Johnson v. City of New York

152 Misc. 2d 576, 578 N.Y.S.2d 977, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 727
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 30, 1991
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 152 Misc. 2d 576 (Johnson v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. City of New York, 152 Misc. 2d 576, 578 N.Y.S.2d 977, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 727 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1991).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, J.

This article 78 proceeding seeks a judgment annulling a [577]*577determination that petitioner is not eligible for an apartment in the building located at 41 Convent Avenue, New York, N. Y. (the Building); ordering that the petitioner’s application for an apartment be granted; ordering respondents Commissioners of Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) and Division of Alternative Management Programs (DAMP) to promulgate written guidelines concerning the renting of vacant apartments in DAMP-administered buildings; and staying respondents from renting any apartments that are now vacant pending determination of this motion.

Respondents New York City (City), HPD and DAMP (collectively, the Municipal Respondents) cross-move for an order dismissing the petition as to them in its entirety and denying petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

Respondents 41 Convent Avenue Tenants’ Association (Tenants’ Association) and Sophie Johnson oppose the petition and petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction on the ground, among others, that petitioner is not financially able to pay the required rent on an apartment in the Building and thus is not eligible for an apartment in the Building.

Petitioner Alvis Johnson resides with her mother and two adult brothers at 41 Convent Avenue, apt. 2A, New York, New York. She claims she wants to move because her mother’s apartment does not provide sufficient space to accommodate her. Petitioner is a recipient of public assistance.

HPD is the agency responsible for administering housing acquired through in rem tax foreclosures by the City. DAMP, a division of HPD, oversees the management of certain of these in rem buildings by private organizations under an alternative management program known as the Tenant’s Interim Lease program (TIL). Under TIL, tenants are given responsibility for managing their own buildings with the goal to eventually purchase their buildings from the City as low-income cooperatives. The purpose of the TIL program is to provide low- and moderate-income tenants with the opportunity to own affordable housing.

Respondent Tenants’ Association is a participant in TIL in respect of the Building. As such the Tenants’ Association entered into an agreement with the City, commonly referred to as an "Interim Lease”, whereby the Tenants’ Association agreed to perform general management services for the Building. Through its tenant selection committee, the Tenants’ [578]*578Association rents vacant apartments in the Building to tenants. Persons accepted as tenants must entér into written leases with the Tenants’ Association. Each and every such lease must be approved by HPD and is subject to the terms of the Interim Lease. Under the TIL program HPD provides a building coordinator who monitors the financial requirements of the Tenants’ Association and assists in the solution of tenant problems so the Building may be in compliance with the provisions of the Interim Lease and the TIL program.

In October 1987 petitioner submitted a written application to the Tenants’ Association for the next available apartment in the front of the Building. She was screened by the Tenants’ Association screening committee. Petitioner was not offered an apartment notwithstanding that a number of apartments in the Building had become vacant. She alleges that two of the vacant apartments were given to friends or relatives of HPD employees and committee members, respectively. She alleges she was told by Ms. Samuels, a member of the screening committee, that she (petitioner) was not considered eligible for an apartment because she is a single woman.

In opposition, the Tenants’ Association claims that petitioner cannot afford to pay the rent on an apartment in the Building because she is on public assistance. Petitioner received no written statement declaring that her application was rejected or explaining why she was not chosen for any of the vacant apartments.

On December 18, 1990 the court ordered a stay of rental of apartment 3K pending hearing of this proceeding.

The Municipal Respondents assert that under the TIL program they are not involved in the management of the Building and the acceptance of prospective tenants by the Tenants’ Association and petitioner thus has not established a recognizable due process claim against the City that would require it to promulgate guidelines for tenant screening committees. Notwithstanding that the TIL program is transitory in nature, however, the court finds that the City is so entwined with the conduct of the tenants’ associations under that program as to constitute significant and meaningful governmental participation triggering constitutional due process guarantees (157 W. 123rd St. Tenants Assn. v Hickson, 142 Misc 2d 984; see generally, Matter of Fuller v Urstadt, 28 NY2d 315, 318). In this regard the court notes that the Tenants’ Association is controlled by HPD. The Tenants’ Association is required to [579]*579submit monthly reports to HPD; HPD may also inspect the Building’s leases, records and bills without prior notice to the Tenants’ Association; the Tenants’ Association is required to maintain a bank account "established in a manner satisfactory to HPD and shall grant HPD the authority, acting alone and at any time to withdraw funds from the account or to prohibit the withdrawal of funds from the Account by [the Tenants’ Association] or its designee”. HPD’s regulatory control of this Building is not limited to fiscal matters; HPD reserves the right to initiate holdover proceedings to remove problem tenants and it is required that HPD approve each and every rental agreement.

"As a general rule, where the State (or city) ' "has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence” with a [housing] program or project, the program or project "cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private’ as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment” ’ ” (157 W. 123rd St. Tenants Assn. v Hickson, 142 Misc 2d 984, 985, supra, quoting Matter of Fuller v Urstadt, 28 NY2d 315, 318, supra). The court finds that HPD’s involvement with the TIL program is sufficient to constitute State action and the Municipal Respondents’ motion to dismiss this proceeding as against them on the grounds that the TIL program does not rise to the level of HPD involvement and does not require the promulgation of regulations by HPD is denied.

HPD is bound by statute and the terms of its own Interim Lease agreements not to discriminate against tenants or prospective tenants on the basis of marital status. For example, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice: "[t]o discriminate against any person because of such person’s race, creed, color, national origin, sex, age or marital status in terms, conditions or privileges of any publicly-assisted housing accommodations or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith.” (Administrative Code of City of New York § 8-107 [3] [b].) The term "publicly-assisted accommodations” specifically includes "[h]ousing operated by housing companies under the supervision of the state commissioner of housing and community renewal, or the department of housing preservation and development” (Administrative Code § 8-102 [11] [b]).

Furthermore, HPD requires lessees of in rem housing to adopt nondiscriminatory practices.

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Related

In Re Marcano
288 B.R. 324 (S.D. New York, 2003)
Johnson v. City of New York
192 A.D.2d 352 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
152 Misc. 2d 576, 578 N.Y.S.2d 977, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 727, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-city-of-new-york-nysupct-1991.