Johnson v. District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act

305 F. App'x 662
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedNovember 10, 2008
DocketNo. 08-7077
StatusPublished

This text of 305 F. App'x 662 (Johnson v. District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act, 305 F. App'x 662 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Opinion

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by appellant. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C.Cir. Rule 34®. It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed July 8, 2008 be affirmed. The district court properly concluded that appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is apparent from the face of the complaint that appellees did not force appellant to work by means of physical or legal coercion. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988) (“[I]n every case in which this Court has found a condition of involuntary servitude, the victim had no available choice but to work or be subject to legal sanction.”). To the extent appellant alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 242, the district court properly dismissed these claims, because there is no private right of action under these criminal statutes. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a “bare criminal statute”); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57 F.3d 1162, 1164 (D.C.Cir.1995).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for re[663]*663hearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.

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305 F. App'x 662, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-district-of-columbia-criminal-justice-act-cadc-2008.