1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Robert W. Johnson, Case No. 2:23-cv-01396-CDS-NJK
5 Plaintiff Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation, Overruling Plaintiff’s 6 v. Objections, and Closing Case
7 Facebook, et al., [ECF Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10] 8 Defendants 9 10 Pro se plaintiff Robert Johnson initiated this action by filing an application for leave to 11 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) alongside his complaint alleging identity theft, fraud, 12 constitutional violations, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) 13 violations, and due process violations against Facebook and a host of other defendants, ranging 14 from social media companies to various political figures (ECF No. 2). Magistrate Judge Nancy 15 Koppe recommends that this case be dismissed because the claim-splitting doctrine forecloses 16 Johnson’s ability to bring separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in 17 the same court against the same defendants. R&R, ECF No. 8. Johnson objects to the report and 18 recommendation. ECF No. 9. Having considered the objection and the R&R, I agree with Judge 19 Koppe, overrule Johnson’s objection, adopt the R&R in its entirety, and kindly direct the Clerk 20 of Court to close this case. 21 I. Legal standard 22 “A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report 23 or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. 24 § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The statute 25 makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and 26 recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”). A magistrate judge’s order 1 should only be set aside if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); LR IB 3- 2 1(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). A magistrate judge’s order is “clearly erroneous” if the court has “a 3 definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 4 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); Burdick v. Comm’r IRS, 979 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1992). “An order is 5 contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law[,] or rules of 6 procedure.” UnitedHealth Grp., Inc. v. United Healthcare, Inc., 2014 WL 4635882, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 7 16, 2014). 8 II. Background 9 After screening Johnson’s complaint, Judge Koppe recommended that this case be 10 dismissed pursuant to the claim-splitting doctrine. See generally ECF No. 8. As observed in the 11 R&R, Johnson has initiated at least five federal actions alleging identical claims against the same 12 defendants. Id. at 2. Judge Koppe concluded that the claim-splitting doctrine, which prevents a 13 plaintiff from harassing a defendant by filing identical, simultaneous actions in separate courts, 14 bars Johnson from reasserting claims that have already been adjudicated. Id. at 1–2. Johnson 15 objected to that R&R. ECF No. 9. 16 III. Discussion 17 A. Johnson’s objection to the R&R (ECF No. 9) is overruled 18 As a threshold matter, it is well established that courts must liberally construe 19 documents filed by pro se litigants and afford them the benefit of any doubt. Erickson v. Pardus, 20 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even liberally construing his motion, the court 21 cannot identify any specific part of the report and recommendation to which Johnson objects or 22 takes issue. See generally ECF No. 9. “When a specific objection is made to a portion of a 23 magistrate judge’s report [and] recommendation, the court subjects that portion . . . to a de novo 24 review.” Kenniston v. McDonald, 2019 WL 2579965, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2019) (citing Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)). “To be ‘specific,’ the objection must, with 26 particularity, identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to 1 which it has an objection and the basis for the objection.” Id. (citing Mario v. P & C Food Markets, 2 Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002)). Johnson has raised no argument to suggest that any 3 mistake or legal error was made in the analysis performed in the R&R. Because Johnson fails to 4 identify any relevant statute, case law, or rules of procedure that Judge Koppe supposedly 5 misapplied, I overrule Johnson’s objection. 6 B. I review and adopt the R&R in full 7 Nonetheless, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule IB 3-2, I find it 8 appropriate to conduct a de novo review to determine whether to adopt the report and 9 recommendation. In doing so, I agree with Judge Koppe that this case is barred per the claim- 10 splitting doctrine. 11 The theory of claim splitting bars a party from subsequent, duplicative litigation where 12 the “same controversy” exists. Fairway Rest. Equip. Contracting, Inc. v. Makino, 148 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 13 1128 (D. Nev. 2015) (citing Single Chip Sys. Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1057 (S.D. 14 Cal. 2007). To determine whether a suit is duplicative, courts in the Ninth Circuit borrow from 15 the test for claim preclusion. Adams v. California Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688–89 (9th 16 Cir. 2007). “We examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or 17 privies to the action, are the same.” Id.; see also Phillips v. Salt River Police Dep’t., 586 F. App’x 381 (9th 18 Cir. 2014). Claim splitting, however, does not require a final judgment on the merits in the prior 19 case. Single Chip Sys. Corp., 495 F.Supp.2d at 1058. Instead, a court assumes that the first suit was 20 final, and then determines if the second suit could be precluded. Id. at 1059. 21 In determining whether the actions are similar enough to warrant application of the 22 claim splitting doctrine, the court considers four factors: (1) whether rights or interests 23 established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second 24 action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether 25 the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of 26 1 the same transactional nucleus of facts. Adams, 487 F.3d at 689. The last factor is the most 2 important. Id. 3 The instant case is a textbook violation of the claim-splitting doctrine. Using just one of 4 the other five federal actions as an example, in August 2023, Johnson filed suit against the same 5 defendants at issue here—Donald J. Trump, Rudy Giuliani, Vladimir Putin, Facebook, Meta, 6 Twitter, and others—in federal court in New Mexico. Johnson v. Trump, 2023 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7 173911 (D.N.M. Sept. 26, 2023).
