WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge.
This action was brought by Jesse L. Cooper, the owner of the towboat “Steve Click, Jr.,” against A. C. Johnson to recover the damages resulting from the sinking of the boat on July 3, 1947. It was alleged in the complaint (hat an agreement was entered into between plaintiff and defendant whereby plaintiff leased and chartered the boat to defendant to be moved from Memphis, Tennessee, where she was lying moored in the Wolf River, and used by defendant in the towing service in the waters of the Mississippi River in and around the Port of Helena, Arkansas, and that it was agreed that as soon as the vessel was inspected at the Customs House at Memphis, Tennessee, the defendant would take it in charge and move it to the Port of Helena, Arkansas, to engage in said towing service. That the vessel was inspected by the office of the United States Coast Guard and met all requirements and defendant reported at the Customs House and there signed as Master of the vessel and taking full charge thereof removed it to the Port of Helena, Arkansas, for the purpose of engaging in said business. That the agreement was that the defendant was to operate the boat in said towing service, and after paying all expenses incident to said operation was to pay plaintiff one-half of the net profits arising from said operation as rent for the towboat, and would at all times take the necessary steps to see that the boat was protected from the hazards of the river.1 That upon the arrival of the boat at the Port of Helena the defendant moored the same to the south end of the unloading and loading dock of the Helena Terminal, some fifty or seventy-five yards from the [938]*938shore, leaving the boat wholly unattended, without crew or watchman and without proper anchor lines, and as a result of the negligence of the defendant the boat sank, resulting in a total loss thereof to the plaintiff. “That the sinking of the boat was due to the negligence of the defendant in his failure to properly protect said boat by keeping a watchman thereon and by keeping the water pumped from the hull and by his failure to properly moor the boat to the shore.” Damages for the defendant’s negligence in permitting the boat to sink were prayed in the sum of $15,000. Defendant answered by specific and general denial of the allegations of the complaint. He admitted that the boat had been inspected at the office of the United States Coast Guard at Memphis and certified to meet the requirements of the inspection, and that he enrolled as Master of the boat, but stated that he had done so, “at the request of the plaintiff who could not qualify as a Master but that the service only extended to the trip from Memphis to Helena, terminating on the same day”, and he denied that the boat was at any time in his charge or that he was the Master of it except on the one day of that trip.
On plaintiff’s motion, with defendant’s consent, plaintiff’s request for jury trial was withdrawn and the case was transferred to the admiralty docket, to be tried by the court as an action in admiralty. The trial continued through six days, resulting in a long record of conflicting testimony, and at its conclusion the court made carefully prepared and complete findings of the facts2 [939]*939and concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover against defendant in the sum of $15,000. Judgment was entered accordingly and defendant has taken this appeal.
[940]*940Opinion.
The appellant here has not pointed out to us and argued in his brief any ruling made by the trial court or any declaration or application of law made by the court which he claims to have been erroneous in law and prejudicial to him. He has instead asserted and argued under five headings matters which lead to his "conclusion” that “The facts overwhelmingly prepoMerrate in favor of appellant’s innocence of negligence a'nd exercise of due diligence” and “appellee utterly failed to prove that appellant was guilty of negligence and liable for the sinking of the Steve Click, Jr. as charged.” While it is true that the case was transferred to the admiralty docket and tried as one in admiralty, it nowhere appears that any principle peculiar to maritime law was .invoked or applicable, and appellant asserts here in an assignment of error that “the relationship of the parties is such that their rights should be settled on principle other than that'of maritime .tort.” The case was determined as shown by the appended -findings and, conclusions of the trial court on the principle that one who takes over the personal property of another upon agreement to preserve it and restore it in as good condition as when received upon the happening of certain events is liable for the loss of the property so held by, him proximately caused by his negligence. The court found such taking over of the boat by defendant and negligence of defendant proximately causing its loss as facts shown by the evidence.
