Johnson v. IDOC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedNovember 19, 2021
Docket3:21-cv-00450
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. IDOC (Johnson v. IDOC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. IDOC, (S.D. Ill. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JAMES JOHNSON, #R43615, ) ) Plaintiff, ) vs. ) Case No. 3:21-cv-00450-DWD ) IDOC, ) DEVIN E. SULLENS, and ) JOHN DOE, Shift Commander, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge: Plaintiff James Johnson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights at Lawrence Correctional Center. This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Complaint Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff and C/O Sullens exchanged words on July 18, 2020. Sullens told Plaintiff he would return to “f*** your s*** up so get ready.” When Sullens returned, he conducted a shakedown of Plaintiff’s cell during which he broke Plaintiff’s property and confiscated his legal papers, books, and magazines. Sullens actions were taken in retaliation for Plaintiff writing grievances regarding Sullens’s abuse of power. Sullens took Plaintiff’s property to John Doe Shift Commander and they destroyed it. Preliminary Dismissal

IDOC, a state government agency, is not subject to suit for money damages under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-71 (1989); Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012). IDOC will, therefore, be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Because Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, any claim(s) may proceed against

Defendants only in their individual capacity and the official capacity claim will be dismissed. See Brown v. Budz, 904 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005) (claim for monetary damages must be brought against defendant in his individual capacity only); Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2000) (official capacity claim against an individual is really a lawsuit for money damages against the State, which is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity). Discussion Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in this pro se action: Count 1: First Amendment claim against Sullens and John Doe for confiscating and destroying Plaintiff’s property on July 18, 2020 in retaliation for Plaintiff filing grievances against Sullens.

Count 2: Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of property claim against Sullens and John Doe for depriving Plaintiff of his property. Count 1

Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, exercising First Amendment rights, or otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012). To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). The allegations in the

Complaint are sufficient to proceed on the claim in Count 1 against Sullens but not against John Doe. There are no allegations that suggest John Doe acted in retaliation or was even aware of the grievances Plaintiff filed against Sullens. As such, Count 1 will be dismissed against John Doe. Count 2

Plaintiff alleges that various items of his personal property were destroyed or confiscated as a result of the cell shakedown and he seeks compensation for those items. To state a property loss claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. If the state provides an adequate remedy for the deprivation of property, Plaintiff has no civil rights claim.

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530–36 (1984) (availability of damages remedy in state claims court is an adequate, post-deprivation remedy). In that vein, the Seventh Circuit has found that Illinois provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy in an action for damages in the Illinois Court of Claims. Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1999); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/8 (1995). For these reasons, Count 2 will be dismissed with prejudice. Motion for Recruitment of Counsel

Civil litigants do not have a constitutional or statutory right to counsel. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007). A district court considering an indigent plaintiff's request for counsel must first consider whether the plaintiff has made reasonable attempts to secure counsel on his own or been effectively precluded from doing so; and, if so, whether the difficulty of the case factually and legally exceeds his capacity as a

layperson to present it. Id. at 654-655. If a plaintiff has not made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel on his own, the court should deny the request. Id. at 655. Here, Plaintiff has not submitted any proof of a reasonable effort to obtain counsel and the motion will be denied. If Plaintiff encounters difficulties in self-representation as this case proceeds, he may refile his motion seeking recruitment of counsel. If he chooses

to renew his request, he should submit rejection letters from at least 3 attorneys to demonstrate that he has made reasonable efforts to obtain counsel on his own. Disposition The Complaint survives review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A in part and is dismissed in part as follows: Count 1 will proceed against Devin E. Sullens but is DISMISSED

without prejudice as to John Doe. IDOC, the official capacity claim, and Count 2 are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate IDOC and John Doe. The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Devin E. Sullens: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and

this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.

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Related

Hudson v. Palmer
468 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Robert Murdock v. Odie Washington
193 F.3d 510 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
Douglas Power v. Phillip M. Summers
226 F.3d 815 (Seventh Circuit, 2000)
Gomez v. Randle
680 F.3d 859 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Calvin Thomas v. State of Illinois
697 F.3d 612 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Pruitt v. Mote
503 F.3d 647 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
William Hawkins v. Rodney Mitchell
756 F.3d 983 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Stewart v. McGinnis
5 F.3d 1031 (Seventh Circuit, 1993)
Voketz v. City of Decatur
904 F.3d 902 (Eleventh Circuit, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. IDOC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-idoc-ilsd-2021.