Johnson v. Coyle

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: January 12, 2000
• Docket: 97-4092
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0015P (6th Cir.) File Name: 00a0015p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

;  MICHAEL JEFFREY JOHNSON,  Petitioner-Appellant,   No. 97-4092 v.  > RALPH COYLE, Warden,  Respondent-Appellee. 1

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron. No. 96-00771—David D. Dowd, Jr., District Judge. Argued: February 5, 1999 Decided and Filed: January 12, 2000 Before: JONES, NELSON, and BOGGS, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Luz V. Lopez-Ortiz, PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael L. Collyer, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Luz V. Lopez-Ortiz, Linda E. Prucha, PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, Columbus, Ohio, for

1 2 Johnson v. Coyle No. 97-4092 No. 97-4092 Johnson v. Coyle 15

Appellant. Michael L. Collyer, OFFICE OF THE specification at Johnson’s retrial. This determination is ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO, Cleveland, Ohio, for properly made by the Ohio courts, and the parties are free to Appellee. argue the issue in the forthcoming state proceedings. _________________ III OPINION Sufficient evidence was presented at trial for a rational jury, _________________ viewing all the evidence most favorably for the prosecution, to find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Johnson killed BOGGS, Circuit Judge. An Ohio state-court jury convicted Brunst, (2) Johnson killed Brunst with prior calculation and Michael Johnson of two counts of aggravated murder, each design, (3) Johnson killed Brunst while raping or attempting with a capital specification, for the death of his sister, Susan to rape Brunst, and (4) assuming that Ohio courts would Brunst. One capital specification alleged that Johnson killed interpret the “restraint of liberty” term of the Ohio kidnapping Brunst with prior calculation and design; the other alleged statute to be satisfied on the facts presented at trial, Johnson that he killed her in the course of a kidnapping or rape. The killed Brunst while kidnapping or attempting to kidnap her. jury convicted Johnson on both counts and recommended a There is no federal constitutional bar to the state’s retrying sentence of death. The state court of appeals affirmed the Johnson for murder or aggravated murder, nor for prosecuting3 conviction and sentence. See State v. Johnson, 1992 WL a capital specification predicated on rape and/or kidnapping. 328492 (Ohio App. Nov. 4, 1992) (unpublished). The state may not prosecute a capital specification based on Johnson’s 1984 Florida conviction. Accordingly, we deny Johnson appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which Johnson’s habeas petition. reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. See State v. Johnson, 643 N.E. 2d 1098 (Ohio 1994). The Ohio Supreme Court found that (1) Johnson’s previous Florida conviction for second-degree murder was not a conviction for a specific intent crime and, therefore, cannot be an aggravating circumstance upon which a capital specification can be grounded, id. at 1103–04; (2) the testimony of three of the four witnesses who testified that Brunst told them about Johnson’s previous attempt to rape Brunst was inadmissible hearsay, and admitting it was an abuse of discretion, id. at 1104–05; (3) certain statements that were admitted into evidence constituted inadmissible character evidence, id. at 1105–06; and (4) a graphic and 3 The magistrate judge asserted that Johnson “is no longer facing a crude passage in an otherwise admissible letter from Johnson death penalty” because his state case was not affirmed on appeal, citing to Brunst was unfairly prejudicial, id. at 1106. Ohio Revised Code § 2929.06. J.A. at 21. The district court correctly held that such a conclusion is not based on a federal constitutional issue Johnson sought rehearing, arguing that the evidence and, therefore, such a claim is not cognizable in Johnson’s habeas presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction proceeding. Id. at 71. Whether § 2929.06 prohibits the death penalty in and that a retrial would thus violate his right against double Johnson’s case is a matter for the Ohio courts, and we make no ruling on that point. We note the issue to bring it to the parties’ attention for the jeopardy. The Ohio Supreme Court denied rehearing. retrial. 14 Johnson v. Coyle No. 97-4092 No. 97-4092 Johnson v. Coyle 3

