Johnson v. City of Yonkers

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Johnson v. City of Yonkers

262 A.D.2d 563, 691 N.Y.S.2d 789, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6952

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided June 21, 1999·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

—In a proceeding to declare that the petitioner complied with General Municipal Law §§ 50-h and 50-i and may therefore serve a summons and complaint against the City of Yonkers, the City of Yonkers appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nicolai, J.), entered July 8, 1998, which granted the application and denied its cross motion for a declaration precluding the petitioner from commencing an action against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

A potential plaintiff who has not complied with General Municipal Law § 50-h is precluded from commencing an action against a municipality (see, Arcila v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 231 AD2d 660). Upon our review of the record, we agree with the Supreme Court that the petitioner sufficiently complied with the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-h at the hearing conducted pursuant thereto, and thus, she should be allowed to serve a summons and complaint against the appellant. Bracken, J. P., Thompson, Goldstein, McGinity and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

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—In a proceeding to declare that the petitioner complied with General Municipal Law §§ 50-h and 50-i and may therefore serve a summons and complaint against the City of Yonkers, the City of Yonkers appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nicolai, J.), entered July 8, 1998, which granted the application and denied its cross motion for a declaration precluding the petitioner from commencing an action against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

A potential plaintiff who has not complied with General Municipal Law § 50-h is precluded from commencing an action against a municipality (see, Arcila v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 231 AD2d 660). Upon our review of the record, we agree with the Supreme Court that the petitioner sufficiently complied with the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-h at the hearing conducted pursuant thereto, and thus, she should be allowed to serve a summons and complaint against the appellant. Bracken, J. P., Thompson, Goldstein, McGinity and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

Johnson v. City of Yonkers, 262 A.D.2d 563, 691 N.Y.S.2d 789, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6952 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

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