Johnson v. Huber

103 P. 99, 80 Kan. 591, 1909 Kan. LEXIS 119
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJuly 3, 1909
DocketNo. 16,123
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 103 P. 99 (Johnson v. Huber) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Huber, 103 P. 99, 80 Kan. 591, 1909 Kan. LEXIS 119 (kan 1909).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Porter, J.:

This is an action to recover a commission for a sale of real 'estate which the plaintiff claims he negotiated as the agent of the defendant. The plaintiff is a real-estate broker, and resides at Winfield, Kan. The defendant is a resident of Iowa, and owns land in Cowley county. The petition set out the written correspondence between the parties which it is claimed constituted the contract, and alleged that the plaintiff had procured a purchaser able and willing to take the [592]*592land upon the defendant’s terms, and that the defendant was unwilling to convey the land to the purchaser and refused to pay the plaintiff’s commission. The ■court sustained a demurrer to the petition, and the only question we have to consider is whether the correspondence of the parties resulted in a contract by which the ■defendant authorized the plaintiff to list his land for sale and bound himself to pay the plaintiff a commission in case the latter found a purchaser ready and willing to take the land on the defendant’s terms. .

All of the plaintiff’s letters to the defendant were written on letter-heads showing that the plaintiff was ■engaged in the business of real estate, loans and abstracts. The first letter was dated at Winfield, July 24, 1907. It was addressed to the defendant at Pella, Iowa, and is as follows:

“Dear Sir — We find by the records that you are the •owner of the S 1/2 of the SE % Sec. 10-33-5. We write to know if you will sell the eighty and what is the least ■cash it will take to buy it.
“We charge 5 per cent, for the $1000 and 21/2 per cent, all over that amount, so give us the price including the commissions.
“We often have inquiries for tracts of this size.
“Please let us hear from you by return mail, and ■oblige. Yours very truly,
M. E. Johnson & Co.”

The defendant replied:

“Pella, Iowa, July 27,. 1907, 5 p. m.
‘“M. E. Johnson & Co., Winfield, Kan.:
“Gentlemen — In reply to your letter of the 24th inst. I would say that my price on the S % of SE % 10-'33-5 Cowley county, Kansas, is $2000 net to me. I have it rented now and could not sell it without consent of parties who rent it, as to time possession could be given, ■etc.
“I understand this is a very nice 80, and it seems to '.me quite a cheap property at the figures named.
Yours truly, D. S. Huber.”

On August 10 the plaintiff wrote informing the de[593]*593fendant that he had negotiated a sale of the land. His letter is as follows:

“Mr. D. S. Huber, Pella, Iowa:
“Dear Sir — We have your favor of the 27th ultimo in which you state that you will take $2000 net to you for the S % of the SE % of section 10, township 33 south, of range 5 east, Cowley county, Kansas.
“We have sold this land. You will please send us the abstract if you have one for this land, together with the enclosed deed properly executed.
_ “Send deed to us or the First National Bank of this city; as soon as the abstract is continued to date showing everything clear and the title is accepted by the purchaser we will send you check for the $2000.
“Trusting we may hear from you by return mail, we are, Yours very truly,
M. E. Johnson & Co.”

Receiving no reply, the plaintiff, on August 22, wrote the defendant the following letter:

“Mr. D. S. Huber, Pella, Iowa:
“Dear Sir — We just wired you, viz.: 'Have you executed and sent deed for land sold? If not, why?” We do not understand why you have delayed answering our communication some time ago.
“The lease and possession of the place we just sold, for you does not cut any figure to our sale, and all we care for is an assignment of whatever lease you have. Send deed at once, if you have not done so.
“Please give this your immediate attention and oblige. Yours very truly,
M. E. Johnson & Co.”

The defendant answered as follows:

“Pella, Iowa, August 23, 1907.
“M. E. Johnson & Co., Winfield, Kan.:
“Gentlemen — Upon my return to my office to-day, after an absence of some time, I find on my desk an accumulation of mail matter, and in with it your communications, and I hasten'to say to you just as soon as I can get to it I will give the business you refer to my attention, and let you hear from me in full.
“This is all I have any time for now.
Yours truly, D. S. Huber.”

[594]*594Later Re again wrote the plaintiff, as follows:

“Pella, Iowa, September 3,1907. 11:20 a. m. “M. E. Johnson & Co., Winfield, Kan.:
“Gentlemen — I have concluded not to sell that land at the present time'. I have' heard from the parties that occupy it, and they will not be willing to leave the place for some time, having moved on it and greatly improved it, with the understanding that they were to occupy it indefinitely, and also to be given an opportunity to purchase, in case they chose to do st>.
Yours truly, D. S. Huber.”

This closed the correspondence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff later wrote other letters urging the defendant to comply with the contract and explaining that he had accepted money on payment for the land, but they have no bearing upon the question at issue.

Did this correspondence result in a contract by which the plaintiff was authorized to list the land for sale on commission? The plaintiff’s first letter is susceptible of but one interpretation. In plain language it informs the defendant of the character of the plaintiff’s business, inquires whether the defendant will sell the land, and asks his lowest cash terms. It states the commission which the plaintiff expects to charge in case a sale is made, and, in effect, though not in express terms, asks authority to list the land for sale. In his answer the defendant states the net price at which he holds the land for sale. The further statement that the land was rented and he could not sell without the consent of the tenant as to time possession should be given can not be construed as a statement that the land was not for sale. The fair inference is that he meant to sell it on the terms stated, subject to the lease. In other words, if the purchaser could arrange with the tenant as to the time possession should be given it would be satisfactory to him. It is alleged in the petition that the purchaser which the plaintiff procured was willing to take the land subject to the [595]*595terms of the lease, and, in the letter of August 22, which the defendant received before he refused to convey, he was informed that the matter of the lease and possession had been arranged.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
103 P. 99, 80 Kan. 591, 1909 Kan. LEXIS 119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-huber-kan-1909.