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1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Robert W. Johnson, Case No. 2:23-cv-01396-CDS-NJK
5 Plaintiff Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation, Overruling Plaintiff’s 6 v. Objections, and Closing Case
7 Facebook, et al., [ECF Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10] 8 Defendants 9 10 Pro se plaintiff Robert Johnson initiated this action by filing an application for leave to 11 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) alongside his complaint alleging identity theft, fraud, 12 constitutional violations, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) 13 violations, and due process violations against Facebook and a host of other defendants, ranging 14 from social media companies to various political figures (ECF No. 2). Magistrate Judge Nancy 15 Koppe recommends that this case be dismissed because the claim-splitting doctrine forecloses 16 Johnson’s ability to bring separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in 17 the same court against the same defendants. R&R, ECF No. 8. Johnson objects to the report and 18 recommendation. ECF No. 9. Having considered the objection and the R&R, I agree with Judge 19 Koppe, overrule Johnson’s objection, adopt the R&R in its entirety, and kindly direct the Clerk 20 of Court to close this case. 21 I. Legal standard 22 “A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report 23 or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. 24 § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The statute 25 makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and 26 recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”). A magistrate judge’s order 1 should only be set aside if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); LR IB 3- 2 1(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). A magistrate judge’s order is “clearly erroneous” if the court has “a 3 definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 4 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); Burdick v. Comm’r IRS, 979 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1992). “An order is 5 contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law[,] or rules of 6 procedure.” UnitedHealth Grp., Inc. v. United Healthcare, Inc., 2014 WL 4635882, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 7 16, 2014). 8 II. Background 9 After screening Johnson’s complaint, Judge Koppe recommended that this case be 10 dismissed pursuant to the claim-splitting doctrine. See generally ECF No. 8. As observed in the 11 R&R, Johnson has initiated at least five federal actions alleging identical claims against the same 12 defendants. Id. at 2. Judge Koppe concluded that the claim-splitting doctrine, which prevents a 13 plaintiff from harassing a defendant by filing identical, simultaneous actions in separate courts, 14 bars Johnson from reasserting claims that have already been adjudicated. Id. at 1–2. Johnson 15 objected to that R&R. ECF No. 9. 16 III. Discussion 17 A. Johnson’s objection to the R&R (ECF No. 9) is overruled 18 As a threshold matter, it is well established that courts must liberally construe 19 documents filed by pro se litigants and afford them the benefit of any doubt. Erickson v. Pardus, 20 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even liberally construing his motion, the court 21 cannot identify any specific part of the report and recommendation to which Johnson objects or 22 takes issue. See generally ECF No. 9. “When a specific objection is made to a portion of a 23 magistrate judge’s report [and] recommendation, the court subjects that portion . . . to a de novo 24 review.” Kenniston v. McDonald, 2019 WL 2579965, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2019) (citing Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)). “To be ‘specific,’ the objection must, with 26 particularity, identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to 1 which it has an objection and the basis for the objection.” Id. (citing Mario v. P & C Food Markets, 2 Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002)). Johnson has raised no argument to suggest that any 3 mistake or legal error was made in the analysis performed in the R&R. Because Johnson fails to 4 identify any relevant statute, case law, or rules of procedure that Judge Koppe supposedly 5 misapplied, I overrule Johnson’s objection. 6 B. I review and adopt the R&R in full 7 Nonetheless, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule IB 3-2, I find it 8 appropriate to conduct a de novo review to determine whether to adopt the report and 9 recommendation. In doing so, I agree with Judge Koppe that this case is barred per the claim- 10 splitting doctrine. 