finds that most, if not II all, substantial evidence to be found concerning the child's care, protection, training, and 12
13 personal relationships would be located in Virginia. Furthermore, even if the first provision of 7
14 GCA § 39202 were satisfied, the Court may still relinquish exclusive, continuing jurisdiction if 15 it finds that the child and his parents to not presently reside in Guam. The Court having so 16 determined that the child and his parents no longer reside in Guam, the Court finds that it should 17 relinquish exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the child-custody determination to the Virginia 18
19 Court. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction is GRANTED.
20 As Plaintiff argues, Defendant's petition in Virginia is a matter of child support and not 21 child custody, and that petition is governed by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 22 ("UIFSA"), codified in 5 GCA § 35101, et seq., and not by the UCCJEA-Pursuant to 5 GCA § 23 35205, governing continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child-support order, 24
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\ FILED SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM '·
2024 APR 29 PH 3: 56 CLERK Of COURT 2
3 BY:~- 4
5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6
7 MELISSA A. JOHNSON, DOMESTIC CASE NO. DM 0674-12
8 Plaintiff, 9 vs. DECISION AND ORDER 10 Re: Defendant's Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction 11 STEPHEN R. JOHNSON, 12 Defendant. 13 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on October 4, 2023, upon 14
15 Defendant Stephen R. Johnson's ("Defendant") Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction from Guam to
16 Virginia ("Motion"). The parties were present, with Attorney Daron Berman appearing for 17 Defendant and Attorney Catherine Camacho appearing for Plaintiff Melissa A. Johnson 18 ("Plaintiff'). Upon consideration of the briefings and the parties' arguments, the Court will 19 GRANT the Motion. 20
21 BACKGROUND
22 Plaintiff and Defendant were previously married and share a single child, A.J. (D.O.B. 23 02/04/2009). The parties divorced on Guam in September 23, 2012. As part of the divorce, the 24 parties executed a Divorce and Property Settlement Agreement ("Agreement"). The section of 25 · the Agreement entitled "Child Custody" was held to . constitute an initial child custody 26
27 determination pursuant to the Guam Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 28 ("UCCJEA"), 7 GCA §§ 101 et seq. Agreement, at 4. After the parties' divorce, both parties Decision and Order Domestic Case No. DM0674-12,Johnson v. Johnson
relocated from Guam, and neither party had resided in Guam for approximately ten (I 0) years
2 when the Motion was filed on March 17, 2023. At the time of filing, Defendant was a resident
3 of Nevada, and the Plaintiff and the parties' son were residents of Virginia. 4 On February 9, 2023, after Defendant attempted to register and modify the parties' 5 divorce degree in Virginia, the Virginia Court entered an Order dismissing Defendant's petition 6 on the ground that "Guam has and shall exercise continuing jurisdiction." Mot., at 2 (citing 7
8 Deel. of Def. at 'If 7). Defendant then filed the instant Motion on March 17, 2023, requesting that
9 the Court decline jurisdiction in this matter and allow Virginia to exercise and assert jurisdiction 10 over the parties and their domestic related issues in this matter. 11 DISCUSSION 12
13 Guam, like nearly all United States jurisdictions, has adopted the Uniform Child
14 Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"). See 7 GCA ch. 39 (statutory 15 codification of the UCCJEA). The UCCJEA "attempts to foster uniformity among state laws 16 governing jurisdiction over child custody determinations." Koji v. Neves, 2016 Guam 36 'If 32. 17 Under the UCCJEA, a child's "home state" is the state or territory in which a child lived with a 18
19 parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six months immediately before the
20 commencement of a child custody proceeding. 7 GCA § 39102. In this case, both Plaintiff and 21 Defendant had filed for divorce within six months of the commencement of the proceeding. 22 Therefore, Guam was the home state of the minor child when the initial custody orders were 23 made. 24
25 Further, the UCCJEA describes the standard for continuing jurisdiction. The standard for
26 continuing jurisdiction is described as: 27
Page2 of6 Decision and Order Domestic Case No. DM0674-12,Johnson v. Johnson
(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 39201, a court of Guam which has made a child-custody determination consistent with sections 39201 or 2 39203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: (I) A court of Guam determines that neither the child, the child's 3 parents, and any person acting as a parent do not have a significant connection with Guam and that substantial evidem:e is no longer 4 available in Guam concerning the child's care, protection, training, 5 and personal relationships; or (2) A court of Guam or a court of another State determines that the 6 child, the child's parents, and any person acting as 9. parent do not presently reside in Guam. 7
8 7 GCA § 39202 (emphasis added). The goal of the "significant connection" inquiry in
9 considering which State's exercise of jurisdiction on an issue of child custody is in the child's 10 best interest, is to determine which state has superior access to relevant evidence. Stelluto v. II Stelluto, 914 So. 2d 34, 40 (La. 2005). California courts have recognized that under the 12
13 UCCJEA, continuing jurisdiction remains with the state that issued the initial decree if "I) a
14 parent still resides in the decree state and 2) the child continues to have some connection with 15 the decree state, such as visitation." Grahm v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200 16 (2005). The court also explained that "the original state retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction 17 as long as the parent who is exercising visitation rights still lives in the decree state and the 18
19 relationship between that parent and the child has not deteriorated to the point at which the
20 exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable." Id. 21 In this case, the Court finds that the Superior Court of GuEm no longer retains 22 continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. As determined above, Guam was the "home state" of the 23 minor children when the initial custody orders were issued. Further, pursuant to the Child 24
25 Custody section of the Agreement, the Court explicitly made an initial child-custody
26 determination as per 7 GCA § 39201. Because the Court made an initial child-custody 27
Page3of6 Decision and Order Domestic Case No. DM0674-12,Johnson v. Johnson
determination consistent with 7 GCA § 39201, the Court acquired exclusive, continuing
2 jurisdiction pursuant to 7 GCA § 3 9202.