No evidence was presented that Brunst was killed, Johnson filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, terrorized, or physically harmed anywhere other than at her again arguing that he may not be retried. The magistrate apartment. There is no way to know if Brunst was killed in judge recommended denial of the petition. The district court her apartment or removed alive and killed elsewhere. considered Johnson’s objections and denied the writ. The Although a rational jury might find the elements of murder district court issued a certificate of probable cause, limited to and/or aggravated murder without evidence of the exact Johnson’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim involving the location of the killing, the same cannot be said for kidnapping and rape charges. We affirm the district court’s kidnapping, which requires that Brunst’s apartment be ruled denial of Johnson’s petition. out as the scene of the murder. There being no evidence for the “purpose” element of kidnapping under either subsection I (2) or (3) of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.01(A), no rational jury could find beyond reasonable doubt that Johnson A. The 1984 Florida Murder committed kidnapping under those subsections. In 1984, Johnson pled guilty to murder in connection with Therefore, to predicate a capital specification on the death of a Florida woman, Denise Hutchinson. There kidnapping, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt were numerous similarities in the circumstances of the two that Johnson restrained Brunst’s liberty in order to engage in killings. At trial in the case before us, the prosecution argued sexual activity, under subsection (4) of of Ohio Rev. Code that the alleged pattern made it more likely that Johnson Ann. § 2905.01(A). We held above that a rational jury could killed Brunst. find beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson raped Brunst. At least one Ohio court has held that the physical restraint Johnson lived with Kathy Keller in Pierson, Florida, from incident to rape may constitute the restraint of liberty required 1980 to 1984. Hutchinson was Keller’s friend, whom for kidnapping. See State v. Hatton, 1999 WL 253450, *23 Johnson “treated as a sister” although he was sexually (Ohio Ct. App. April 19, 1999) (unpublished) (holding that attracted to her. After a fight between Johnson and Keller, the defendant’s act of forcing himself on top of the victim Keller moved in with Hutchinson. Johnson felt that constituted a restraint 2of liberty sufficient to support a Hutchinson was responsible for his break-up with Keller. He kidnapping conviction). We are reluctant to consider this the fought with Hutchinson, who forbade him to come to her settled law of Ohio; however, that is a matter for the Ohio mobile home. On December 29, 1984, Florida police found courts. We hold that if the Ohio courts allow a conviction for Hutchinson’s body, nude from the chest down, lying in her kidnapping on these facts, there is no federal constitutional bed. Her face had been struck repeatedly with an iron skillet. bar preventing the state from arguing the kidnapping capital Hutchinson was very drunk when she was killed. She had semen in her vagina, but the quantity recovered was insufficient to determine the blood type of the donor. Johnson 2 To convict a defendant of both rape and kidnapping, Ohio law eventually confessed to the murder. He was steadily requires the prosecution to prove “separate animus” for the two crimes, employed, but quit going to work immediately after the see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.25, which has not been shown on the murder. Johnson pled guilty to murder in the second degree evidence in the record. To support the capital specification, it must be and was imprisoned in Florida. While in prison, he wrote a possible for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt, on the letter to his sister, Susan Brunst, referring to her as “a perfect evidence viewed most favorably for the prosecution, that Johnson raped 10” and stating that he found her attractive. State v. Johnson, or kidnapped Brunst. There was no need for the state to prove separate animus because (1) either is sufficient in itself and (2) Johnson was not 643 N.E. 2d 1098, 1106 (Ohio 1994). convicted of either rape or kidnapping. 4 Johnson v. Coyle No. 97-4092 No. 97-4092 Johnson v. Coyle 13