11 The theory of claim splitting bars a party from subsequent, duplicative litigation where 12 the “same controversy” exists. Fairway Rest. Equip. Contracting, Inc. v. Makino, 148 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 13 1128 (D. Nev. 2015) (citing Single Chip Sys. Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1057 (S.D. 14 Cal. 2007). To determine whether a suit is duplicative, courts in the Ninth Circuit borrow from 15 the test for claim preclusion. Adams v. California Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688–89 (9th 16 Cir. 2007). “We examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or 17 privies to the action, are the same.” Id.; see also Phillips v. Salt River Police Dep’t., 586 F. App’x 381 (9th 18 Cir. 2014). Claim splitting, however, does not require a final judgment on the merits in the prior 19 case. Single Chip Sys. Corp., 495 F.Supp.2d at 1058. Instead, a court assumes that the first suit was 20 final, and then determines if the second suit could be precluded. Id. at 1059. 21 In determining whether the actions are similar enough to warrant application of the 22 claim splitting doctrine, the court considers four factors: (1) whether rights or interests 23 established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second 24 action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether 25 the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of 26 1 the same transactional nucleus of facts. Adams, 487 F.3d at 689. The last factor is the most 2 important. Id. 3 The instant case is a textbook violation of the claim-splitting doctrine. Using just one of 4 the other five federal actions as an example, in August 2023, Johnson filed suit against the same 5 defendants at issue here—Donald J. Trump, Rudy Giuliani, Vladimir Putin, Facebook, Meta, 6 Twitter, and others—in federal court in New Mexico. Johnson v. Trump, 2023 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7 173911 (D.N.M. Sept. 26, 2023). There, Johnson alleged the same claims alleged here: that “[a]ll 8 defendants committed identity theft, fraud, U.S. Constitutional violations, RICO acts and due 9 process violations against [him].” Case No. 1:23-cv-00723-KWR-LF, ECF No. 1. Approximately a 10 week after initiating the New Mexico action, Johnson filed the instant suit against the same 11 defendants alleging the same claims: that defendants “committed identity theft, fraud, U.S. 12 Constitutional Violations, RICO Acts and Due Process violations.” Compl., ECF No. 2 at 2. 13 These two suits are the definition of duplicative—each contains the same parties, the 14 same claims, and though unelaborated in the complaint, presumably arise from the same 15 transactional nucleus of facts. Whether for the purpose of harassment or because he believes 16 rolling the dice in Nevada will give him better odds, Johnson seeks to litigate in this district the 17 same claims which he already filed in the earlier New Mexico case. This is precisely what the 18 claim-splitting doctrine prohibits. See, e.g., Shahrokhi v. Harter, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 247936, *4 (D. 19 Nev. Dec. 30, 2021) (“This court finds that this complaint violates the general prohibits against 20 claim-splitting because the exact same facts and transactions upon which the claims in 21 this suit are based are also the subject of multiple other federal complaints.”). Importantly, 22 Johnson has had, and continues to have, the opportunity to fully litigate his claims in another 23 forum—for example, the New Mexico court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Johnson, 24 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173911 at *2. For that reason, and because it will serve judicial efficiency, I 25 dismiss this case with prejudice. See id. 26 1 Because I dismiss the complaint with prejudice, plaintiff's motion for default judgment is 2}| denied as moot. Conclusion 4 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Koppe’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 8] is ADOPTED in its entirety. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's objection [ECF No. 9] is OVERRULED. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's application for leave to proceed in forma 8|| pauperis [ECF No. 7] and motion for default judgment [ECF No. 10] are DENIED as moot. 9 This case is dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is kindly instructed to 10]| enter judgment accordingly and close this case. -) ll DATED: December 15, 2023 // 2 Lig — Cristina). Silva 13 Unite tates District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26