Johnson v. Johnson

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Johnson v. Johnson

24 A.D.2d 431, 260 N.Y.S.2d 801, 1965 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3920

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 17, 1965

StatusPublished

This text of 24 A.D.2d 431 (Johnson v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Johnson v. Johnson, 24 A.D.2d 431, 260 N.Y.S.2d 801, 1965 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3920 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1965).

Pincite

Opinion

Order granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, and judgment in favor of plaintiff pursuant to said order, unanimously reversed, on the law, with $50 costs to appellant, plaintiff’s motion denied, defendant’s cross motion granted, and the complaint dismissed. The tax provisions of subdivision (h) of paragraph 6 of the original agreement are an integral part of the support [432]*432requirements of that paragraph. Such requirements having been suspendea, as the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the supplemental agreement makes clear and as the consensual entry of the Family Court order confirms, it must be concluded that suspension of the tax provisions was likewise intended. Concur — Botein, P. J., Valente, McNally, Stevens, and Steuer, JJ.

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Order granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, and judgment in favor of plaintiff pursuant to said order, unanimously reversed, on the law, with $50 costs to appellant, plaintiff’s motion denied, defendant’s cross motion granted, and the complaint dismissed. The tax provisions of subdivision (h) of paragraph 6 of the original agreement are an integral part of the support [432]*432requirements of that paragraph. Such requirements having been suspendea, as the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the supplemental agreement makes clear and as the consensual entry of the Family Court order confirms, it must be concluded that suspension of the tax provisions was likewise intended. Concur — Botein, P. J., Valente, McNally, Stevens, and Steuer, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

24 A.D.2d 431, 260 N.Y.S.2d 801, 1965 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3920, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-johnson-nyappdiv-1965.