B. The Charged Conduct evidence. Four witnesses testified that Brunst told them of the Thanksgiving Sunday, 1989, rape attempt. The Ohio Johnson was released from prison in 1989 and moved back Supreme Court ruled that the testimony of three of these to Akron, Ohio, where he lived with his mother and younger witnesses was erroneously-admitted hearsay, see Johnson, brother, Thomas Johnson. Johnson’s sister, Susan Brunst, 643 N.E. 2d at 1104–05, but held that Cook’s testimony fell also lived in Akron. She was involved with a married man, within the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay Ron Cook. exclusion, id. at 1104. However, “‘where the evidence offered by the State and admitted by the trial court—whether Brunst told several friends that on the Sunday after erroneously or not—would have been sufficient to sustain a Thanksgiving, 1989, Johnson tried to rape her in her jury verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude apartment. The friends testified that according to Brunst, retrial.’” United States v. Quinn, 901 F.2d 522, 530 (6th Cir. Johnson told her he wanted to “lick her pussy,” held a knife 1990) (quoting Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34 (1988)). to her throat, pulled up her shirt, touched her breasts, and Accordingly, for the purposes of this appeal we consider the attempted to carry her to the bedroom, but that she was able evidence from all four witnesses. Brunst’s body was found to talk him out of raping her. After this incident, Brunst told nude, and the prosecution also presented evidence that her daughter, Cynthia, not to be alone with Johnson, and Johnson wrote to Brunst from prison expressing his attraction Brunst and Cook ceased socializing with him. Johnson later to her. admitted to police that on that Sunday he heard Brunst talking on the telephone to a woman he was interested in, telling her Viewing all of the evidence presented at trial in the light that Johnson had been in prison and that he was kinky. most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could have Johnson said that he fought with Brunst and wanted to scare found beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson killed Brunst her, but denied that he tried to rape her. during or immediately after raping or attempting to rape her. Allowing the state to argue a capital specification based on Johnson was treated briefly at Fallsview Psychiatric rape will not subject Johnson to double jeopardy. Hospital in February 1990. Johnson’s family apparently attempted to have him committed at that time, but the court In Ohio, kidnapping is defined as the forceful removal or released him after three days. Johnson was angry at the restraint of another in order to to hold the victim for ransom family, particularly his brother and Brunst, for trying to or as a hostage or shield, to facilitate the commission of a commit him, and told his brother that nobody would get away felony, to terrorize or inflict serious physical harm on the with “putting him away like that.” victim or another, or to engage in sexual activity against the victim’s will. There is no evidence that Johnson sought A woman who lived with Johnson’s aunt, Donna Gray, ransom for Brunst or used her as a shield or hostage. testified that Johnson spent every weekend at Gray’s house in Therefore, no rational jury could have found that Johnson Diamond, Ohio, to drive his Jeep on trails there. On May 27, committed kidnapping under subsection (1) of Ohio Rev. 1990, Johnson took several relatives and friends with him and Code Ann. § 2905.01(A). However, he may have removed showed them a trail off of Jones Road, behind the post office, her from her apartment to facilitate killing her or to terrorize that he had discovered the day before. Brunst’s body was or harm her, or he may have restrained her liberty to engage eventually found near this trail. Johnson did not visit Gray in sexual relations against her will. the weekend that Brunst disappeared. 12 Johnson v. Coyle No. 97-4092 No. 97-4092 Johnson v. Coyle 5

the place where he is found or restrain him of his liberty, On Friday, June 1, 1990, Brunst and Cook argued at her for any of the following purposes: apartment. Brunst told Cook that she planned to spend the (1) To hold for ransom, or as a shield or hostage; weekend drunk. She drank and smoked marijuana with a (2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight friend that evening, then went to the East Akron Eagles Club, thereafter; where she had two more drinks and left for home at (3) To terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on approximately 11:00 p.m. Johnson entered the Eagles Club the victim or another; with James Westberg about fifteen minutes after Brunst left. (4) To engage in sexual activity, as defined in section The barmaid told Johnson that he had just missed his sister 2907.01 of the Revised Code, with the victim against his and that she was drunk. Later, Johnson went to the pay phone will. and, on his return, stated that he got no answer at Brunst’s house, but that he was sure she made it home safely and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.01(A) (“Kidnapping”). would check on her the next morning. Cook, who was out of town, also tried to call Brunst several times that night. At (A) “Sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse midnight, Brunst answered. After a brief argument, Cook between a male and female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and hung up, but immediately called again. Brunst told Cook that cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, she was alone, that she was going to be sick, and that she had without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, to go. Cook called a third time “almost immediately,” but got of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or no answer. other object into the vaginal or anal cavity of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete Johnson and Westberg left the Eagles Club in Johnson’s red vaginal or anal intercourse. Jeep at 1:00 a.m., when the club closed. Johnson said he (B) “Sexual contact” means any touching of an wanted to check on his sister, so he drove to her apartment. erogenous zone of another, including without limitation Johnson went into Brunst’s apartment with a Budweiser beer the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person can. While Johnson was inside, Westberg got out of the Jeep is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing and vomited for about ten minutes. Johnson came back or gratifying either person. outside without his beer, and the two drove to the apartment (C) “Sexual activity” means sexual conduct or sexual complex where they both lived. Johnson told Westberg that contact, or both. Brunst was drunk and vomiting, naked, with the door wide open, and referred to her repeatedly as a “stupid bitch.” When Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.01 (in relevant part). he pulled up at their apartment building, Johnson did not stop the engine. Johnson was still in the Jeep with the engine The prosecution presented evidence that Johnson had been running when Westberg entered his apartment. At 4:30 that convicted of murdering Hutchinson in 1984, that her body morning, another neighbor, who was returning home, saw was found with semen in the vagina, and that she would not Johnson leaving the apartment complex in his red Jeep. On have consented to sexual relations with Johnson, see Johnson, Saturday, June 2, Johnson did not show up for work. A 643 N.E. 2d at 1105. Johnson viewed both women as sisters, coworker testified that before that day, Johnson had never both had angered him, and in both cases he appears to have missed work. reacted with sexual violence toward the source of his anger and rejection. The similarity of the two cases suggests a Cook went to Brunst’s apartment at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday, pattern, which a rational jury might have inferred from the June 2, 1990, and found the door open. He found an address 6 Johnson v. Coyle No. 97-4092 No. 97-4092 Johnson v. Coyle 11

