Johnson v. Holms

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 ADRIAN JOHNSON, Case No. 2:18-cv-00647-GMN-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 SGT D. HOLMS, et al.,

8 Defendants.

9 10 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 118). This is 11 Plaintiff’s sixth time filing such motion. Each of Plaintiff’s six motions make substantively the same 12 argument. Plaintiff’s Motion is denied for the reasons stated below. Plaintiff is further advised that 13 unless there is some substantial change in the facts pertaining to his case, and not to the conditions 14 of his present incarceration, no subsequently filed motion seeking appointment of counsel will be 15 considered by the Court. 16 As previously explained, on numerous occasions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 17 Circuit finds no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in civil cases. Ivey v. Bd. of 18 Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit further holds that 19 when determining whether counsel should be appointed, the court has discretion to consider three 20 relevant factors: (1) the plaintiff’s financial resources; (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure 21 counsel; (3) the meritoriousness of the plaintiff’s claim; and (4) the ability of the petitioner to 22 articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Id. 23 Plaintiff argues that he should be appointed counsel because he is incarcerated, in a 24 segregated unit, has limited access to the law library and because he lacks the skills and education 25 to litigate this matter. Plaintiff further states that since his complaint was screened and some of his 26 claims survived, his claims are meritorious, and he is entitled to the assistance of counsel. ECF No. 27 118 at 7. Plaintiff made the similar argument in his prior motion seeking appointment of counsel. 1 The Court does not dispute, as stated in Plaintiff’s current motion, that Plaintiff is indigent, 2 in segregation, may have limited access to the law library, the library itself may have technical 3 difficulties, that he is not a lawyer, and that he believes his claims have merit. However, none of 4 these factors weigh in favor of using the limited resources available to the Court for appointment of 5 pro bono counsel. The difficulties any pro se litigant would have do not establish exceptional 6 circumstances. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that prisoner 7 litigants’ lack of a legal education does not constitute “exceptional circumstances”). As stated in 8 Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1989), “the Constitution does not require the 9 elimination of all economic, intellectual, and technological barriers to litigation.” Moreover, 10 Plaintiff’s lack of legal knowledge and comprehension do not rise to the level of exceptional 11 circumstances. Zamaro v. Moonga, 656 F. App’x 297, 299 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that lack of 12 adequate knowledge of “complex legal and medical issues” is not an exceptional circumstance “in light 13 of the legal competence of most prisoners in similar situations.”). 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s sixth Motion for Appointment of 15 Counsel (ECF No. 118) is DENIED. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that unless there is some substantial change in the facts 17 pertaining to or underlying the present claims brought by Plaintiff that are before the Court, the Court 18 will not entertain or consider any additional motions for appointment of counsel. 19 20 Dated this 28th day of August, 2020.

22 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27