As appellant has made no point that the court’s findings do not fully sustain the judgment, and as the facts found manifestly do require the judgment entered in accord with them, it.is clear that whether the appeal is in admiralty or for review of a civil action tried to the court without a jury this court may not disturb the findings of facts of the trial court or reverse the judgment tmless the findings, or one or more of them, are clearly erroneous. The rule governing appeals in admiralty cases in this respect is the same as in appeals from judgments in civil actions tried by the court. In Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. New York [941]*941Central R. Co., 2 Cir., 126 F.2d 992, at pages 994, 995, the court said:
“Even before the promulgation of Admiralty Rule 46% in June, 1930, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723 (281 U.S. 773) the decisions were legion that when a judge had seen and heard the witnesses his conclusions would prevail unless clearly wrong. We had repeatedly so held. The Jersey City, 2 Cir., 51 F. 527; The Albany, 2 Cir., 81 F. 966, 968 (semble) ; the A. G. Brower, 2 Cir., 220 F. 648; The F. B. Squire, 2 Cir., 248 F. 469; Donovan v. New York Trap Rock Co.,
2 Cir., 271 F. 308; The Perry Setzer, 2 Cir., 299 F. 586; United States Mexican Oil Corporation v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 20 F.2d 385; The James McWilliams, 2 Cir., 42 F.2d 130; The Cullen No. 32, 2 Cir., 62 F.2d 68. And when the question came up after Rule 46% was passed, express findings were naturally accorded the same finality as implicit findings had been given before. Lillig v. Union Sulphur Co., 9 Cir., 87 F.2d 277; The Berwindglen, 1 Cir., 88 F.2d 125; Eastern Tar Products Co. v. Chesapeake Oil Transport Co., 4 Cir., 101 F.2d 30; City of Cleveland v. McIver, 6 Cir., 109 F.2d 69; Commercial Molasses Corp. v.
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WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge.
This action was brought by Jesse L. Cooper, the owner of the towboat “Steve Click, Jr.,” against A. C. Johnson to recover the damages resulting from the sinking of the boat on July 3, 1947. It was alleged in the complaint (hat an agreement was entered into between plaintiff and defendant whereby plaintiff leased and chartered the boat to defendant to be moved from Memphis, Tennessee, where she was lying moored in the Wolf River, and used by defendant in the towing service in the waters of the Mississippi River in and around the Port of Helena, Arkansas, and that it was agreed that as soon as the vessel was inspected at the Customs House at Memphis, Tennessee, the defendant would take it in charge and move it to the Port of Helena, Arkansas, to engage in said towing service. That the vessel was inspected by the office of the United States Coast Guard and met all requirements and defendant reported at the Customs House and there signed as Master of the vessel and taking full charge thereof removed it to the Port of Helena, Arkansas, for the purpose of engaging in said business. That the agreement was that the defendant was to operate the boat in said towing service, and after paying all expenses incident to said operation was to pay plaintiff one-half of the net profits arising from said operation as rent for the towboat, and would at all times take the necessary steps to see that the boat was protected from the hazards of the river.1 That upon the arrival of the boat at the Port of Helena the defendant moored the same to the south end of the unloading and loading dock of the Helena Terminal, some fifty or seventy-five yards from the [938]*938shore, leaving the boat wholly unattended, without crew or watchman and without proper anchor lines, and as a result of the negligence of the defendant the boat sank, resulting in a total loss thereof to the plaintiff. “That the sinking of the boat was due to the negligence of the defendant in his failure to properly protect said boat by keeping a watchman thereon and by keeping the water pumped from the hull and by his failure to properly moor the boat to the shore.” Damages for the defendant’s negligence in permitting the boat to sink were prayed in the sum of $15,000. Defendant answered by specific and general denial of the allegations of the complaint. He admitted that the boat had been inspected at the office of the United States Coast Guard at Memphis and certified to meet the requirements of the inspection, and that he enrolled as Master of the boat, but stated that he had done so, “at the request of the plaintiff who could not qualify as a Master but that the service only extended to the trip from Memphis to Helena, terminating on the same day”, and he denied that the boat was at any time in his charge or that he was the Master of it except on the one day of that trip.
On plaintiff’s motion, with defendant’s consent, plaintiff’s request for jury trial was withdrawn and the case was transferred to the admiralty docket, to be tried by the court as an action in admiralty. The trial continued through six days, resulting in a long record of conflicting testimony, and at its conclusion the court made carefully prepared and complete findings of the facts2 [939]*939and concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover against defendant in the sum of $15,000. Judgment was entered accordingly and defendant has taken this appeal.
[940]*940Opinion.
The appellant here has not pointed out to us and argued in his brief any ruling made by the trial court or any declaration or application of law made by the court which he claims to have been erroneous in law and prejudicial to him. He has instead asserted and argued under five headings matters which lead to his "conclusion” that “The facts overwhelmingly prepoMerrate in favor of appellant’s innocence of negligence a'nd exercise of due diligence” and “appellee utterly failed to prove that appellant was guilty of negligence and liable for the sinking of the Steve Click, Jr. as charged.” While it is true that the case was transferred to the admiralty docket and tried as one in admiralty, it nowhere appears that any principle peculiar to maritime law was .invoked or applicable, and appellant asserts here in an assignment of error that “the relationship of the parties is such that their rights should be settled on principle other than that'of maritime .tort.” The case was determined as shown by the appended -findings and, conclusions of the trial court on the principle that one who takes over the personal property of another upon agreement to preserve it and restore it in as good condition as when received upon the happening of certain events is liable for the loss of the property so held by, him proximately caused by his negligence. The court found such taking over of the boat by defendant and negligence of defendant proximately causing its loss as facts shown by the evidence.