book and a small jewelry box outside the door, but there was The Ohio Supreme Court held that purposeful killing is not no sign of a struggle. Cook testified that some of the clothes an element of the Florida second-degree murder statute and, he saw Brunst wearing the day before were there, but that he consequently, that Johnson’s “1984 Florida conviction of found only one of the pink socks that she had been wearing. second-degree murder was insufficient to prove the R.C. Cook found a Budweiser can in the bedroom. Cook handled 2929.04(A)(5) aggravating circumstance.” See State v. many items, cleaned up the vomit around the toilet, and Johnson, 643 N.E. 2d 1098, 1103–04 (Ohio, 1994). generally spoiled the apartment as a crime scene. An Akron “Whereas an appellate court on habeas review decides federal detective interviewed Cook at the apartment that evening. law questions de novo . . . , the federal reviewing court is generally bound by state court interpretations of state law.” Akron police interviewed Johnson several times after Caldwell v. Russell, 181 F.3d 731, 735-36, (6th Cir. 1999) Brunst was reported missing. On June 3, 1990, Johnson (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431 (1983), and admitted that he had left his beer can at Brunst’s apartment. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)). Accordingly, On June 5, Johnson spoke of Brunst in the past tense and told we defer to the Ohio Supreme Court and hold that there was police that although he was not guilty of the murder, he might insufficient evidence to prove the specific intent capital as well confess and get it over with because his family was specification. trying to slander him. He said that he had learned from his mother and his aunt Donna that Brunst’s body had been D. Sufficiency of the Evidence re: Rape/Kidnapping moved twice; that Brunst had never been in his Jeep; that he Capital Specification killed Brunst for sex, drugs, and money; and that while he was in prison in Florida he discussed committing the perfect Again, under Ohio law, “[i]mposition of the death penalty crime with Ted Bundy. On June 8, Johnson maintained eye for aggravated murder is precluded unless one or more of the contact with the police officer who was questioning him until following is specified in the indictment or count in the he was asked about Brunst. During June 1990, Johnson sold indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code his car, told his landlady that he was moving out, and refused and proved beyond a reasonable doubt:” to help his family look for Brunst. .... On June 27, 1990, a Portage County deputy sheriff found what later proved to be Brunst’s nude body, badly (7) The offense was committed while the offender was decomposed, near Jones Road in Diamond, Ohio. The deputy committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing coroner concluded that “homicidal violence” was involved. immediately after committing or attempting to commit Near the body, police found a pink sock matching the one kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, found at Brunst’s apartment, a pair of panties of the kind or aggravated burglary, and either the offender was the Brunst wore, and a piece of carpet torn from Johnson’s truck. principal offender in the commission of the aggravated In an attempt to identify the body, Portage County deputy murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the sheriffs interviewed Johnson, who happened to be the first aggravated murder with prior calculation and design. relative they were able to contact. Johnson told the deputies that they might as well charge him because everyone thought Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(A) (in relevant part). that he killed Brunst. No person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case of a victim under the age of thirteen or mentally incompetent, by any means, shall remove another from 10 Johnson v. Coyle No. 97-4092 No. 97-4092 Johnson v. Coyle 7