3 However, the parties having left Guam, the Court may only retain exclusive, continuing 4 jurisdiction over the determination until the Court determines that neither the child nor the 5 parties have a significant connection to Guam and that substantial evidence is no longer 6 available in Guam concerning the child's care, protection, training and i:ersonal relationships. 7
8 Because both the parties and the child have not resided in Guam for over ten (10) years, the
9 Court finds that the child and the parties no longer have a significant connection to Guam and, IO the child having lived the majority of his life in Virginia, the Court further finds that most, if not II all, substantial evidence to be found concerning the child's care, protection, training, and 12
13 personal relationships would be located in Virginia. Furthermore, even if the first provision of 7
14 GCA § 39202 were satisfied, the Court may still relinquish exclusive, continuing jurisdiction if 15 it finds that the child and his parents to not presently reside in Guam. The Court having so 16 determined that the child and his parents no longer reside in Guam, the Court finds that it should 17 relinquish exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the child-custody determination to the Virginia 18
19 Court. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction is GRANTED.
20 As Plaintiff argues, Defendant's petition in Virginia is a matter of child support and not 21 child custody, and that petition is governed by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 22 ("UIFSA"), codified in 5 GCA § 35101, et seq., and not by the UCCJEA-Pursuant to 5 GCA § 23 35205, governing continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child-support order, 24
25 (a) A tribunal of this state that has issued a child-support order consistent with the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction 26 to modify its child-support order if the order is the controlling order and: (1) at the time of the filing of a request for modification this state is the 27 residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the 28 support order is issued; or
Page4of6 Decision and Order Domestic Case No. DM0674-12, Johnson v. Johnson
(2) even if this state is not the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, the parties 2 consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this state may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order. 3 (b) A tribunal of this state that has issued a child-support order consistent 4 with the law of this state may not exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction 5 to modify the order if: (1) all of the parties who are individuals file consent in a record 6 with the tribunal of this state that a tribunal of another state that has jurisdiction over at least one (1) of the parties who is an individual or that is located in the 7 state of residence of the child may modify the order and assume continuing, 8 exclusive jurisdiction; or (2) its order is not the controlling order. 9
10 (c) If a tribunal of another state has issued a child-support order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act or a law substantially similar to that 11 Act which modifies a child-support order of a tribunal of this state, tribunals of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal of 12 the other state. 13 (d) A tribunal of this state that lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to 14 modify a child-support order may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to modify a support order issued in that state.(e) A 15 temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a jurisdictional 16 conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal. 17 7 GCA § 35205. Under the UIFSA, the Court is only required to exercise continuing,
19 exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child-support order if the order is the controlling order
20 and: (1) at the time of filing of a request for modification, Guam is the residence of the 21 parties or the child; or (2) if the state is not the residence of the parties or the child, the 22 parties consent in a record or in open court that the Court may continue to exercised 23 jurisdiction to modify its order. 24
25 Because neither of these provisions has been satisfied, the Court is not required to
26 maintain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order. Plaintiff 27 notes that, compared to 5 GCA § 35205(b) which requires "all of the parties" to consent 28
Page5 of6 Decision and Order Domestic Case No. DM0674-12, Johnson v. Johnson
to the Court relinquishing jurisdiction, 5 GCA § 35205(a)(2) only reqc1ires that "the
2 parties consent" for the Court to continue exercising jurisdictiton. Plaintiff argues that
3 this means only Plaintiff needs to consent in order for 35205(a) to be triggered. The Court 4 does not agree with this reasoning, as 35205(a)(2) still states that "the parties" must 5 consent to continue jurisdiction, not "a party" or "any party." By a plain reading, this 6 implicates more than one party must consent. Therefore, Plaintiffs co:1sent does not 7
8 trigger 35205(a)(2), and the decision to relinquish continuing, exclusive jurisdiction is
9 left to the discretion of the Court. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is fully GRANTED. 10 CONCLUSION 11 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Transfer 12
13 Jurisdiction to Virginia.
15 IT IS so ORDERED _ _A_PR_2_9_2_02_4_ __ 16
20 HONORABLE ARTHUR R. BARCINAS Judge, Superior Court of Guam 21
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