Johnson v. Early Warning Services LLC

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05589
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CHRISTOPHER C. JOHNSON, CASE NO. C25-5589-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE 9 v. SUMMONS AND TO SHOW CAUSE

10 EARLY WARNING SERVICES, LLC,

11 Defendant(s).

12 Plaintiff Christopher C. Johnson, representing himself, filed a complaint alleging that 13 Defendant Early Warning Services LLC violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA,” 15 14 U.S.C. § 1681), the Washington Fair Credit Reporting Act (“WFRCA,” WASH. REV. CODE § 15 19.182), and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA,” WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86). 16 Dkt. No. 4. Johnson applied to proceed in forma pauperis, and when U.S. Magistrate Judge Grady 17 Leupold granted that application, he recommended that the Court review Johnson’s complaint 18 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) before issuing summons. Dkt. No. 3. 19 The Court has reviewed Johnson’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim on which 20 relief may be granted. Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal 21 courts to deciding only actual “cases” and “controversies.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 22 555, 559 (1992). The doctrine of standing sets apart those “cases” and “controversies” that are of 23 “the justiciable sort referenced in Article III[.]” Id. at 560. 24 1 [T]o satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 2 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely 3 speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

4 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). 5 In this case, Johnson alleges that when he requested that Defendant provide him a full file 6 disclosure as required by the FCRA and WFCRA, Defendant requested additional documentation 7 that he had already provided. Dkt. No. 4 ¶ 13. The complaint does not state that Defendant refused 8 to provide Johnson’s file in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) or Section 19.182.070 of the 9 Revised Code of Washington, but instead alleges facts suggesting that Defendant intended to 10 comply with its obligation to ensure that Johnson provided proper identification before a file is 11 disclosed. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(h)(a)(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.080. Johnson’s complaint 12 thus alleges at most a potential future violation of the FCRA, WFCRA, or CPA, if Defendant 13 refuses to acknowledge Johnson’s identifying documents, but because Johnson’s communication 14 with Defendant appears to be ongoing and Defendant has not yet refused to provide a full file 15 report, the complaint does not allege facts suggesting that a violation has occurred already or is 16 likely to occur imminently. Johnson’s alleged damages (Dkt. No. 4 ¶¶ 15–18) are thus predicated 17 on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” 18 Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. 19 Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580–81 (1998)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Johnson’s complaint does 20 not allege facts showing that his claim is ripe, as is necessary to establish Article III standing. See 21 Bova v. City of Medford, 564 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 23 24 1 The Court therefore declines to issue summons at this time. Johnson is ORDERED TO 2 SHOW CAUSE no later than August 15, 2025, why this case should not be dismissed without 3 prejudice for lack of standing.

4 Dated this 16th day of July, 2025. 5 A 6 Kymberly K. Evanson 7 United States District Judge

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