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence re: Specific Intent Capital On June 29, 1990, Akron detectives again interviewed Specification Johnson. The first thing Johnson said to the officers was “I’m the killer,” and he dared them to arrest him. Johnson gave the Under Ohio law, “[i]mposition of the death penalty for officers several accounts of the murder, saying he bludgeoned aggravated murder is precluded unless one or more of the Brunst with a tire iron, then that he stabbed her, and finally following is specified in the indictment or count in the that he shot her, referring to Brunst throughout as a “bitch” indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and a “whore.” None of the accounts of the murder itself and proved beyond a reasonable doubt:” were plausible in light of the lack of evidence of traumatic injury to the recovered body, although in each case Johnson .... said that he dumped the body behind the post office in Diamond. On June 30, 1990, Akron police officers arrested (5) Prior to the offense at bar, the offender was Johnson. At his arraignment, Johnson stated that he was tired convicted of an offense an essential element of which of it all and just wanted to plead guilty. was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct II involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender. Johnson argues that there is insufficient evidence that Brunst was a victim of homicide at all; that even if there is Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(A) (in relevant part). evidence that he killed Brunst, there is insufficient evidence that the killing was a result of prior calculation and design; A person acts purposely when it is his specific that there is insufficient evidence that Brunst’s death was intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the connected with rape; and that there is insufficient evidence offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain that Brunst’s death was connected with kidnapping. Although nature, regardless of what the offender intends to the Ohio Supreme Court found reversible error in Johnson’s accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage trial, and even though that court several times referred to the in conduct of that nature. evidence as “weak” or as “not overwhelming,” it stopped short of holding that the evidence was insufficient to support Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.22(A). a conviction. See State v. Johnson, 643 N.E. 2d 1098 (Ohio 1994). There is no evidence that Johnson killed or attempted to kill more than one person in the case now before us. The statute When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the under which he was previously convicted in Florida states: evidence to support a conviction, we inquire “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the The unlawful killing of a human being, when prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 1990) (en although without any premeditated design to effect the banc); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). death of any particular individual, is murder in the second degree . . . . Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04(2) (in relevant part). 8 Johnson v. Coyle No. 97-4092 No. 97-4092 Johnson v. Coyle 9

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence re: Murder death”).1 We held above that a rational jury could, on the evidence in the record, find beyond a reasonable doubt that “No person shall purposely cause the death of another . . . .” Johnson killed Brunst. Unless that jury were to find that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.02 (“Murder”). Viewing the Johnson killed Brunst on his first visit, while Westberg was evidence most favorably to the prosecution, there is no doubt waiting outside, it must necessarily find that he returned to do that a rational jury could have found that Johnson killed it. While it is possible that he could have returned with pure Brunst. Johnson is the last person known to have seen Brunst motives and, once he was there, killed Brunst in a moment of alive. He was angry with her just after he saw her. He sat in passion, (1) this does not seem likely, and (2) even if it is his running vehicle rather than enter his apartment when he possible, a rational jury might find, on the evidence presented, drove home. A neighbor saw him leaving home at 4:30 a.m. that he returned later to kill her after calculating and forming the morning Brunst disappeared. Brunst’s nude body was a plan. found near an off-road trail Johnson had found days before Brunst disappeared. A piece of carpet from Johnson’s Jeep Johnson was mad at Brunst when he and Westberg left her was found near the body. Johnson, who had a perfect work apartment at approximately 1:30 a.m. He displayed no attendance record, did not show up for work the morning after injuries, and there was no sign of a struggle at Brunst’s Brunst disappeared, similar to his behavior after the apartment. These facts suggest that there was no “triggering Hutchinson murder. Johnson did not visit his aunt in event” to ignite Johnson’s passions after he returned. If Diamond that weekend, as he had done every weekend for a Brunst was alive when Johnson left her apartment at year. Johnson sold the vehicle that the piece of carpet was approximately 1:30 a.m., and he killed her later, it was most taken from. Johnson told his landlady he was going to move likely with “prior calculation and design.” out and asked to have his security deposit returned. He began to behave erratically and suspiciously in general. He On the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could confessed to the murder several times. He referred to his believe that Brunst was alive when Johnson left at 1:30 a.m., sister in the past tense before she was known to be dead. He and that he returned intending to kill her. Therefore, the sustained eye contact with detectives until they asked about evidence in the record, viewed most favorably to the Brunst. Although circumstantial, this evidence is substantial. prosecution, could lead a rational jury to conclude that, “Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a beyond a reasonable doubt, Johnson killed Brunst “with prior conviction, and ‘[i]t is not necessary for the evidence to calculation and design.” There was sufficient evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.’” convict him of aggravated murder. United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 992 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334 (6th Cir. 1992)). The evidence presented against Johnson is certainly sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a 1 reasonable doubt that he killed Brunst. Causing the death of another “while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to B. Sufficiency of the Evidence re: Aggravated Murder commit, kidnapping[ or] rape,” which was alleged in Johnson’s indictment, also constitutes aggravated murder. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. “No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and § 2903.01(B). Because we hold that a rational jury could have found prior calculation and design, which is sufficient to support a conviction design, cause the death of another . . . .” Ohio Rev. Code for aggravated murder, we need not analyze the rape and kidnapping Ann. § 2903.01 (“Aggravated murder; specific intent to cause allegations here. See infra at 11-15, for our analysis of these allegations as a capital specification.