As appellant has made no point that the court’s findings do not fully sustain the judgment, and as the facts found manifestly do require the judgment entered in accord with them, it.is clear that whether the appeal is in admiralty or for review of a civil action tried to the court without a jury this court may not disturb the findings of facts of the trial court or reverse the judgment tmless the findings, or one or more of them, are clearly erroneous. The rule governing appeals in admiralty cases in this respect is the same as in appeals from judgments in civil actions tried by the court. In Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. New York [941]*941Central R. Co., 2 Cir., 126 F.2d 992, at pages 994, 995, the court said:
“Even before the promulgation of Admiralty Rule 46% in June, 1930, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723 (281 U.S. 773) the decisions were legion that when a judge had seen and heard the witnesses his conclusions would prevail unless clearly wrong. We had repeatedly so held. The Jersey City, 2 Cir., 51 F. 527; The Albany, 2 Cir., 81 F. 966, 968 (semble) ; the A. G. Brower, 2 Cir., 220 F. 648; The F. B. Squire, 2 Cir., 248 F. 469; Donovan v. New York Trap Rock Co.,
2 Cir., 271 F. 308; The Perry Setzer, 2 Cir., 299 F. 586; United States Mexican Oil Corporation v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 20 F.2d 385; The James McWilliams, 2 Cir., 42 F.2d 130; The Cullen No. 32, 2 Cir., 62 F.2d 68. And when the question came up after Rule 46% was passed, express findings were naturally accorded the same finality as implicit findings had been given before. Lillig v. Union Sulphur Co., 9 Cir., 87 F.2d 277; The Berwindglen, 1 Cir., 88 F.2d 125; Eastern Tar Products Co. v. Chesapeake Oil Transport Co., 4 Cir., 101 F.2d 30; City of Cleveland v. McIver, 6 Cir., 109 F.2d 69; Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 2 Cir., 114 F.2d 248, 250; The S. C. L. No. 9,
3 Cir., 114 F.2d 964; The Bellatrix, 3 Cir., 114 F.2d 1004; McAllister Bros. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 118 F.2d 45; Johnson v. Andrus, 2 Cir., 119 F.2d 287; United States Gypsum Co. v. Conners Marine Co., 2 Cir., 119 F.2d 689.”
In The C. W. Crane, 2 Cir., 155 F.2d 940, 941, the same court said:
“This appeal represents one more effort to induce us in an admiralty case to disregard the trial judge’s findings of fact although supported by evidence, where the testimony is in conflict, and where he heard and saw most of the witnesses — something which we have repeatedly said we would not do.” Citing cases.
The rule as to review of findings of fact in appeals in civil actions is stated and the cases are cited for this court in Hudspeth v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 8 Cir., 170 F.2d 418.
Notwithstanding the appellant here has not pointed in his brief to any specific findings of fact made by the district court asserted to be unsupported by testimony, we have carefully examined all the evidence and made comparison with the trial court’s findings. We are satisfied that each of the findings is supported by credible testimony or documentary evidence and that none is clearly erroneous. It is of no importance that another trier of the facts might have taken a different view of the evidence and might have drawn different inferences from the whole or particular parts thereof, no-r would it serve a useful end to discuss such possible inferences tending to relieve the appellant from liability. The district court’s findings supported by evidence must control decision here.
The record herein shows that some five months after the entry of the judgment in the district court and the taking of this appeal, the plaintiff filed a motion in the district court for a new trial with leave to take additional newly discovered evidence and that the court, on consideration of the motion and affidavits attached thereto and counter affidavits, found that there were no errors of law appearing on the face of the record in the casé and that the new facts discovered since the decree would not materially affect the decree or probably induce a different result and overruled the motion. Beyond including said proceedings in the record here appellant has made no reference to them in his brief. They were directed to the sound discretion of the court and no abuse of such discretion is shown and the court’s denial of the motion is not the subject of appeal. Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 300 U.S. 131, loc. cit. 137, 57 S.Ct. 382, 81 L.Ed 557.
The judgment is in accord with the findings and as there are no grounds upon which the findings may be upset, the judgment should be and it is:
Affirmed.